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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
THE FILMIC 
 
“[T]he more we consume moving images, the more the single still image rises above the rest, 
substituting itself for our reality.” – Gisèle Freund1 
 
“There is nothing in the structural logic of the cinema filmstrip that precludes sequestering any 
single image. A still photograph is simply an isolated frame taken out of the infinite cinema.” – 
Hollis Frampton
2
 
 
 Larry Gottheim’s film Fog Line (1970) begins with a still shot of a landscape covered in 
dense fog. All that can be seen through the fog are the outlines of a few trees intersected by four 
high-tension wires. The setting is subtly beautiful, and the complete lack of sound creates a space 
for meditation. Minutes pass. Apart from some slight shaking, the camera does not move, nor do 
any elements within the mise-en-scène. The trees and telephone wires become easier to make out 
as the fog lifts, although the fog’s retreat is so gradual, its movement is not perceived by the 
viewer. After 11 minutes of the same motionless shot, the film abruptly ends (see Figure 1). 
During my first viewing, I found Fog Line simultaneously boring and absorbing. I was 
bored because, on a superficial level, nothing happened. Yet I was fascinated because I had never 
encountered a film like this before. It was so still, so uneventful, I felt like I was staring at a 
photograph or a painting for several minutes rather than watching a movie. 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in Raymond Bellour, “Concerning ‘The Photographic’” (trans. Chris Darke), in Still Moving: Between 
Cinema and Photography, eds. Karen Beckman and Jean Ma (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 270.  
2
 Hollis Frampton, On the Camera Arts and Consecutive Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton, ed. Bruce 
Jenkins (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 134. 
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Figure 1: Larry Gottheim, Fog Line (1970)  
  
 When I watched Fog Line a second time, I realized that there was actually more 
movement than I had initially registered. At one point, several minutes into the film, barely 
visible grainy shadows (in actuality, horses) slowly wander from one side of the landscape to the 
other. (Gottheim had intentionally selected this location for his film because of the horses that 
regularly moved through it.) At another point, a small, almost indiscernible bird quickly flies 
above the wires. Like most viewers, I had missed these developments in my first careful 
viewing; it was as if the prolonged inertia had tricked my mind into thinking I was looking at a 
still. I was unable to easily detect the minimal motion within the shot since, after the first few 
minutes of stasis, I was no longer expecting movement of any kind. Scott MacDonald describes 
the spectatorial experience engendered by Fog Line cogently: “For a few moments at the 
beginning of the film, viewers cannot be sure that the image they’re looking at is a motion 
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picture. Indeed, it is only once the fog has thinned enough for an identification of the image to be 
possible that we can recognize that something other than the movie projector—the fog itself—is 
moving.”3 
 While Fog Line is a remarkable and unique cinematic experience, it is not without 
predecessors, nor is it without successors. In fact, it places itself in a rich and variegated tradition 
which I will call the cinema of stasis. Static films
4
 offer radical challenges to conventional 
conceptions of cinema, since they are ostensibly motion pictures without motion. In most films, 
an impression of movement is provided either by the motion of the camera or the motion of 
elements within the mise-en-scène—usually both. In contrast, static films generally feature no 
camera movement, as well as little or no movement within the frame. Instead, these films 
foreground stasis and consequently blur the lines between traditional visual art and motion 
pictures.
5
  
 It should be noted that the term movement is polysemous and is sometimes used in a 
broader sense than what I have in mind here. For example, Gilles Deleuze suggests that 
movement can be achieved in film, not only through the motion of the camera or elements in the 
frame, but also through montage, which he claims “allows the achievement of a pure mobility 
extracted from the movements of characters.”6 As the Oxford English Dictionary indicates, 
movement can refer to “a change in place or position,” and by this definition any cinematic 
montage (even a montage of still shots) would constitute movement. However, movement can 
                                                 
3
 Scott MacDonald, The Garden in the Machine: A Field Guide to Independent Films about Place (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 9. 
4
 My use of the term static film should not be confused with Dadaist Raoul Hausmann’s, who uses the appellation to 
refer to photomontage. See Raoul Hausmann, “Photomontage,” in Photography in the Modern Era: European 
Documents and Critical Writings, 1913-1940, ed. Christopher Phillips (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art and 
Aperture, 1989), 179.  
5
 For lack of a better term, I will use the term traditional visual art to refer to sketches, paintings, photographs, 
sculptures, and other historically “static” visual arts.  
6
 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 25. 
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also designate “the action or process of moving,”7 and it is this more specific definition that I 
have in mind. In other words, a film that engages in montage can still be considered a static film 
for my purposes, so long as the elements within the frame are static (as in, say, Chris Marker’s 
La jetée [The Jetty] [1962]). For while the spectator’s point of view is shifting “in place or 
position,” no “action or process of moving” is directly observed; in cases like these, the 
movement itself takes place off-camera.
8
  
 While individual static films have been the subject of scholarly attention, the cinema of 
stasis as a modality has not yet been adequately theorized. I want to remedy this by analyzing 
several subsets of static cinema—the furniture film, the protracted film, the textual film, and the 
monochrome film—drawing attention to the diversity and multivalence of cinematic stasis. I also 
want to attempt to answer several questions that are intrinsically posed by static films: Why take 
a medium uniquely positioned to create the illusion of movement and instead use it to create a 
quasi-photographic stasis? What forms of spectatorship are appropriate in approaching these 
works? And finally, what are the implications of these experiments for the ontology of film?  
 Of course, stasis has always played an important role in cinema’s ontology. Even in films 
that appear to offer constant movement, the ostensible motion is an illusion insofar as it is 
created by a series of still frames in quick succession.
9
 But beyond this, even the appearance of 
                                                 
7
 OED Online. November 2010. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
123031?redirectedFrom=movement. 
8
 Of course, Deleuze uses the French term mouvement; however, a similar polysemy inheres in this word as well. 
 I should briefly note that one could also conceptualize the constantly changing sound track of a film as a 
kind of auditory movement. While this dissertation will primarily explore stillness as a visual phenomenon, I will 
examine the relationship between visual and aural stasis in Chapter 3. 
9
 In the days of early cinema, it was widely believed that this illusion was the result of persistence of vision, a 
phenomenon produced by afterimages that would briefly persist on the retina and thus provide a false sense of 
continuity. While many film scholars and lecturers continue to parrot this view, Joseph and Barbara Anderson 
(among others) have exposed the numerous holes in this etiology, claiming that soon “only the creationists among us 
will cling to the myth of persistence of vision as an actual explanation of how movies come to be.” Instead, the 
Andersons present empirical research suggesting that the perception of cinematic movement can only be understood 
through the study of “short-range apparent motion.” See Joseph Anderson and Barbara Anderson, “The Myth of 
Persistence of Vision Revisited,” Journal of Film and Video 45, no. 1 (1993): 3-12. See also their essay “Motion 
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stasis on the screen is one that would have been familiar to cinema’s early spectators. As Tom 
Gunning has pointed out, in the Lumière brothers’ early exhibitions, “the films were initially 
presented as frozen unmoving images, projections of still photographs.”10 After a few moments 
of stasis, the projector would be put in motion and the “photograph” would become animated, 
much to the delight of the audience. For the Lumières, stasis served as a kind of counterpoint to 
the startling movement that would soon come. The prolonged dominance of the still created the 
expectation of a slide show before subverting this expectation and showcasing the new 
technology of the motion picture. But if some early audiences were tricked into expecting stasis, 
only to be surprised by movement, later audiences would come to expect movement from a film, 
only to be surprised by those rare exceptions to the rule: films that returned to the primordial 
stasis out of which motion pictures evolved.   
 The very existence of terms like movie, moving picture, and motion picture reveals just 
how central the impression of movement has been in conventional conceptions of cinema.
11
 
Indeed, many film theorists have problematically made movement the sine qua non of cinema. 
For example, in his 1934 essay “Motion,” Rudolf Arnheim claimed that “film is required by 
aesthetic law to use and interpret motion.”12 This presupposition was prevalent among many 
early filmmakers, even within the avant-garde (from which the cinema of stasis would eventually 
arise)—Germaine Dulac asserted, “Le cinéma est l’art du mouvement et de la lumière,”13 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Perception in Motion Pictures,” in The Cinematic Apparatus, ed. Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath (London: 
Macmillan, 1980), 76-95.  
10
 Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)credulous Spectator,” in Film Theory and 
Criticism, 6
th
 ed., eds. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 866. 
11
 This is not the case in all languages, however. As experimental filmmaker Takahiko Iimura has pointed out, in the 
Japanese word for film (eiga), “the emphasis is […] on the state of reflection rather than motion.” See Esperanza 
Collado, “Takahiko Iimura in Interview,” Experimental Conversations 5 (2009-2010), http://www. 
experimentalconversations.com/articles/484/takahiko-iimura-in-interview/. 
12
 Rudolf Arnheim, “Motion,” in Film as Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 181. 
13
 Quoted in Tom Gunning, “Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality,” differences: A 
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 18, no. 1 (2007): 38. 
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Slavko Vorkapich called movement “the fundamental principle of the cinema art: [cinema’s] 
language must be, first of all, a language of motions.”14 However, other avant-gardists, like 
Douglass Crockwell, were more cautious in their theorizations, problematizing the assumed 
centrality of movement to cinematic practice. For Crockwell, “Visually the motion picture is 
sequential art…Motion is but one of the incidental byproducts.”15 Along similar lines, Peter 
Kubelka has declared, “Cinema is not movement. Cinema is a projection of stills—which means 
images which do not move—in a very quick rhythm.”16 These theorizations serve as useful 
reminders that even in traditional motion pictures, stasis is always deeply embedded in the 
ontology of film. As Laura Mulvey points out, “[C]inema’s stillness [is] a projected film’s best-
kept secret,” albeit one that can now be exposed during home viewing through the use of the 
pause button.
17
  
 Such wildly divergent theorizations suggest an aporia at the heart of cinema’s ontology. 
On the one hand, many film theorists have insisted that the motion perceived in cinema is 
illusory, an optical trick or, in the memorable formulation of Surrealist Jean Goudal, “a 
conscious hallucination.” For Goudal, “The persistence of images on the retina, which is the 
physiological basis of cinema, claims to present movement to us with the actual continuity of the 
real; but in fact we know very well that it’s an illusion, a sensory device which does not 
                                                 
14
 Quoted in William C. Wees, Light Moving in Time: Studies in the Visual Aesthetics of Avant-Garde Film 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 12. 
15
 Quoted in Tom Gunning, “Machines That Give Birth to Images: Douglass Crockwell,” in Lovers of Cinema: The 
First American Film Avant-Garde, 1919-1945, ed. Jan-Christopher Horak (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1998), 343. Crockwell specifically had the Mutoscope in mind, which permitted the viewer to control the 
movement (or stasis) of the stills. However, his unorthodox definition of cinema remains useful, particularly since 
modern technologies (DVDs, computers, etc.) again give the viewer a certain amount of control over cinematic 
movement (with the ability to pause, as well as rewind and fast-forward at varying speeds). 
16
 Peter Kubelka, interview by Jonas Mekas, in Structural Film Anthology, ed. Peter Gidal (London: British Film 
Institute, 1978), 103. (The interview was originally published in the Spring 1967 issue of Film Culture.)  
17
 Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), 22. 
7 
 
 
 
completely fool us.”18 On the other hand, Christian Metz asserts, “In the cinema the impression 
of reality is also the reality of the impression, the real presence of motion.”19 Or in the words of 
Gunning, “I think there is little question that phenomenologically we see movement on the 
screen, not a ‘portrayal’ of movement.”20 
 Ultimately, the apparent disagreement may be primarily a semantic one. Asking whether 
cinematic movement is “real” is a bit like asking whether dreams are real. The answer is, yes and 
no. On the one hand, the experience itself is certainly real, and it can have tangible physiological 
effects on the dreamer (or spectator), including fear, excitement, arousal, etc. On the other hand, 
a chair in a dream is ontologically of a different order than a chair in real life, just as the 
movement in the Lumière brothers’ The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station (L'arrivée d'un 
train en gare de La Ciotat) (1895) is ontologically distinct from the arrival of an actual train. 
(Even the earliest cinematic spectators were aware of this distinction, urban legends 
notwithstanding.) Cinematic movement, unlike movement in the “real” world, is divisible into 
discrete units, traditionally 24 static frames per second. (The fact that actual motion is indivisible 
has been noted by many philosophers, most notably Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution.
21
) But 
this does not make the phenomenal perception of movement in motion pictures any less real. 
Philosopher J.L. Austin’s interrogation of the word real in Sense and Sensibilia is pertinent here: 
“When it isn’t a real duck but a hallucination, it may still be a real hallucination—as opposed, for 
                                                 
18
 Jean Goudal, “Surrealism and Cinema,” in The Shadow and Its Shadow: Surrealist Writings on the Cinema, 3rd 
ed., trans. and ed. Paul Hammond (San Francisco: City Light Books, 2000), 88-89. 
19
 Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema, trans. Michael Taylor (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974), 9. 
20
 Gunning, “Moving Away from the Index,” 44. 
21
 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Breinigsville, PA: Nabu Press, 2010). 
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instance, to a passing quirk of a vivid imagination.”22 So if the perception of a duck moving in a 
film is (as Goudal would have it) hallucinatory, the hallucination itself remains real.
23
 
 But whether we conceptualize cinematic movement as real or illusory, the question 
remains: How do we theorize films that forgo even the impression of movement, films in which 
stasis predominates? Can a motion picture exist without motion? In his essay “Fire and Ice,” 
Peter Wollen convincingly argues that “movement is not a necessary feature of film” (he 
references Chris Marker’s La jetée, a work made up almost entirely of photographic stills, to 
validate this claim).
24
 Tom Gunning also discusses the possibility of static films: “I think we can 
certainly conceive of films that exclude motion, made entirely of still images. Interestingly, 
many films that use still images seem to do so to comment on movement. Clearly, the dialectical 
relation between stillness and movement provides one of the richest uses of motion in film. But I 
think it would be an essentialist mistake to assume a film could not avoid cinematic motion, even 
if the examples of such are very rare and possibly debatable.”25 (Unfortunately, Gunning does 
not elaborate on what examples he has in mind.) The “dialectical relation between stillness and 
movement” has certainly been a critical element in cinematic praxis, stretching at least as far 
back as Edweard Muybridge’s invention of the zoopraxiscope in 1879, and the significance of 
this dialectic has been theorized perceptively, not only by Gunning himself, but by other film 
scholars as well. For example, Laura Mulvey has explored the pivotal role of stillness in Roberto 
Rossellini’s Journey to Italy (Viaggio in Italia) (1953) and Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960),26 
while Raymond Bellour has analyzed the use of the freeze frame in films like Dziga Vertov’s 
                                                 
22
 J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 69. 
23
 Deleuze makes much the same point in his first Cinema book through a series of rhetorical questions: “[I]s not the 
reproduction of the illusion in a certain sense also its correction? Can we conclude that the result is artificial because 
the means are artificial?” See Deleuze, Cinema 1, 2. For a more extensive analysis of the “reality” of cinematic 
movement, see Robert Sinnerbrink, New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images (London: Continuum, 2011), 28-44. 
24
 Peter Wollen, “Fire and Ice,” in The Cinematic, 112. 
25
 Gunning, “Moving Away from the Index,” 50. 
26
 Mulvey, 85-122. 
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Man with a Movie Camera (1929) and François Truffaut’s The 400 Blows (Les quatre cents 
coups) (1959).
27
 While I find these analyses useful, such scholarship generally focuses on 
momentary intrusions of stasis in films that are teeming with movement. However, I am more 
interested in interrogating films in which there is little to no movement, films in which stasis—
not motion—is the default setting. 
 Paul Schrader is one of the only writers who has directly acknowledged the existence of 
the cinema of stasis (what he calls “stasis films”). In his well known 1972 book, Transcendental 
Style in Film, Schrader discusses works like Michael Snow’s Wavelength (1967), Bruce Baillie’s 
Still Life (1966), and Stan Brakhage’s Song 27, My Mountain (1968), films which feature only 
minimal movement. Schrader also gives attention to the early films of Andy Warhol, such as 
Sleep (1963), Eat (1963), and Empire (1964). (I would classify all of the above as part of the 
cinema of stasis.) While I am thankful that Schrader draws attention to this modality, his analysis 
of static films is necessarily cursory, since his overriding concern is with “transcendental” films, 
works which progress from a state of movement to a state of stasis in order to evoke a sense of 
the spiritual (e.g. the films of Yasujirō Ozu and Robert Bresson). As Schrader himself correctly 
notes, “stasis films” are not merely “an extension of transcendental style,” but “a different breed 
of film altogether.”28  
 A more thorough theorization of stasis in cinema has been provided by the philosopher 
Noël Carroll. In his critique of Gregory Currie’s Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and 
Cognitive Science, Carroll argues that films can exist without offering the impression of 
                                                 
27
 Bellour, “Concerning ‘The Photographic,’” 253-276.  
28
 Paul Schrader, Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1972), 168. In contrast to the films Schrader focuses on (which shift from movement to stasis), Elena del Rio 
explores how the films of Rainer Werner Fassbinder often feature tableaux vivant which suddenly erupt into violent 
mobility. See Elena del Rio, Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance: Powers of Affection (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2008), 67-69. 
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movement. He provides several useful examples of films that withhold the illusion of movement, 
including Nagisa Ôshima’s Band of Ninja (1967), Hollis Frampton’s Poetic Justice (1972), and 
Michael Snow’s One Second in Montreal (1969). For Carroll, “These are all films in the sense 
that they were constructed and disseminated by means of standard film apparatuses. They 
command a significant place in film history where the question of ‘What is film?’ is part of an 
ongoing conversation internal to the filmworld—one addressed by filmmakers and theorists 
alike.”29 Carroll continues by offering a distinction between static films and works in other 
media that might involve a succession of stills (e.g. slide shows): “[Static] films use stasis as a 
stylistic choice. It is the fact that they are films that makes their stillness a pertinent, if not the 
pertinent, feature of the works in question. Had these films been slides, one would not remark 
upon their stillness. Movement is not a stylistic option with slides. But since these works are 
films, one is prompted to ask why there is no movement in them. What is the point? Any 
interpretation of these works has to offer an explanation of why the filmmakers under 
consideration have eschewed the possibility of movement.”30 To illustrate this point, consider 
Ôshima’s Band of Ninja, a work composed entirely of static comic-book-style sketches in black 
and white (paradoxically making it a kind of static animated film). Until Band of Ninja is over, it 
is conceivable that one of the sketched ninjas will become animated and begin to run from one 
end of the screen to the other. But it would be absurd to wonder if a drawing of Superman in an 
actual comic book might begin to fly from one frame to another, or to think that the image of 
Fred Astaire in a photograph might begin dancing.
31
 
                                                 
29
 Noël Carroll, “The Essence of Cinema?” Philosophical Studies 89, no. 2/3 (1998): 327. 
30
 Ibid, 327-328. 
31
 Philosopher Arthur C. Danto also makes this point in his essay “Moving Pictures.” He imagines screening a film 
in which the first page of Tolstoy’s War and Peace is displayed for eight hours and then projecting a slide of the 
same page for eight hours. He concludes that “a perfectly legitimate right [to expect movement] is frustrated in the 
case of the film, whereas there is no legitimate expectation either to be frustrated or gratified in the case of the 
11 
 
 
 
 What then are the implications of such works for conceptualizing film? As Carroll 
astutely suggests, traditional definitions of cinema that foreground the illusion of movement may 
represent a “de facto disenfranchisement of much of the history of avant-garde film.”32 For 
Carroll, what is critical is not that the illusion of movement is actually created in any given work, 
but only that “the relevant imagery be produced in a medium with the capacity to deliver 
movement,”33 that “the possibility of movement is always technically available.”34 Since 
potential movement is intrinsic to the cinematic apparatus, Carroll suggests that the label 
“moving picture” might be more useful than “film.”35 On this particular point, I find Carroll’s 
argument puzzling. While I have no serious reservations with calling, say, Snow’s One Second in 
Montreal a moving picture or a motion picture simply for ease of expression, strictly speaking, 
these would be misnomers, since Snow does not create any impression of movement in this 
work. Granted, it would be rather cumbersome to replace the term moving picture with picture in 
which the potential for movement is immanent. But it is misguided to suggest that only potential 
movement is implied by the traditional nomenclature. It seems rather like calling Stan 
Brakhage’s Dog Star Man (1964) a talkie, reasoning that, although the film is completely silent, 
the potential for sound and speech are always technically present. Such an appellation would be 
more than a little misleading. Consequently, I will refer to individual works within the cinema of 
stasis as films (static films, to be more precise) rather than movies, motion pictures, or moving 
pictures.
36
  
                                                                                                                                                             
slide.” See Danto, “Moving Pictures,” in Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology, eds. Noël Carroll 
and Jinhee Choi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 102.   
32
 Carroll, “The Essence of Cinema?” 330. 
33
 Ibid., 329. 
34
 Noël Carroll, “Defining the Moving Image,” in Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures, 126. 
35
 Ibid., 126. 
36
 Philosopher Robert Yanal also prefers the term film to moving picture, for similar reasons. See Robert Yanal, 
“Defining the Moving Image: A Response to Noël Carroll,” Film and Philosophy 12 (2008): 136-137. I will 
continue to use the term cinema in relation to these films, even though it is etymologically derived from the Greek 
12 
 
 
 
 But there is a far more serious problem with Carroll’s argument about cinematic 
movement. For Carroll, in order to qualify as a film, something must necessarily belong to “the 
class of things from which the impression of movement is technically possible.”37 Carroll’s 
definition usefully takes account of the existence of static films, since his emphasis is only on 
potential movement, whether or not this potential is actualized.  However, as Robert Yanal 
points out, Carroll’s definition is in need of further refinement. To illustrate his concern, Yanal 
borrows an idea from fellow philosopher Bruce Russell for a film called Spot, which only 
“projects a motionless spot of light, nothing more.”38 According to Yanal, “It is of course 
logically possible that Spot can, without any mechanical intervention, morph into Citizen Kane 
and thus begin to move. But is it technically possible that Spot—as it really is—can project 
motion? Not given real world conditions and laws. Carroll might respond that we don’t know 
that nothing moves in Spot until the end. True, but late knowledge is still knowledge, and this 
epistemic accident does not bear on the actual technical possibilities of Spot.”39 In other words, 
Yanal seems to suggest that motion—even potential motion—should not be considered a 
necessary condition of the cinema. To put it succinctly, “images move in most but not all 
films.”40 Granted, motion is normative in cinematic praxis—and this is precisely what gives 
static films their aesthetic force—but motion is no more a necessary condition of cinema than 
sound or color are. 
 To further illustrate this critical point, let us move out of the realm of the hypothetical 
and into the realm of the actual. In 1970, Michael Snow arranged the first screenings of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
word for movement (kiné), since in its modern connotation, cinema does not seem as inextricably tied to movement 
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conceptual work called A Casing Shelved, which was hailed by Jonas Mekas as “one of the great 
moments of cinema.”41 In this work, a slide of a bookcase (the same one that appears in 
Wavelength) is displayed, while Snow’s recorded voice is heard describing the objects that 
appear on it. As the voice describes an item, the viewer scans the bookcase to find it, so that, as 
Carroll points out, “the only movement” in this work is “the movement of our eyes.”42 Snow 
considers A Casing Shelved to be a film, even if it intentionally stretches our predefined notions 
of what “counts” as cinema, but Carroll takes issue with this designation: “I would argue that this 
‘film’ is not a film at all; to be a film, properly so called, requires the literal possibility of 
movement.”43 The problem here (to echo Yanal’s perspicacious rebuttal of this claim) is that 
there is no “literal possibility of movement” in many films. If I have already seen Ôshima’s Band 
of Ninja (or if I have read a detailed description of the film from a trusted source), then for all 
intents and purposes, I know there is no possibility of a ninja becoming animated and moving 
across the screen. It seems that what Carroll is ultimately suggesting is this: for a work to be 
considered a film, it must be delivered by a medium that offers the potential for movement, 
whether or not that potential is actualized in any particular work. But this seems like a dubious 
distinction. After all, if I choose to post a video of A Casing Shelved online (on YouTube, for 
example), would the slide show suddenly become a film in Carroll’s view, since the medium 
now has the potential for movement? What if I were to show the work to a crowd who did not 
know whether I was displaying a slide, a film of a slide, or simply a film of a static bookcase? 
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Would not the experience be essentially cinematic (albeit quite unorthodox), regardless of the 
answer to this question? 
 Carroll is concerned that categorizing A Casing Shelved as a film would necessarily “turn 
family albums into cineplexes,”44 since neither Snow’s work nor photographs in family albums 
has the capacity for motion. But there is a crucial difference: A Casing Shelved is 45 minutes in 
length, whereas a family album has no duration, no inherent temporal dimension. Thus, if one is 
intent on establishing necessary conditions for the cinema (and I will argue in Chapter 4 that 
there is no reason to do so), motion—even the potential for motion—should not be on the list. If 
cinema has any indispensible component, it would appear to be duration. Whether one is 
considering Gérard Courant’s 150-hour Cinématon (1978-2010) or Thomas Edison’s 5-second 
Fred Ott’s Sneeze (1894), all films have a running length; there is no such thing as an atemporal 
film. Thus, while Mary Ann Doane (and many other film theorists, including Christian Metz) 
claim that “[t]he ability to represent movement” is “what distinguishes film from 
photography,”45 I would argue that the more fundamental distinction between cinema and 
photography (as well as other traditional visual arts) is not movement, but duration. As Maya 
Deren has noted, “the motion picture, though composed of spatial images, is primarily a time 
form.”46 
 Carroll’s emphasis on potential movement as a sine qua non of cinema is further 
problematized by works in which the spectator is simply unaware of whether or not this potential 
is present. Consider, for instance, James Coleman’s film La tache aveugle (The Blind Spot) 
(1978-1990). Coleman borrows a very small amount of footage (less than a second) from James 
                                                 
44
 Ibid., 185. 
45
 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 131. Christian Metz claims that movement is “one of the greatest differences, doubtless the 
greatest, between still photography and the movies.” See Metz, 7. 
46
 Maya Deren, “Cinematography: The Creative Use of Reality,” Daedalus 89, no. 1 (1960): 160. 
15 
 
 
 
Whale’s The Invisible Man (1933) and stretches each individual frame out for about 20 minutes 
(the work as a whole lasts eight hours). The process is achieved through the use of two slide 
projectors which are computer driven. Is the potential for movement present here or not? 
Normally slide shows do not permit the illusion of movement, but is it not feasible that the 
technology running the slides could still invest them with movement? Again, the answers to such 
questions seem irrelevant. It is not at all clear why La tache aveugle’s status as a film (or a slide 
show, or whatever other classification one might suggest) should be dependent on the technology 
that happens to be used to project it.  
 As works like La tache aveugle suggest, the phenomenology of duration is one of the 
foremost preoccupations of the cinema of stasis. Even though duration is intrinsic to the filmic 
medium, in traditional motion pictures, the goal is generally to confront the spectator with a 
barrage of engaging scenes which will make her “lose track of time” (to borrow a useful cliché). 
A moviegoer glancing at her watch during a film is usually seen as a bad sign, an indication that 
the cinematic experience is not proving to be as immersive as it was designed to be. But an 
awareness of time is often part of the raison d'être of static films. In several works, this is 
literalized. For example, in James Riddle’s 9 Minutes (1966), numbers appear on the screen to 
demarcate each second that passes, and in Gottfried Schlemmer’s 8h01-8h11 (1968), the face of 
a digital clock is the sole image on the screen for the film’s entire 11 minutes. But even if time 
itself is not the explicit subject of a work, many static films still call attention to their own 
duration. Consider, for example, Warhol’s audacious Empire, in which a static shot of the 
Empire State Building dominates the frame for over eight hours. There is very little change on-
screen throughout the film. To be sure, lights in the Empire State Building occasionally go on 
and off, and the reflections of Warhol and his associate Jonas Mekas can momentarily be 
16 
 
 
 
glimpsed changing reels. But as a whole, nothing happens, and as a result, it is difficult to view 
the film without thinking about how many hours remain. This is, in fact, one of Warhol’s goals. 
One watches Empire, he claims, “to see time go by.”47   
 This description is suggestive, since witnessing “time go by” implies a kind of movement 
in spite of the stasis on the screen. Even though Empire (like many static films) seems 
immutable, the experience of viewing such films involves constant flux. This kind of paradox 
has been eloquently theorized by Henri Bergson. While it is true that Bergson displays little 
interest in film as an art form (being more interested in the philosophical implications of the 
cinematographic apparatus), he nevertheless maps out a phenomenology of duration which is 
apposite in understanding the cinema of stasis: 
 [T]here is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change every moment: 
 if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow. Let us take the most 
 stable of internal states, the visual perception of a motionless external object. The object 
 may remain the same, I may look at it from the same side, at the same angle, in the same 
 light; nevertheless the vision I now have of it differs from that which I have just had, 
 even if only because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is there, 
 which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental state, as it advances on 
 the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates: it goes 
 on increasing—rolling upon itself, as a snowball on the snow.48  
In other words, for Bergson, an experience of absolute stasis is impossible. Even if the object of 
my attention does not move (as is the case with static films), my subjective, phenomenological 
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apprehension of the object is constantly evolving. This is a necessary consequence of the 
duration of experience. The spectator of a film like Empire witnesses movement: not the 
movement of the building on the screen, but the movement of time itself.
49
 This sense of the 
inevitability of perpetual motion prompts Bergson to make the Heraclitean assertion that 
“consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. The circumstances may be the same, but 
they will act no longer on the same person, since they will find him at a new moment in his 
history. Our personality, which is being built up each instant with its accumulated experience, 
changes without ceasing.”50 Although Warhol’s Empire State Building is essentially immutable, 
my conscious experience of it is not. For example, during just one minute or so of the film, the 
following questions begin to come to my mind: Is this a productive use of my time? Am I falling 
for some kind of Warholian prank by watching all eight hours? Would I get the gist of the film if 
I just watched 10 minutes? Or is that precisely missing the point? Is Warhol’s goal to counter the 
capitalistic equation “Time equals money” by offering a space in which time can be observed, 
felt, and reflected upon, rather than hurriedly “spent”? And of course, similar questions surface 
and subside throughout the film’s duration. By foregrounding stasis, films like Empire actually 
make the spectator more aware of the movement of time and consciousness, neither of which can 
be apprehended in the same way when one is absorbed in the movement of a cinematic image. 
 Roland Barthes makes a similar argument in his classic 1970 essay “The Third Meaning: 
Research Notes on Several Eisenstein Stills.” While his object of investigation is the film still 
(that is, a frame extracted from a motion picture) rather than the still film, his formulations 
remain useful. Barthes is interested in interrogating “the filmic,” which he defines as “what, in 
the film, cannot be described […] the representation that cannot be represented. The filmic 
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begins only where language and articulated metalanguage cease.”51 But paradoxically, Barthes 
argues that “to a certain extent,” the filmic “cannot be grasped in the projected film, the film ‘in 
movement,’ ‘au naturel,’” but only in the still.52 Consequently, “the ‘movement’ which is taken 
for the essence of film is not animation, flux, mobility, ‘life,’ copy, but merely the armature of a 
permutational unfolding.”53 Challenging conventional theorizations which see the movement of 
images as “cinema’s sacred essence,”54 Barthes instead astutely asserts that an experiential 
“unfolding” is the sine qua non of film, a conceptualization that is evocative of Bergson’s 
phenomenological “snowball.”  
 In fact, Barthes’ argument mirrors Bergson’s in another respect: for both, only that which 
is still can be conceptually grasped. As Bergson puts it, “Of immobility alone does the intellect 
form a clear idea.”55 Even when one tries to imagine motion, Bergson perceptively argues, one 
invariably does so “by constructing movement out of immobiles put together.”56 (Raymond 
Bellour makes a similar observation. He attempts to visualize in his mind’s eye the movement of 
boats on the Bosporus Strait. The result: “If I shut my eyes and try to follow a vision turning in 
my memory, one boat passing another for example, a jerky succession of progressive flashes 
appears.”57) This may explain Barthes’ claims that a motion picture must be stilled before its 
cinematic qualities can be cognitively grasped. And this is precisely what the cinema of stasis 
accomplishes: by halting the constant movement generally associated with motion pictures, the 
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static film permits a more substantive understanding of cinema, foregrounding its temporal 
dimensions and the stillness that is pivotal to its ontology.  
 Ernie Gehr’s minimalist film Serene Velocity (1970) serves as a striking verification of 
Barthes’ contention that the filmic can only be grasped when cinematic motion is somehow 
stilled. The “object” being filmed is an empty corridor in a university. It is difficult to improve 
on P. Adams Sitney’s description of Serene Velocity in Visionary Film: “The filmmaker 
positioned his tripod within the corridor and then proceeded to alter his zoom lens every four 
frames. At first the shifts are not dramatic. He alternates four frames at 50 mm with four at 55 
mm. After a considerable period the differential increases: 45 mm to 60 mm. Thus, the film 
proceeds with ever increasing optical shocks. In this system the zoom never ‘moves.’ The 
illusion of movement comes about from the adjustment of the eye from one sixth of a second of a 
distant image to one sixth of a second of a nearer one.”58 As Serene Velocity proceeds, it slowly 
evolves from a motion picture to a static film. That is, since there is initially little distance 
between the repeatedly alternating shots of the corridor (one appearing a bit closer than the 
other), it creates the impression of quickly moving forward and backward in the corridor, as if 
one were on some kind of perversely disorienting amusement park ride. Even though Gehr did 
not actually move his camera to create the experience (all of the changes in perception are 
created with Gehr’s zoom lens), the spectator feels like a camera that is being incessantly 
“thrust” into the corridor (an experience with inescapable sexual undertones). However, as time 
goes on, the distance between the two repeating shots slowly starts to increase. At first, the mind 
tries to maintain its impression of movement on the screen, even if it is choppy, almost 
stroboscopic. But eventually, the distance is too great for the illusion of movement to be 
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maintained, and the remainder of the film can only be processed as the perpetual succession of 
static shots. Only when the film has finally progressed from apparent motion to apparent stasis 
can the Barthesian “filmic” be grasped. That is, the spectator becomes increasingly aware that 
the entire film is composed of alternating static shots and that the impression of movement 
engendered from the earlier stills is an illusion stemming from their close proximity to each 
other. Watching the film is like seeing a magician reveal how a trick is done by performing the 
trick again and again and drawing attention to how the deception occurs. The “trick” of 
cinematic motion has never been easier to understand on an affective level (as opposed to an 
intellectual level) than it is in Serene Velocity.  
 Given Noël Carroll’s interest in motion and stasis in cinema, it should come as no 
surprise that he has devoted an entire essay to Gehr’s magnum opus. In it, Carroll argues that 
films can do more than simply parrot pre-existing philosophical views; they can also “do” 
philosophy by using the cinematic medium “to articulate some original conceptual point.”59 For 
Carroll, Serene Velocity is just such a film. While I have no serious qualms with these assertions, 
Carroll seems to draw precisely the wrong philosophical point from Gehr’s film. He claims that 
“Gehr proposes movement as an essential feature of cinema, one that has special pride of place 
for the philosophical definition insofar as it signals the very species to which films belong—
motion pictures or, as I prefer to say, moving images.”60 But if anything, Serene Velocity is 
insistent on challenging definitions of cinema that privilege movement. After all, the impression 
of movement that Gehr creates eventually deteriorates, laying bare the static nature of every shot 
in the film (and by extension, the stasis at the heart of all cinema).
61
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 In many ways, in fact, Serene Velocity feels more like a succession of still photographs 
than a film. Of course, in a sense cinema really is nothing more than a succession of photographs 
(or other stills). But while this fact is carefully concealed in traditional motion pictures, static 
films often foreground this dimension of cinema’s ontology. The cinema of stasis has profound 
affinities with traditional visual art, and consequently, an interrogation of static films necessitates 
an exploration of the dialectical tension between stasis and movement that has subtended visual 
art even prior to cinema’s emergence.  
 Even though a painting, sculpture, or photograph cannot produce the perception of 
motion, there is often an implied motion in traditional visual art that is central to its aesthetic. As 
Gotthold Lessing points out, though paintings are “motionless,” a painter can nevertheless 
“suggest motion.”62 Goethe too insists that static artworks (like the classic sculpture Laocoön 
and His Sons) can be constructed so as to appear “always animated.”63 Arthur C. Danto gives the 
useful example of Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s sculpture David (1623-1624) (see Figure 2), which is 
designed to suggest that David is in the process of slinging a stone at Goliath. The sculpture itself 
is obviously still, yet the work is necessarily participatory—the assumption is that the viewer 
will cognitively vivify the work by imagining the completion of the movement and the launching 
of the stone. As Danto puts it, “In describing our experience with David, we might say that we 
see he is in movement, but we don’t see him move.”64  
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Figure 2: Gian Lorenzo Bernini, David (1623-1624) 
 
 Another useful example of implied motion is Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a 
Staircase, No. 2 (1912) (see Figure 3), a work that was likely inspired, in part, by the 
chronophotographs of Étienne-Jules Marey. With its succession of abstract shapes at different 
points along a staircase, the painting suggests a body in constant motion. Again, the viewer must 
actively carry out Duchamp’s intention by visualizing the nude body moving from one end of the 
canvas to the other. As with Bernini’s David, the spectator is prompted to imagine movement, 
but no actual phenomenon of movement presents itself. Still, the inherent motion of works like 
Duchamp’s serves as a verification of Giorgio Agamben’s claim that “paintings are not immobile 
images, but stills charged with movement, stills from a film that is missing.”65 
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Figure 3: Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2 (1912) 
 
 Obviously, the impression of movement in motion pictures is phenomenologically 
distinct from mere implied motion. As Danto points out, “[W]ith the movies, we do not just see 
that they move, we see them moving.”66 But just as sculptures and paintings can produce a kind 
of illusion of movement while remaining perfectly still, so films can produce an illusion of stasis, 
even though this stasis is the result of the constant movement of the film stock (at least in 
traditional cinematic praxis). As Mulvey puts it, stasis in film is produced by “a series of 
identical frames repeated in order to create an illusion of stillness to replace the illusion of 
movement.”67 (Of course, this conception is becoming increasingly problematized by new 
methods of watching films, such as streaming videos online, which do not rely on the movement 
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of film stock, but instead on the transfer of digital information. I will explore the theoretical 
ramifications of this development in my concluding chapter.
68
) 
 Cinema and traditional visual art clearly engage with movement in different ways, but 
many see another vital difference between the two traditions. For example, in his seminal essay 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Walter Benjamin offers the 
following observation: “The painting invites the viewer to contemplation; before it, he can give 
himself up to his train of associations. Before a film image, he cannot do so. No sooner has he 
seen it than it has already changed. It cannot be fixed on.”69 Benjamin proceeds to quote the 
French writer Georges Duhamel: “I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have 
been replaced by moving images.”70 Although Benjamin admits, by way of a caveat, that 
Duhamel “detests the cinema and knows nothing of its significance,” he nonetheless agrees with 
Duhamel on this point, asserting, “[T]he train of associations in the person contemplating these 
images is immediately interrupted by new images.”71 While Benjamin is right to suggest that the 
constant fluctuations of traditional motion pictures often preclude a contemplative stance vis-à-
vis the images on the screen, this view is radically challenged by films that do arrest images for 
prolonged periods of time, films that often change very little—if at all. In fact, one could argue 
that static films are even more insistent on spectatorial contemplation than traditional visual art. 
After all, it is possible for an individual to visit a museum and glance at Salvador Dalí’s painting 
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Sleep (1937) for a few seconds before moving on to look at other works. The spectator could 
then honestly tell others, “I saw Dalí’s Sleep.” But compare this to Andy Warhol’s film Sleep, 
which shows the poet John Giorno sleeping (and moving very little) for over five hours. One 
could certainly watch just a few seconds of the film, but could one then say, “I saw Warhol’s 
Sleep”? Given the temporal dimensions of film, which do not permit the cursory perception of an 
entire work in a single moment, this would seem to be a problematic assertion.
72
 Consequently, 
evoking a contemplative stance is one of the primary goals of static films, many of which 
demand prolonged engagement and meditation in a way that is often only encouraged by 
traditional visual art. 
 Of course, such encouragement is generally only implicit. In other words, artists often 
hope that spectators will immerse themselves in their works, staring at them and reflecting on 
them for extended periods of time. (Lessing puts it this way: “[T]he works of both painter and 
sculptor are created not merely to be given a glance but to be contemplated—contemplated 
repeatedly and at length.”73) Occasionally, this implicit expectation is made explicit, however, as 
in Marcel Duchamp’s To Be Looked at (from the Other Side of the Glass) with One Eye, Close 
to, for Almost an Hour (1918) (see Figure 4). The work consists of (accidentally) shattered glass, 
a strip of metal, various geometric shapes, and a convex lens. The title is somewhat humorous, 
since it is hard to imagine that many visitors to a museum will actually stare at a single work for 
an hour (especially if this involves being close to the work, thus blocking the gazes of other 
spectators). Still, the title represents Duchamp’s attempt to inject duration (and by extension, 
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engagement and reflection) into traditional visual art. Given Duchamp’s explicit instructions, 
could one still claim to have seen this work after glancing at it for just a moment? This is a rather 
difficult question to answer. 
 
 
Figure 4: Marcel Duchamp, To Be Looked at (from the Other Side of the Glass) with One Eye, Close to, for Almost an Hour 
(1918) 
 
 In any case, the fixed gaze at the fixed object (which Duchamp is clearly interested in 
engendering) is also a paramount concern in static cinema. The Benjaminian “shock effect,” a 
critical element in most motion pictures, is usually bypassed in static films. Unlike “the cinema 
of attraction” so perceptively theorized by Tom Gunning (and before him, by Eisenstein), the 
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cinema of stasis generally aims to engender introspection, not shock.
74
 If there is a shock, it is 
merely the subtle shock of subverted expectations. To borrow Gunning’s terminology, static 
films are generally interested neither in the startling “confrontation” of early cinema (or of the 
avant-garde films of Luis Buñuel or Jack Smith), nor in the “diegetic absorption” of mainstream 
cinema.
75
  
 The fact that there are exceptions to this rule is unsurprising, given the diversity of static 
cinema. For instance, James Broughton and Joel Singer’s Hermes Bird (1979) features a penis 
becoming erect in extreme slow motion for 11 minutes, a gesture that, in its violation of taboo, 
seems closely allied with the exhibitionistic and confrontational “cinema of attractions” 
theorized by Gunning.
76
 (Interestingly, however, the prolonged exposure to the male member in 
this work makes it less shocking than the fleeting, split-second shots of penises in films like 
Ingmar Bergman’s Persona [1966] and David Fincher’s Fight Club [1999].) Furthermore, in 
terms of “diegetic absorption,” not all static films forgo narrativity; for example, Ôshima’s Band 
of Ninja features a salient plot. Still, very few static films are interested in overt shock or 
narrativity. Instead, the majority of works within the cinema of stasis aim to create a space for 
meditation, for immersion in an image, for sober reflections on the nature of movement and 
stasis, time and space, cinema and art. 
  The yearning for stillness and meditation so characteristic of static cinema may well have 
arisen as a response to historical and cultural forces. In particular, it is worth noting that static 
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films only begin appearing in the post-WWII era.
77
 This may simply reflect the fact that in the 
early decades of cinema, movement was a kind of novelty, something that distinguished films 
from older media, such as photography. Perhaps only after movement had become codified, 
deeply entrenched as the status quo, did it make sense to radically break with this tradition, to 
challenge the hegemony of motion in cinematic practice. But David Campany also offers a 
compelling theoretical framework in the introduction to his edited volume The Cinematic. 
According to Campany, “The advanced photography and film of the first half of the twentieth 
century was shaped profoundly by modern ideas of speed. To be contemporary and progressive 
was to make use of the latest media and be reactive, instantaneous, fast.” This fascination with 
speed, in Campany’s view, is embodied in films like Walter Ruttmann’s Berlin: Symphony of a 
Great City (1927) and Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera. (And there are numerous other pre-
WWII films that exemplify the centrality of speed for early directors, particularly within the 
avant-garde. Consider, for example, the rapid succession of mobile quasi-abstract objects in Man 
Ray’s Le retour à la raison [The Return to Reason] [1923], the dizzying movements at the end of 
René Clair’s Entr’acte [1924], and the lightning-fast montages featured in Kenneth 
MacPherson’s Borderline [1930]). But for Campany, there is an important aesthetic shift in the 
post-WWII era: “After the Second World War, European and North American culture began to 
be dominated by the ideologies of mainstream cinema, television, lifestyle culture, saturation 
advertising, and mass distraction. In this new situation speed lost much of its critical edge and 
most of its artistic credentials. To be radical in this new situation was to be slow. A stubborn 
resistance to the pace of spectacle and money-driven modernization seemed the only creative 
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 The only unambiguous exception to this rule that I am aware of is Walter Ruttmann’s Weekend (Wochenende) 
(1930), which appears to be the first static film ever made. Weekend features a rich, evocative sound track of voices, 
clocks, alarms, and other “found” sounds, but the screen remains blank and motionless for the work’s entire eleven-
minute duration.   
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option and it came to characterize the landmarks of art and film in the latter decades of the last 
century.” While Campany seems to be primarily thinking of directors of “slow” feature-length 
films, such as Vittorio de Sica, Robert Bresson, and Chantal Akerman, he also acknowledges that 
a “[r]esistance to speed” was central to the aesthetics of avant-garde filmmakers like Warhol, 
Snow, and Frampton—pivotal figures in the cinema of stasis.78 (Campany’s suggestion that slow 
[and by extension, static] films were a counterpoint to the “mass distraction” of advertising and 
popular culture seems especially plausible when one remembers that some of the earliest static 
films—such as Gil Wolman’s L’Anticoncept and Guy Debord’s Hurlements en faveur de Sade 
[Howls for Sade] [1952]—were created by Situationists, who were openly engaged in a struggle 
against “the society of the spectacle.”)  
 Deleuze provides a similar chronology in Cinema 2: The Time Image. Again, he focuses 
primarily on art cinema (neo-realism, the new wave, etc.) rather than the avant-garde; 
nevertheless, he correctly notes a general trend in post-WWII cinema wherein “movement can 
tend to zero [and] the character, or the shot itself, remain immobile.”79 In contrast to the constant 
permutations of early cinema, there arose in this era “a cinema of the seer and no longer of the 
agent [de voyant, non plus d’actact].”80 For Deleuze, these new filmmakers sought to represent 
time directly (rather than indirectly through the medium of movement).
81
 It could be argued that 
static filmmakers simply took this “cinema of the seer” to its logical extreme, removing agency 
and movement from its privileged position to engage more immediately with duration itself.  
 While the category of static cinema is a useful one, the boundaries delineating this 
modality are by no means clear-cut—in fact, many individual works reside in the interstices 
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between traditional motion pictures and static films. Consider, for instance, Tony Conrad’s The 
Flicker (1965), which consists only of static white and black frames. There is no on-screen 
movement in any conventional sense (e.g. a person or even an abstract shape moving from one 
end of the screen to the other), yet the carefully constructed rhythm of the alternating frames 
creates an almost hallucinatory sense of pulsation (as well as the illusion of kinetic phosphenes, 
at least in my viewing of the film). While the dividing line between traditional motion pictures 
and static films is clearly porous, creating rough distinctions between the two remains useful. 
There is a continuum of motion in cinema, from films that are essentially motionless (like Larry 
Gottheim’s Fog Line and Andy Warhol’s Empire) to films that are replete with movement (like 
René Clair’s Entr’acte and the majority of Hollywood films). My aim is to interrogate those 
films that fall somewhere on the “still” end of this continuum.  
 Throughout this dissertation, I will attempt to grapple with the aesthetic, affective, 
cultural, historical, and philosophical dimensions of static films. However, this is not to suggest 
that these films form any kind of unified genre, school, or movement. Since it is exceedingly 
difficult to make coherent generalizations about static cinema, one of the aims of this dissertation 
will be to emphasize the richness and range of this tradition. Static films are occasionally 
designed to serve as the backdrop for other activities (as in the early films of Warhol), but they 
can also be immersive, encouraging a meditative gaze (this is the case, I will argue, in many 
Fluxus films). Static films can exploit film’s unique ability to structure time (as in Michael 
Snow’s So Is This [1982]); they can also foreground frequently overlooked elements of 
cinema—such as color, sound, and embodied perception (as in Derek Jarman’s Blue [1993]). In 
other words, cinematic stasis is just as malleable and multivalent as cinematic movement. In 
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spite of this heterogeneity, however, all static films inherently challenge widespread essentialist 
conceptions of cinema by broadening our conception of what a film can be or do.     
 In Chapter 2, I will analyze the early films of Andy Warhol. Warhol’s “stillies” are often 
conceptualized as experiments in boredom. However, I will suggest that films like Sleep and 
Empire are not designed to be viewed in silence from beginning to end (an experience that would 
likely bore even the most ardent fan of Warhol’s cinema), but are best understood as furniture 
films, works designed to be viewed partially and distractedly. By repudiating movement, Warhol 
creates films that do not demand close attention, and so his stillies can be enjoyed in conjunction 
with other experiences, such as conversing, eating, drinking, and dancing. I will argue that in 
Warhol’s cinema, the rigid and predetermined temporality of traditional motion pictures gives 
way to one that is open-ended and amorphous. 
 Chapter 3 will engage with protracted films—works which use extreme slow motion to 
create the impression of stasis—giving especially close attention to Disappearing Music for Face 
(1966), a Fluxus film by George Maciunas and Mieko Shiomi. Films like Disappearing Music 
can be profitably theorized as interrogations of microtime, since they foreground interstitial 
moments which are generally below the threshold of perception. I will argue that protracted films 
reveal film’s unique capacity to offer affective access to alternate temporalities. I will further 
connect these films with musical experiments by artists like Yves Klein and La Monte Young, 
which also use extended duration as an aesthetic strategy. 
 In Chapter 4, I will examine textual films, works which forgo conventional cinematic 
imagery in favor of letters, words, numbers, and other typographical text. Giving close attention 
to Michael Snow’s So Is This (a film comprised entirely of individual words, displayed one at a 
time) this chapter explores the implications of remediating written text in film. I claim that, by 
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drawing attention to the differences between cinematic reading and more conventional forms of 
reading, textual films foreground the unique ability of cinema to structure duration. I also 
contend that textual films implicitly challenge orthodox ontologies of film that rely on necessary 
conditions, instead positing a more Wittgensteinian approach (i.e. one based on “family 
resemblances.”) 
 Chapter 5 gives consideration to the monochrome film. In these works, a single static 
color dominates the screen for lengthy periods of time. I will engage in a close reading of the 
most well known monochrome film—Derek Jarman’s Blue—a work in which all that is visible is 
a striking blue color field. I will also try to address the following questions: What is the 
relationship between these films and monochrome paintings (such as the works of Kazimir 
Malevich, Robert Rauschenberg, and Yves Klein)? What role is played by the sound track (often, 
though not always, present in monochrome films), especially since there is no person or image 
on the screen to complement what is heard? Finally, how can these films be understood within 
the context of philosophical debates regarding absence and “the void”?  
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CHAPTER 2 
SERIOUS IMMOBILITIES: 
ANDY WARHOL, ERIK SATIE, AND THE FURNITURE FILM 
 
“When people think they’ve seen enough of something, but there’s more, and no change of shot, 
then they react in a curiously livid way. They think there must be justification for it, but it never 
occurs to them that the fact that you happen to like whatever is in the shot is sufficient 
justification.” – Wim Wenders1 
 
Joseph Gelmis – “Your films are just a way of taking up time?” 
Andy Warhol – “Yeah.”2 
 
 In 1893, Erik Satie composed Vexations, a delicate and haunting piece of music that 
would eventually come to be seen as his most radical composition. While the sheet music at first 
appears relatively straightforward, it includes a bizarre performance note in which Satie suggests 
that if the performer decides “to play this phrase 840 times in a row, it will be as well to prepare 
oneself in advance, and in the deepest silence, through serious immobilities.”3 While there is 
nothing at all unusual about the use of repetition in music, Satie’s uncompromising and 
unrelenting repetition was entirely unprecedented. It anticipated the minimalism that would come 
to prominence in the second half of the 20
th
 century, with composers like La Monte Young, 
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 Wim Wenders, “Time Sequences, Continuity of Movement,” in Campany, The Cinematic, 89. 
2
 Andy Warhol, I’ll Be Your Mirror: The Selected Andy Warhol Interviews, ed. Kenneth Goldsmith (New York: 
Carroll and Graf, 2004),  169. 
3
 Quoted in Robert Orledge, “Understanding Satie’s Vexations,” Music & Letters 79, no. 3 (1998): 386. It is 
generally assumed that Vexations is a piece for piano; however, the score does not specify what instrument should 
be used. 
34 
 
 
 
Philip Glass, Steve Reich, and John Adams. (In fact, the piece’s lack of a tonal center also 
foreshadowed the atonality pioneered by Arnold Schoenberg, Anton Webern, and Alban Berg in 
the first half of the century.) 
 On September 9, 1963, John Cage staged the first complete performance of Vexations at 
the Pocket Theatre in New York. Ten pianists took turns playing the repetitions, and the piece 
lasted from 6:00 p.m. until 12:40 p.m. the following day.
4
 Among those present for the 
performance was Andy Warhol, who would go on to promote a strikingly similar aesthetic in his 
early films, works in which a relatively static object or person is filmed for a very lengthy period 
of time.
5
 In his first film, Sleep (1963), the poet John Giorno is shown sleeping nude from 
various angles for almost five and a half hours (with numerous individual shots being repeated 
over and over again), while in Empire (1964), a single static shot of the Empire State Building is 
maintained for over eight hours (see Figure 1).
6
 Warhol’s early films (which he called “stillies”) 
are often theorized as explorations of boredom. While I do not necessarily take issue with this 
approach, it strikes me as somewhat limiting. I want to argue that Warhol is following the lead of 
Satie, who developed the concept of furniture music (musique d’ameublement). Satie was 
interested in music that was not meant to be closely listened to, but which was instead designed 
to serve as a backdrop for other activities. Along similar lines, I will argue that Warhol’s stillies 
                                                 
4
 Sources that describe the event are divided as to whether the number of pianists was ten or twelve. In any case, 
Cage’s decision to use a team of pianists was probably a wise one, as individual pianists who have attempted to 
perform Vexations in its entirety have often encountered problems. For example, in 1970, Peter Evans was forced to 
terminate his performance after fifteen hours of playing, when he began to experience “frightful hallucinations.” See 
Alan M. Gillmor, Erik Satie (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 103. 
5
 I should briefly note that there is some disagreement as to whether or not Warhol actually attended the 
performance, and if so, for how long. See Gary Comenas, “Notes on John Cage, Erik Satie’s Vexations, and Andy 
Warhol’s Sleep,” http://www.warholstars.org/ news/johncage.html. See also Branden W. Joseph, “Andy Warhol’s 
Sleep: The Play of Repetition,” in Masterpieces of Modernist Cinema, ed. Ted Perry (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2006), 180, 202. While it seems likely to me that Warhol was present for at least part of 
the performance, the arguments I present in this essay are not contingent on this claim. 
6
 The idea for Empire was suggested to Warhol by the filmmaker John Palmer, whose reflection can be briefly 
glimpsed in the film’s last reel. See Callie Angell, Andy Warhol Screen Tests: The Films of Andy Warhol Catalogue 
Raisonné, Volume One (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 2006), 153. 
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are best understood as furniture films, works which open up new ways of thinking about 
cinematic reception by inviting a series of distracted glances rather than a focused and 
comprehensive gaze. 
 
 
Figure 1: Andy Warhol, Empire (1964) 
 
 I would like to begin with a frequently quoted (and frequently misunderstood) remark 
from Francis Bacon’s 1612 essay “Of Studies”: “Some books are to be tasted, others to be 
swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in 
parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence 
and attention.”7 Many assume that the point of Bacon’s metaphor is to lavish praise on those rare 
“great” books which are worthy of close analysis. In fact, he is drawing attention to the need for 
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 Francis Bacon, “Of Studies,” in Francis Bacon: The Major Works, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 439. As Vickers points out, “curiously” here means “with minute attention” (773). 
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a diversity of approaches to reading texts. Not every book is designed to be “read wholly, and 
with diligence and attention”—for many texts, a casual and cursory engagement is more 
apropos.
8
  
 Satie was intent on fighting for a similar kind of diversity in the consumption of musical 
compositions. While the normative stance vis-à-vis music in Satie’s day often involved 
“chewing” and “digesting” (that is, attending a performance and becoming engrossed in each 
musical development), Satie was interested in composing music that could be merely tasted (or 
at most, swallowed). Here is how he described it: “[T]here’s a need to create furniture music, 
that is to say, music that would be a part of the surrounding noises and that would take them into 
account. I see it as melodious, as masking the clatter of knives and forks without drowning it 
completely, without imposing itself. It would fill up the awkward silences that occasionally 
descend on guests. It would spare them the usual banalities. Moreover, it would neutralize the 
street noises that indiscreetly force themselves into the picture.”9 For Satie, such furniture music 
would be pleasant, yet unobtrusive, serving as the backdrop for other experiences (conversing, 
eating, appreciating visual art, etc.). In the words of John Cage, “Furniture Music was Satie’s 
most far-reaching discovery, the concept of a music to which one did not have to listen.”10 
 Among the Satie compositions that are generally considered furniture music are Forged 
Iron Tapestry (Tapisserie en fer forgé) (1917), Phonic Floor Tiles (Carrelage phonique) (1917), 
and Wall Hanging for a Prefectural Office (Tenture de cabinet préfectoral) (1923), as well a 
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 For this insight, I am indebted to Ann Blair’s discussion of Bacon in “Reading Strategies for Coping with 
Information Overload,” Journal of the History of Ideas 64, no. 1 (2003): 13-14. 
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 Quoted in Gillmor, 232.  
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 John Cage, Conversing with Cage, 2
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 ed., ed. Richard Kostelanetz (New York: Routledge, 2003), 51. While this 
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good armchair.” Quoted in Roger Shattuck, The Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant-Garde in France, 1885 to 
World War I, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1968), 169. 
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piece which easily has one of the strangest titles in the history of music: Fanfare for Waking Up 
the Big Fat King of the Monkeys (Who Always Sleeps with One Eye Open) (Sonnerie pour 
réveiller le bon gros roi des singes [lequel ne dort toujours que d'un oeil]) (1921). However, 
Satie’s only public performance of furniture music took place during the intermission of a play 
(written by his friend Max Jacob) at the Galerie Barbazanges in Paris on March 8, 1920. Satie 
arranged for a small band to continually play repeated figures from Camille Saint-Saëns’s Danse 
macabre and Ambroise Thomas’s Mignon. He had hoped that the music would fade into the 
background while the audience conversed and enjoyed the picture exhibition in the theater hall. 
Contrary to Satie’s explicit instructions, however, audience members found themselves 
engrossed in the music, listening to it carefully and deliberately. An aggravated Satie began to 
scream, “Go on talking! Walk about! Don’t listen!”11  
 Even though Satie only used the label furniture music for a handful of his works, the 
appellation seems applicable for a substantial swath of his oeuvre. For example, Satie’s 
composition for René Clair’s film Entr’acte (1924) is inconspicuous and repetitive, and its 
various speeds and moods serve to complement the Dadaist spectacles that fill the screen.
12
 And 
even though Satie did not coin the term furniture music until 1917, it seems clear that the idea 
was already in its formative stages in 1893 when he composed Vexations. The piece is subtle and 
brooding, and its unyielding repetitions begin to create a vacuum of auditory stimuli, a numbing 
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 Quoted in Gillmor, 233. For more on this incident, see the excerpt from Arnold Schoenberg’s Harmonielehre 
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sameness that forces one to seek stimulation elsewhere (even if only through daydreaming—or 
in extreme cases, hallucinating). Vexations is furniture music avant la lettre.
13
 
 Andy Warhol shared Satie’s interest in the furniture aesthetic. However, this crucial 
component of Warhol’s vision has received remarkably little scholarly attention. Many discuss 
films like Sleep and Empire as if it were a foregone conclusion that they must be watched from 
beginning to end in reverent silence. Consequently, boredom has come to seen as the dominant 
theme of Warhol’s stillies. To provide just one example, consider the comments made by A.R. 
Warwick in a recent issue of Artwrit. Warwick sees it as “a simple reality” that films like Empire  
and Sleep are “boring”: “These are not films to be watched, but endured. […] The cultural cachet 
of watching [them] comes from one’s ability to sit through the entire screening, to endure the 
inevitable tedium of watching a virtually unchanging image for hours at a time. […] Warhol’s 
audiences either fled or stayed, either struggling to remain engaged or succumbing to the tedium 
of his films that offer no conclusions, only experiences.”14 Since this is a fairly common way of 
describing Warhol’s stillies, it is hardly surprising that many have dismissed these films without 
feeling the need to see them. After all, why would a filmmaker deliberately set out to bore an 
audience? And why would anyone knowingly attend a boring film? It is almost as if, in addition 
to exploring the theme of torture in films like Vinyl (1965), Warhol wanted to literally torture his 
audience, as well. 
 However, evidence suggests that Warhol had no desire to bore (much less torture) those 
who attended his films. His stillies had a very different raison d'être. In a 1963 interview, 
Warhol described the then-untitled Sleep this way: “[I]t’s a movie where you can come in at any 
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39 
 
 
 
time. And you can walk around and dance and sing. […] It just starts, you know, like when 
people call up and say ‘What time does the movie start?’ you can just say ‘Any time.’”15 (One 
sees here a precursor to many of the compositions of John Cage: “The early works have 
beginnings, middles, and endings. The later ones do not. They begin anywhere, last any length of 
time.”16) A few years later, Warhol emphasized that audience dynamics were more important to 
him as a filmmaker than what was on the screen: “My first films using the stationary objects 
were also made to help the audiences get more acquainted with themselves. […] You could do 
more things watching my movies than with other kinds of movies: you could eat and drink and 
smoke and cough and look away and then look back and they’d still be there.”17 And in 1975, 
Warhol was asked, “Did you try to make boredom chic with some of your early movies like 
Empire?” to which he responded, “No. What I was trying to do is make comedy in the audience. 
People always have a better time, have more fun together than watching what is on the screen.”18 
In other words, Warhol advocated a distracted, fragmentary, and unfocused mode of 
spectatorship. When Paul Arthur laments the fact that decades after the release of Warhol’s films 
“the audience still cannot sit still for them,”19 he fails to answer the critical question: Why should 
they? One can imagine Warhol seeing spectators silently immersing themselves in his early films 
and reacting in much the same way that Satie reacted to the audience at the Galerie Barbazanges 
(sans the exclamation marks, of course): “Go on talking. Walk about. Don’t watch.” 
This represents a radical break from traditional modes of cinematic spectatorship. As 
Noël Burch has pointed out, ever since the days of early silent cinema, the dominant logic of the 
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cinema has been that of the “motionless voyage”—in other words, the on-screen movements 
offer a kind of journey, even though the viewer does not leave his seat.
20
 As Burch rightly notes, 
however, there are a “few avant-garde films that reject these conditions.”21 While he does not 
specify what films he has in mind, one immediately thinks of Warhol’s stillies, which turn the 
logic of the motionless voyage on its head. With works like Sleep and Empire, it is now the film 
that is motionless and the spectator who is ambulatory. And Warhol’s ideal audience does more 
than simply move about—they sing, dance, smoke, and converse. In most cinematic venues, 
speaking during a film (not to mention singing and dancing) is seen as rude and classless, and is 
often met with exasperated hushes. For example, in his 1922 book The Art of the Moving 
Picture, the poet Vachel Lindsay advocates talking during films, but he admits that this approach 
can lead to disastrous results. Specifically, he recounts one occasion in which a discussion he had 
with a friend during a movie deeply offended two women sitting in front of them, so much so 
that they stormed out of the theater, with one being reduced to tears. Consequently, Lindsay 
recommends proceeding with caution: “[I]n our present stage of civilization, sit on the front seat, 
where no one can hear your whisperings but Mary Pickford on the screen. She is but a shadow 
there, and will not mind.”22 Of course, Lindsay is writing before the sound era, so there is little 
danger of missing important plot points through occasional chatter. And many of Warhol’s early 
films eschew dialogue for precisely the same reason: the silence enables spectators to “do more 
things.” 
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In fact, one of the primary functions of Warhol’s stillies (and by extension, much of static 
cinema) is to direct the viewer’s attention away from the screen. Warhol’s early films are meant 
to be looked at, but not seen. A failure to realize this has, I believe, prevented some from seeing 
the value of Warhol’s cinema. In some cases, this has manifested itself as outright hostility. For 
instance, Jonas Mekas recalls the outrage that accompanied the premiere of Empire: “Ten 
minutes after the film started, a crowd of thirty or forty people stormed out of the theater into the 
lobby, surrounded the box office, Bob Brown, and myself, and threatened to beat us up and 
destroy the theater unless their money was returned. ‘This is not entertainment! This movie 
doesn’t move!’ shouted the mob.”23 And even sophisticated spectators have often diminished 
Warhol’s stillies due to a failure to understand the furniture aesthetic. No less an avant-garde 
luminary than Tony Conrad has remarked, “I have never been able to cure myself of suspicions 
that Andy Warhol’s static films […] are incurably opportunistic and basically devoid of the 
intrinsic interest or freshness that I feel to be the real challenge of static work.”24 However, there 
is a sense in which Warhol’s early films are not supposed to be interesting in and of 
themselves—what is interesting is the cinematic experience that they engender (as well as their 
conceptual originality). Warhol films things which are emphatically not intrinsically 
interesting—a building, a haircut, an empty chair (the latter is all that can be seen for several 
minutes in the Warhol film Paul Swan [1965]). But precisely for this reason, the cinematic image 
becomes just one of many objects available for visual consumption, and it is eventually casually 
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and distractedly noticed the way one might notice the Empire State Building itself—or a couch.25 
Since, as Rudolf Arnheim has pointed out, “Motion is the strongest visual appeal to attention”26 
(a fact well known to anyone who owns a cat and a laser pointer), static films often encourage 
viewers to direct their attention elsewhere. And this is generally what Warhol’s audiences did. 
Consider Stephen Koch’s description of the early screenings of Sleep: “People would chat during 
the screening, leave for a hamburger and return, greet friends and talk over old times.”27 To call a 
film like Sleep boring or “devoid of […] intrinsic interest,” then, is, in a sense, to miss the point. 
The film is only as boring as the audience who watches it. Warhol draws our attention to the 
manifold components of the cinematic experience (eating, conversing, moving in and out of the 
theatrical space, etc.) that are so often overlooked in film theory. As Koch goes on to say, “Even 
if one only glances at the image from time to time, it plunges one into a cinematic profundity; in 
a single stroke, that image effects a complete transformation of all the temporal modes ordinarily 
associated with looking at a movie.”28 
This is why Amy Taubin has claimed that the “message” of Warhol’s early films is “My 
time is not your time.”29 But one should recognize the full import of this suggestion. The 
alternate temporality that Warhol creates is not merely the consequence of his use of slight slow 
motion (24 frames per second slowed down to 16 frames per second)—it is also the result of the 
fact that his stillies do not monopolize the audience’s time, but free them to use their time 
however they see fit. Recall that Warhol insisted that films like Sleep do not start at a precise, 
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predetermined time, but simply start “any time,” whenever a spectator feels like showing up. As 
Vivienne Dick points out, “In one instant Warhol makes us aware that our time and the time on 
the screen is different, that we have control over how we are seeing—we can let ourselves be 
absorbed in into a meditative state or we can withdraw. The film will go on nevertheless in its 
own sweet time.”30 This open-ended temporality is a clear precursor to the video installations 
that would come to prominence in the 1970s. (In fact, J. Hoberman has claimed that Sleep and 
Empire “might be considered the original video installations.”31) Warhol did, in fact, venture into 
video art on two occasions. One is his film Outer and Inner Space (1965), a film/video hybrid 
that displays four images of Edie Sedgwick rambling (often incoherently) about boredom, 
bullshit, and blowfish. The other work (less well known) is Water (1971) (it is sometimes called 
Water Piece for Ono, since the videotape was produced for Yoko Ono’s “This is Not Here” 
exhibition in Syracuse, New York). The video is simply a 32-minute fixed shot of the Factory 
watercooler, with sounds of chatting and gossip in the background. Not only is Water a furniture 
film, but it calls attention to its status as a furniture film. A watercooler is a quintessential site of 
sociality, a locus of snacking, drinking, chatting, joking, and so on. As such, it is precisely the 
kind of object that Warhol’s stillies yearn to be. By offering spectators nothing but a watercooler, 
Warhol is going out of his way to emphasize that it is the interactions of the audience 
members—not the film itself—that is of central importance. Warhol rarely seemed particularly 
interested in the content of his early films; instead, he claimed, “I’m interested in audience 
reactions to my films.”32  
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True to the contours of video installation art, Warhol wanted spectators to begin and end 
their viewing experiences whenever they desired. This applied not only to an actual video 
installation like Water, but even to films like Sleep and Empire. Of course, this has always 
technically been an option, but before Warhol, rarely (if ever) had a director encouraged this 
kind of sporadic and incomplete reception. As Koch puts it, “Warhol is perhaps the first film-
maker ever to concede that his audience might not wish to see every minute of his work.”33 
Almost fifty years after Warhol’s early films were released, many are still struggling to come to 
terms with this mode of cinematic spectatorship. It is difficult to imagine arriving late to a film 
without feeling the need to ask someone, “What did I miss?” It is even more difficult to imagine 
walking out in the middle of a film that one actually likes. (Personally, I feel incapable of 
walking out of any film that I have started, even when it is one I despise—it always feels like 
some kind of unforgivable coitus interruptus.) Even if dominant models of spectatorship still 
demand  complete viewings, the more fractional Warholian approach has become fairly 
commonplace within the avant-garde. For example, in the program notes for his film Diaries, 
Notes, and Sketches (a.k.a. Walden) (1969), Jonas Mekas writes (in the third-person), “[T]he 
Author won’t mind (he is almost encouraging it) if the Viewer will choose to watch only certain 
parts of the work (film), according to the time available to him, according to his preferences, or 
any other good reason.”34 Takahiko Iimura makes a similar assertion regarding his textual film 1 
to 60 Seconds (1973): “[I]t is fine if you go out and come back, or never come back, or stay 
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outside watching without seeing what’s going on.”35 Or for a more recent example, consider 
Abbas Kiarostami’s comments on his static film Five: Dedicated to Ozu (2003), an experimental 
documentary consisting of five prolonged shots of natural settings: “You know how annoyed 
some directors get on finding out that someone has fallen asleep while watching their film. I will 
not be annoyed at all. I can confidently say that you would not miss anything if you had a short 
nap. […] I declare that you can nap during this film.”36 
Like Mekas, Iimura, and Kiarostami after him, Warhol was an advocate of fragmentary 
forms of spectatorship. This became especially evident in 1964 at the second annual New York 
Film Festival. Here Warhol produced an installation which I will call (for ease of expression) the 
Quartet Installation. Four of Warhol’s stillies (Sleep, Haircut [No. 2] [1963], Kiss [1964], and 
Eat [1964]) were simultaneously shown on Fairchild 400 projectors (which permitted the 
screening of 8mm films on small TV-like screens). Warhol simply borrowed three minutes of 
footage from each film and put them on a continuous loop, resulting in films that were 
(according to a press release) “endless.”37 No longer was it necessary (or even possible) for one 
to see a film from beginning to end. A film could be dropped in on distractedly for a few 
moments before moving on to a new film. (And this is precisely the point of the split screen that 
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Warhol would later use in Chelsea Girls [1966]: “I put two things on the screen […] so you 
could look at one picture if you were bored with the other.”38) This practice is in some ways an 
institutionalization of the Surrealists’ mischievous habit of theater-hopping, in which they would 
enter a theater, begin watching a movie in media res, only to leave abruptly at the first hint of 
boredom to intrude on another film, and so on. But Warhol’s Quartet Installation also has deep 
affinities with a common form of reception associated with the medium of television: channel 
surfing. Here, one derives pleasure not from immersing oneself in a particular program, but 
rather, from distractedly sampling from numerous programs (or to use Bacon’s term, “tasting” 
several shows).
39
  
 Given Warhol’s love of television, it should come as no surprise that he sought to create 
films and installations with televisual properties. As Warhol put it, “[I]n the late 50s I started an 
affair with my television which has continued to the present, when I play around in my bedroom 
with as many as four at a time.”40 (Notice how Warhol’s own viewing habits serve as the basis 
for his Quartet Installation, in which spectators are given precisely four film loops to 
perceptually “play around” with.) And Warhol said, “I’ve always believed in television,”41 a 
devotional statement of almost religious fervor. Not only did the Quartet Installation enable the 
spectator to “jump” from one screen to another, but the “endless” duration of Warhol’s film 
loops also echoes the interminability of  TV programming. As Greg Uhlin points out in his essay 
on Warhol and television, “Televisual time can be first characterized as the experience of 
                                                 
38
 Warhol, I’ll Be Your Mirror, 166. 
39
 This kind of spectatorial sampling has become more widespread than ever in the modern era—think, for example, 
of the way computer users often navigate between a multiplicity of websites, programs, and interfaces 
simultaneously. 
40
 Andy Warhol, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol: From A to B and Back Again (New York: Harvest/HBJ, 1975), 
26. 
41
 Warhol, I’ll Be Your Mirror, 187. Italics in original. 
47 
 
 
 
infinitude,” adding, “[T]he extended duration of Warhol’s early films indicates a desire for the 
process of recording to be continuous and unending.”42 
 What are the implications of Warhol’s intermedia experiment? In part, it serves to 
complicate facile taxonomies that have long emphasized the supposed gulf between cinema and 
television. The most famous theorization of the distinctions between film and TV was written in 
1964—the same year that Warhol created his Quartet Installation. I am speaking, of course, of 
Marshall McLuhan’s book Understanding Media. McLuhan asserts that film is a “hot” medium 
(one that is “high definition,” or filled with information), while TV is a “cool” medium (one that 
is “low definition,” leaving much to be “filled in or completed by the audience.”43) I have never 
found McLuhan’s categories to be particularly helpful. He seems to suggest that the limited 
information provided by TV screens (which traditionally offered a mere 480 scan lines) requires 
the viewer to complete the image in a way that is not necessary in cinema. It is difficult to take 
this distinction seriously, since as Noël Carroll points out in his perceptive rebuttal of McLuhan, 
“We don’t do anything to ‘fill in’ or to ‘complete’ the TV image; we just look.”44  
 Contra McLuhan, many media theorists argue that while cinema invites a gaze, television 
merely invites a glance.
45
 Clearly, such distinctions are becoming increasingly problematic in our 
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“post-medium” age,46 in which some spectators gaze at large, looming high-definition TV 
screens, while others distractedly glance at movies on computer screens and iPods. Still, there is 
a kernel of truth in such theorizations: TV viewing is, in general, less immersive than film 
viewing (which suggests a greater sense of agency on the part of the TV viewer). I find Steven 
Shaviro’s formulation (in his reading of McLuhan) especially persuasive: “[Television] is a part 
of our everyday experience; it quietly insinuates itself into our personal lives. We get so deeply 
involved with television precisely because it doesn’t imperiously demand our attention. It is 
simply there, day in and day out, like wallpaper or a piece of furniture.”47 With his Quartet 
Installation, Warhol sought to “cool” down the medium of film so that it would be less intrusive 
and more participatory. His early films and installations challenged deeply held assumptions 
about cinematic spectatorship by appropriating the furniture aesthetic so closely associated with 
television. While many spectators (such as the Surrealists) had approached film this way before, 
Warhol was creating some of the first films that demanded this kind of reception.
48
 
 As the Quartet Installation suggests, one of the most pivotal components in the furniture 
aesthetic is radical repetition. When a composition or a film takes some unexpected turn, our 
attention is piqued—we become interested in what the next development will be. But when a 
musical phrase or cinematic shot is repeated again and again, ad infinitum, the artwork fades into 
the background and our attention becomes focused elsewhere. In visual art, this repetition often 
leads to a degradation of signification. This was Warhol’s goal: “[T]he more you look at the 
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same exact thing, the more the meaning goes away, and the better and emptier you feel.”49 
Whether it is serial repetition (painting after painting of the Campbell’s soup can) or repetition 
within a single work (100 Coke Bottles [1962], 100 Dollar Bills [1962], 100 Soup Cans [1962]), 
Warhol obsessively repeats images until they are drained of all meaning, producing a kind of 
perceptual catatonia. It is reminiscent of Gertrude Stein’s famous “a rose is a rose is a rose is a 
rose,”50 in which the word rose, through repetition, loses its semantic content and becomes a 
hollow phoneme. Warhol’s furniture films operate on the same principle. Identical shots are 
repeated again and again in Sleep, and while no shot is repeated in Empire, a quick glance at the 
filmstrip reveals frame after frame with essentially the same content.
 51
 Ron Padgett’s poem 
“Sonnet: Homage to Andy Warhol” (which was inspired by Sleep) brilliantly captures the 
centrality of repetition in Warhol: 
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Of course, on one level, “Sonnet: Homage to Andy Warhol” simply offers a comically literal 
onomatopoeic evocation of the sound of snoring. But beyond this, Padgett’s poem subverts 
conventional modes of reading literature (in much the same way that Warhol’s films subvert 
conventional modes of cinematic spectatorship). How does one “read” this poem, exactly? 
Should one carefully consider each line, one at a time, or simply glance at the poem holistically? 
Is the sight of the repeated z’s what is important here (a sight which, when focused on for several 
seconds, inevitably makes the reader drowsy)? Or is the sound crucial, as well? (In other words, 
should the poem be “read” aloud? And what might such a reading sound like?) However these 
questions are answered, Padgett’s use of extreme repetition creates a strikingly Warholian 
aesthetic. When one looks at the z’s for more than a moment, they lose their status as semantic or 
graphemic indicators. Like Warhol’s incessant shots of Giorno’s sleeping body, Padgett’s 
repetition results in a deflection of the attentive eye: one can glance at the work momentarily, but 
giving it focused and thorough consideration is exceedingly difficult. 
 Many critics have been intent on finding a “deeper” meaning in Warhol’s repetitions, 
seeing his art and cinema as critiques of capitalism, for example, or commentaries on the 
emotional blankness of the postmodern era. However, Shaviro rightly insists that one should 
resist the temptation to search for a “message” or pre-packaged “meaning” in Warhol’s 
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repetitions. In his book The Cinematic Body, Shaviro astutely notes, “[Warhol’s] surfaces are 
impenetrable precisely because there is nothing beneath them, no depth into which one could 
penetrate. […] [A]ll we see is a mask, but there is nothing behind the mask.”53 And, of course, 
Warhol himself consistently frustrated any attempts to tease meaning out of his work: 
“What is Pop Art trying to say?”  
“I don’t know.”  
“What do your rows of Campbell soup cans signify?”  
“They’re things I had when I was a child.”  
“What does Coca Cola mean to you?” 
“Pop.”54 
Soup cans, coke bottles, skyscrapers—none of these things “means” anything. They simply form 
the backdrop of our everyday experiences, and Warhol’s art draws our attention to the ubiquity 
of these objects (and their representations). One is reminded of Samuel Beckett’s response to a 
query about the meaning of his play What Where: “I don’t know what it means. Don’t ask me 
what it means. It’s an object.”55 Warhol manufactures objects which are deliberately empty, 
devoid of meaning.  As Michel Foucault puts it, “A day will come when, by means of similitude 
relayed indefinitely along the length of a series, the image itself, along with the name it bears, 
will lose its identity. Campbell, Campbell, Campbell, Campbell.”56  
 Warhol’s fascination with repetition extends well beyond his paintings and films, 
however—it is also one of the most striking features of his writing. His notorious a: A Novel 
(1968) consists almost entirely of transcriptions of cassette tapes featuring the discursive, 
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amphetamine-fueled tirades of Factory superstars. Critical treatments of a generally focus on its 
status as an intermedia artifact, its Joycean stream-of-consciousness style, or its Cagean 
renunciation of authorial control (the ubiquitous errors and typos committed by the novel’s four 
typists are retained, reminding one of the ink blots of Warhol’s silkscreens, or the sprocket holes 
and white flares that often punctuate his films). But what is often overlooked in a is its 
unrelenting repetitiveness. Occasionally, this takes the form of the repetition of a single 
grapheme: 
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
57
 
 $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
58
 
 *******
59
 
 ……………………..60 
 Mmmmmmmm mmmmmm mmmmmm
61
 
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO-
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
62
 
    On other occasions onomatopoeic words are repeated—or even entire sentences: 
 I love amphetamine  I love amphetamine  I love a mphetamine
63
    
 Oh oh oh oh oh oh oh oh oh oh oh ohh
64
 
 plop plop plop plop plop plop plop
65
 
 shuffle shuffle shuffle shuffle shuffle shuffle
66
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And in one case, the repetition results in a sequence that could easily be mistaken for a sequel to 
Padgett’s “Sonnet: Homage to Andy Warhol”: 
SNORE / SNORE / SNORE / SNORE / SNORE / SNORE SNORE / SNORE / (Pr elude 
t o sn o ri ng) SNIFF / SNIFF / SNIFF / Sniff / Sniff
67
 
The textual repetitions that permeate a—along with the absence of narrativity—discourage the 
reader from paying close attention to the text. To return to Bacon’s formulation, one quickly 
realizes that Warhol intends a to be tasted, not swallowed or digested. When reading the novel, I 
am often captivated, but at other times, the repetitive constructions prompt me to simply scan the 
text while letting my mind wander. Of course, such cognitive diversions are not uncommon 
when reading, but in most cases (for example, when one is reading a classic novel like The Great 
Gatsby), one feels the need to re-read passages that were not given careful attention in order to 
catch plot points or details that might be important. In a furniture novel like a, on the other hand, 
everything is deliberately irrelevant, as trivial and mundane as a can of soup or a building. There 
is no fear of missing something in a, for there is nothing there to miss. 
In films like Sleep and Empire, there is also nothing to miss, since the incessant repetition 
of what is essentially the same photogram results in an unrelenting stasis. If a salient visual 
difference were introduced at some point in the film (if, for example, King Kong suddenly 
appeared and began climbing up the side of the building), the work would cease to be a furniture 
film, and would instead become immersive. But Warhol wanted as little action as possible. It is 
no wonder that Warhol preferred the term stillie to movie for his early films, since there is little 
or no movement in these works. This helps to explain why, in a 1969 interview, Warhol 
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maintained, “We haven’t made a movie yet.”68 When he was asked what he had been doing, 
exactly, he simply responded, “Just photographing what happens.”69 In other words, Warhol’s 
furniture films are not only televisual, they are also photographic. Apart from the emulsion grain 
that reminds one of the movement of the projector, the film is largely indistinguishable from a 
photograph. (As Arthur Danto puts it, in his monograph on Warhol, “Two screens, one showing 
Empire, the other a still of Empire, look as much alike as Brillo Box looks like a box of 
Brillo!”70) A film like Empire mimics the immobility of a photograph, and indeed, one would be 
tempted to label it as such, if it were not infused with duration—the most pivotal distinction 
between film and photography.
71
  
 None of this is to suggest that a distracted viewing is the only “correct” way to view 
Warhol’s early films. As Paul Arthur notes, “Depending on what we make of the image, we may 
leave the theatre, doze off, fantasise, yell at the screen, [or] treat it like a ‘normal’ movie 
experience. The list is not endless but it is distinctly Warholian.”72 There is obviously nothing 
wrong with giving furniture art one’s close and undivided attention. I sympathize with the 
audience at the Galerie Barbazanges who found Satie’s furniture music too mesmerizing to 
ignore. I also sympathize with those rare cineastes who have sat alone and watched Empire in its 
entirety, overwhelmed by the originality and beauty of Warhol’s monomaniacal vision. To a 
large extent, the distinction between furniture art and its antithesis (immersive art) is in the eye 
of the beholder, not an immanent part of the work itself. Some listeners have found themselves 
entranced by the minimalistic splendor of Satie’s Vexations; others have put on a recording of a 
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more intricate composition (say, Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde [1859]) to listen to distractedly 
while reading the newspaper, getting dressed, and washing the dishes. Some spectators have 
watched Warhol’s Sleep with an alert and fascinated eye; others have watched a seemingly more 
demanding film (like Howard Hawks’ The Big Sleep [1946]) while simultaneously eating dinner, 
going through mail, and tidying up the living room. (Of course, watching a film in a movie 
theater rather than at home makes a distracted viewing experience somewhat more difficult, but 
it does not preclude this option altogether—after all, it is hardly uncommon to see spectators in a 
theater whispering to neighbors, playing with their cell phones, and necking.) My goal is not to 
prescribe a certain mode of spectatorship, but merely to draw attention to a dimension of static 
films (and of cinema more broadly) that is often overlooked: the way viewers can derive pleasure 
from components of a cinematic experience that have little to do with the film itself. 
 But does this mean that boredom can be summarily dismissed as a component of 
Warhol’s vision? Not necessarily. Warhol was fond of saying, “I like boring things”—although it 
should be noted that he was somewhat fickle on this point: on one occasion, he left a screening 
of Sleep after only a few minutes (much to the chagrin of his colleague Jonas Mekas), reasoning, 
“Sometimes I like to be bored, and sometimes I don’t—it depends what kind of mood I’m in. 
Everyone knows how it is, some days you can sit and look out the window for hours and hours 
and some days you can’t sit still for a single second.”73 Warhol does seem to imply that he finds 
Sleep boring. But one must tread carefully here, resisting simplistic dichotomies (e.g. the stillies 
are either interesting or boring). Warhol’s films are interesting precisely because they are boring. 
Or, to put it another way, the content of Warhol’s films is boring, but this is what makes the 
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experience of watching them so potentially interesting. The viewer is no longer bound by the 
terms of the conventional spectatorial contract. As Michael Snow has argued, there is usually an 
implicit “social contract that a spectator makes in going to a cinema theatre. This, of course, 
comes from the theatre (plays, live performances), but the ‘contract’ is: Events which will have 
determined durations usually take place on the screen (stage) and I will sit here and experience 
these durations.”74 In fact, Lev Manovich has gone so far as to compare movie theaters to “large 
prisons,” insofar as they demand “institutionalized immobility,” forbidding audience members 
from leaving their seats or talking.
75
 Warhol offers a new contract: spectators are no longer tied 
to their seats with rope (either literally or metaphorically), but are free to look at the image as 
much or as little as they  please, much the way they would a photograph or a painting. The 
duration of the film may be predetermined, but the duration of its viewing is indeterminate. 
Further, the silence of Warhol’s stillies allows spectators to communicate freely without the fear 
of missing anything. They can discuss the static images on the screen, the accompanying rock 
music that Warhol often employed, or anything else that might be of interest. Warhol frees his 
audiences from the confines of the spectatorial contract. 
 Unfortunately, this aim is often entirely overlooked by those who reductively see 
Warhol’s films as explorations of boredom. After all, no one would call the Empire State 
Building itself boring, nor is it likely that this term would be directed at a photograph of the same 
building. So why does a film of this structure suddenly create such outrage?
76
 The hostility that 
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many have expressed towards the very idea of films like Empire and Sleep is often inextricably 
connected with the assumption that these films are supposed to be watched in their entirety and 
with close concentration. But consider the incisive remarks of avant-garde filmmaker Barbara 
Rubin (who helped organize the first performances of what would later be called The Exploding 
Plastic Inevitable). After calling Empire “the most beautiful movie I’ve ever seen,” Rubin added, 
“I’m waiting till we project it in the sky.”77 The idea that the film could be projected in the sky 
rather than in a theater suggests that Rubin appreciated Warhol’s furniture aesthetic. She realized 
that the beauty of the film could best be apprehended when viewed casually and at leisure, the 
way one views an actual work of architecture. And the fact that Warhol uses a work of 
architecture to encourage a form of distracted spectatorship is especially compelling in light of 
Walter Benjamin’s remarks on architecture in his famous “Work of Art” essay: “Architecture has 
always offered the prototype of an artwork that is received in a state of distraction and through 
the collective.” Benjamin adds that “the optical reception of architecture […] takes the form of 
casual noticing rather than attentive observation”—precisely the form of reception that Warhol 
sought.
78
 When it is understood that a film like Empire is not (or at least, not only) a practical 
joke, but a furniture film that encourages a free and open-ended mode of visual consumption, the 
hostility directed at it tends to dissolve.
79
 I have witnessed this distinction in the classroom. 
When I have asked my students to watch just ten minutes or so of a static film from beginning to 
end in silence, the experience tends to be awkward and arduous. But when I have shown such 
films while conversing with students, telling jokes, sipping on beverages, and so on, everyone 
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suddenly finds themselves enjoying the screening. This is the kind of spectatorial shift that 
Warhol was interested in creating: “[T]hat had always fascinated me, the way people could sit by 
a window or a porch all day and look out and never be bored, but then if they went to a movie or 
a play, they suddenly objected to being bored. I always felt that a very slow film could be just as 
interesting as a porch-sit if you thought about it the same way.”80  
 This observation highlights another problem with seeing Warhol’s films as explorations 
of boredom: the term is generally used as a pejorative. When we call something boring, we often 
mean that it is laborious, even painful. When Warhol says that he likes boring things, however, 
he is not confessing to being some kind of masochist—he is expressing a fondness for the 
quotidian, the inconspicuous, the uneventful. This is the kind of “boredom” that one encounters 
when sitting on one’s porch, and it is a pleasant experience. Warhol is fascinated by those 
elements which recur ad infinitum in daily life, yet which are (or at least were) tacitly prohibited 
from being represented in art: soup cans, dollar signs, kitschy flowers, cartoon characters, 
wallpaper designs, consumer advertisements. And his films work in much the same way. 
Everything that is generally excised from cinematic representation becomes dominant in 
Warhol’s vision. When seeing a James Bond film, for example, one expects only the exciting 
parts of Bond’s life to be portrayed: shootouts, explosions, sexual liaisons. One can imagine 
what the audience reaction might be if—in the interest of realism—a film devoted a substantial 
amount of time to Bond sleeping, eating a meal, getting a haircut, and using the restroom. And 
yet, these uneventful events constitute the fabric of our existence. One is reminded here of E.M. 
Forster’s insight in A Passage to India: “Most of life is so dull that there is nothing to be said 
about it, and the books and talk that would describe it as interesting are obliged to exaggerate, in 
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the hope of justifying their own existence.”81 Warhol has little interest in exaggeration (and for 
that matter, little interest in justifying the existence of his art and films). He simply presents, 
without embellishment or commentary, the quotidian objects and routines that we usually seek to 
escape through art.
82
 This may be boring for some, but as Malcolm Le Grice emphasizes, 
Warholian boredom is “a functional boredom,”83 one which is deliberately employed to create a 
new kind of audience dynamic. The only reason that Warhol’s stillies are likely to evoke a 
painful kind of boredom is if one attends a screening expecting a traditional motion picture and 
waits for something to happen.
84
 But if one realizes that one is watching an uneventful furniture 
film, the experience is quite different. As Frances Colpitt contends,  it is often the case that when 
an audience becomes bored in the face of conceptual art (and Warhol is mentioned here as an 
example), “[t]he root of the problem is in the unpreparedness of the audience.”85  
 Susan Sontag’s remarks on boredom in her 1965 essay “One Culture and the New 
Sensibility” are apposite here. For Sontag, boredom is a problematic—and imprecise—term, 
particularly when used in the context of avant-garde art. It is often used simply to express 
dissatisfaction with works which run counter to audience expectations. As Sontag puts it, “There 
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is, in a sense, no such thing as boredom. Boredom is only another name for a certain species of 
frustration. And the new languages which the interesting art of our time speaks are frustrating to 
the sensibilities of most educated people.”86 In Sontag’s view, then, artists do not want their 
audiences to be bored by their work—although this may be a necessary byproduct of creating 
something which is truly new. It may take time for spectators to become acclimated to the 
radically heterogeneous, but once this is done, boredom will be replaced by interest. This is why 
Sontag claims that “the purpose of art is always, ultimately, to give pleasure—though our 
sensibilities may take time to catch up with the forms of pleasure that art in a given time may 
offer.”87 This “catching up” may take months or years, but it may also occur over the course of a 
single work. John Cage hoped for just such an epiphanic reversal when he staged the 
performance of Satie’s Vexations. He realized that some in the audience might initially be bored, 
but as he notes in his book Silence, “In Zen they say: If something is boring after two minutes, 
try it for four. If still boring, try it eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and so on. Eventually one discovers 
that it’s not boring at all but very interesting.”88 Or as Dick Higgins puts it, “Is [Vexations] 
boring? Only at first.” As time passes, Higgins argues, Vexations simply becomes a part of the 
“environment,” eventually engendering an ever-intensifying “euphoria.”89 Similarly, it may take 
a few minutes to resign oneself to the fact that nothing will happen in a film like Empire, but 
once one does so, the film moves into the background, and one is left with a startlingly unique 
cinematic experience, one that is potentially very interesting. As Wayne Koestenbaum puts it, 
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“Warhol’s images can seem stupid, mute, until you stare at them long enough to travel through 
stupefaction to illumination.”90 So if one insists on using the term boring to describe furniture 
art, then a clarification is in order: Vexations is not boring in the same way that the music of 
Andrew Lloyd Webber is boring, and the boredom evoked by Empire is not comparable to the 
kind engendered by a Paul W.S. Anderson film. This is not some snobby jeremiad about high 
and low art (both Satie and Warhol were intent on complicating such dichotomies). However, a 
fundamental distinction must be acknowledged: Webber and Anderson are trying to excite and 
captivate their audiences with works that are meant to be engrossing; Satie and Warhol are trying 
to create furniture art, works which can be casually tasted rather than greedily consumed.
91
  
 To further illustrate this point, it will be useful to examine a recent screening of Empire at 
The Museum of Modern Art. On February 19, 2011, the film was shown in its entirety to an 
audience who tweeted their responses to the experience (each tweet has been recorded in Mark 
Leach’s book #Empirefilm).92 Many of the tweets are cinephile wisecracks, very much in line 
with Warhol’s desire to “make comedy in the audience”: “I for one welcome today’s 
announcement that Michael Bay is on board to direct the 3D IMAX remake of Warhol’s 
‘Empire,’”93 “[S]ay what you want, but it still has a more sensible plot than [A]vatar,”94 etc. But 
many of the tweets also suggest the highly participatory nature of the cinematic experience. 
There are several discussions that suggest the pleasure the audience is deriving from watching 
the film while doing other things: whispering, telling jokes, eating popcorn, drinking whiskey, 
taking acid, and cheering. In fact, the audience seems to cheer—as if at a sporting event—
                                                 
90
 Koestenbaum, 11. 
91
 For extended analyses of the multivalence and complexity of boredom, see Patricia Meyer Spacks, Boredom: The 
Literary History of a State of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) and Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy 
of Boredom (London: Reaktion Books, 2011). 
92
 See Mark Leach, #Empirefilm (Lexington, KY: CreateSpace, 2011). 
93
 Ibid., 15-16. 
94
 Ibid., 37. 
62 
 
 
 
whenever there is any miniscule change on the screen: “[B]uilding’s floodlights went on!!! (The 
crowd erupts!!!)”95 Some have difficulty adjusting to this furniture aesthetic, particularly in an 
institution of high art—as one spectator tweeted, “I can’t believe I just shouted outloud [sic] in a 
@MuseumModernArt theater.”96 And it is striking how many tweets suggest that the experience 
was not boring (as many anticipated), but interesting and even (somewhat surprisingly) fast-
paced:  
 We thought #empirefilm would be endurance but it’s gone by so fast—and with great 
 entertainment. It’s really almost over?97 
 [T]ime has gone by surprisingly fast!!
98
 
 But seriously, I don’t find this boring at all.99 
And of course, the very idea of encouraging the audience to tweet during Empire (rather than 
directing them to turn their cell phones off, a standard injunction preceding screenings in 
mainstream venues) further suggests the central role of audience participation. (One spectator 
even asks, contra McLuhan, “[I]s film still a hot medium?”100) I suspect that Warhol would have 
been delighted to see the “cool,” active, participatory approach of the MoMA audience, an 
approach that made the experience of watching Empire anything but boring.   
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The furniture aesthetic that Warhol attempted to bring to the cinema was almost certainly 
inspired by his own habit of listening to the radio and watching TV distractedly. This habit was a 
crucial element in Warhol’s creative process: when painting, he found it useful to “have the radio 
blasting opera [or in some cases, rock and roll], and the TV picture on (but not the sound).”101 
(This configuration served as the basis for the premiere screening of Sleep, for which the silent 
image, televisual in its interminability, was accompanied by a radio tuned to a pop station: “[I]f a 
person were bored with the movie, he could just listen to the radio.”102) In other words, Warhol 
was intensely interested in—and inspired by—the furniture aesthetic in a broad range of media. 
Like Satie, he was committed to the value of artworks which could be attended to casually and 
intermittently, works which could be tasted rather than digested. As Satie passionately asserted, 
furniture music “fills the same role as light, warmth, and comfort in all its forms. […] A man 
who has not heard ‘Furniture Music’ does not know happiness.”103 One is tempted to say the 
same of the furniture film. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STASIS IN FLUXUS: 
DISAPPEARING MUSIC FOR FACE AND PROTRACTED CINEMA 
 
“Is the flight of a butterfly music?” – Milan Knížák1 
 
“The face is a veritable megaphone.” – Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari2 
 
 In the Fluxus film Disappearing Music for Face (based on an idea by Mieko Shiomi), the 
spectator is confronted by a single static shot of a mouth filmed in black and white. Since most 
of the face falls outside the shot, the mouth dominates the screen. The shot is intentionally off-
center, and consequently, only the left side of the face (including the cheek and a prominent 
dimple) is visible. The mouth is frozen into an open smile, revealing a significant gap between 
the front teeth (see Figure 1). Minutes pass. Nothing seems to change. One begins to wonder if 
the work is nothing more than a filmed photograph, since it seems devoid of any traces of 
movement (apart from the movement suggested by the imperfections of the film stock). After 
several minutes, however, a slight change becomes noticeable. The smile is still there, but it 
seems less pronounced. One cannot help but question this perception, since at no point has the 
mouth (or anything else in the mise-en-scène) moved—or has it? Could it be that staring at this 
static face for a lengthy period of time has produced an illusion of change?  
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Figure 1: George Maciunas and Mieko Shiomi, Disappearing Music for Face (1966) 
 
 After about five minutes, it becomes increasingly evident that the mouth (which belongs 
to Yoko Ono) has been moving, albeit at rate too slow to be perceived. (As Scott MacDonald 
describes it, “[V]iewers never actually see Ono’s mouth move; they only see that it has 
moved.”3) The smile is almost gone now, leaving only a trace of the original pleasure—it is 
evocative of the forced half-smiles that often appear in family photographs. Several minutes 
later, the smile has faded entirely, as has the dimple on the left cheek. The mouth is still slightly 
open, but the teeth can barely be seen. Eleven minutes into the film, the teeth have disappeared 
and the mouth that once smiled now curves slightly downward, in a pose that can be read as 
either neutral or melancholy (see Figure 2). The face is abruptly replaced by a black screen and 
the film ends. 
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Figure 2: George Maciunas and Mieko Shiomi, Disappearing Music for Face (1966) 
 
 In addition to being fascinating, strange, and (as Tony Conrad asserts) “beautiful,”4 
Disappearing Music for Face offers useful ways of thinking about cinematic stasis. It displays a 
fascination with stillness that was ubiquitous, not only in the works of Mieko Shiomi, but in the 
works of Fluxus artists more generally. In this chapter, I will attempt to map out the aesthetic and 
temporal dimensions of protracted films, works which (like Disappearing Music) use extreme 
slow motion to create the perception of stasis. I want to argue that, in addition to blurring the 
lines between cinema and photography, these experiments enable access to a series of interstitial 
moments which are generally hidden from perception. Further, it is my assertion that by 
manufacturing alternate temporalities, protracted films foreground the plasticity and contingency 
of time itself.  
 It will be useful to begin by contextualizing Disappearing Music and exploring its 
relationship to the other static films that were created by Fluxus artists. The brief opening credits 
claim that Disappearing Music is “by Chieko Shiomi” (who would later change her first name to 
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Mieko), and the (rather scant) scholarship on the film generally echoes this attribution. It is true 
that the film was based on one of Shiomi’s “action poems” of the same name (she later called 
them “event scores”). However, the film was actually made by George Maciunas, the leading 
figure in the Fluxus collective.
5
 The Shiomi event score which inspired the film reads as follows: 
 Change gradually from a smile to no smile. 
 In concert performers begin the piece with a smile, and during the duration of the piece, 
 change the smile very slowly and gradually to no smile. Conductor indicates the 
 beginning with a smile and determines the duration by his example which should be 
 followed by the orchestra.
6
 
Shiomi did not authorize Maciunas’ film version of her event score; in fact, she had already 
returned to Japan when the film was made in New York in 1966.
7
 When she first saw it, she was 
disappointed with the interpretation because “the mouth is not the only body part which can 
smile.”8 However, she has since come to accept that “George had no choice,” since if he had 
shown the entire face, the slow-motion blinking of Ono’s eyes might have become a humorous 
distraction from the smile itself. (Still, she emphasizes that the Maciunas film is just one possible 
cinematic interpretation of her work, and she hopes that other interpretations will arise in the 
future.
9
) 
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 Stasis is a central component in Shiomi’s event scores. For example, Music for Two 
Players I (1963) instructs two performers to look at each other, face to face, for an extended 
period of time (a gesture which is reminiscent of the staring games often played by children). 
Piece for a Small Puddle (1964) suggests gazing at one’s own reflection in a puddle. And 
Shadow Piece II (1964) reads as follows: 
 1 
 Project a shadow over the other side of this page. 
 2 
 Observe the boundary line between the shadow and the lighted part. 
 3 
 Become the boundary line.
10
 
 In all of these pieces, the reader (or performer) is instructed to stare at an essentially static 
person or object for a substantial period of time (the instructions for Music for Two Players I 
involve sustaining a gaze for a total of 20 minutes). Shiomi’s insistence on stillness provides an 
opportunity for quiet contemplation—as she puts it, “To concentrate you need stasis.”11 But why 
should one’s concentration be directed at such ordinary objects? This is, in fact, part of the 
raison d’être of Fluxus: by dissolving arbitrary boundaries between art and life, Fluxus artists 
sought to reveal the beauty of mundane objects (faces, puddles, shadows, etc.), objects that we 
frequently look at without seeing. In this sense, Fluxus has a clear precursor in Duchamp’s objets 
trouvés (his bicycle wheel, bottle rack, urinal, etc.). However, Fluxus goes one step further. As 
Wolf Vostell notes, Duchamp may have seen the ordinary urinal as an artwork, but the 
                                                 
10
 See Ken Friedman, Owen Smith, and Lauren Sawchyn, eds. The Fluxus Performance Workbook (A Performance 
Research e-Publication, 2002), 96-97, http://www.thing.net/~grist/ld/fluxusworkbook.pdf. 
11
 Shiomi, e-mail to author, May 20, 2011. 
69 
 
 
 
fundamental insight of Fluxus was that “using the urinal was equally an artistic activity.”12 Thus, 
it is not just the smile (and its absence) that Shiomi foregrounds, but the act of smiling (along 
with the cessation of this act). She sought to produce a “conversion of trivial actions into artistic 
performances.”13 
 I witness the disappearance of smiles several times each day, but until encountering 
Shiomi’s work, I never really experienced a disappearing smile as such. I would only notice the 
smile itself, or perhaps the pleasant statement or situation which occasioned it. However, the 
suggested protraction of this action in Shiomi’s event score (and its later realization in Maciunas’ 
film) enables one to see the smiles that are encountered on a daily basis as performances teeming 
with aesthetic value. The smile can be seen as a smile, freed of its contextual contingencies. In 
this sense, Shiomi is carrying on the tradition of John Cage (who was, along with Duchamp, one 
of the most important influences on Fluxus). As Cage states at the conclusion of his book 
Silence, “It behooves us […] to see each thing directly as it is, be it the sound of a tin whistle or 
the elegant [mushroom] Lepiota procera.”14 
 Shiomi’s dedication to the aesthetic value of stasis can be seen in the work of other 
Fluxus artists, as well. For example, several of Yoko Ono’s film scripts foreground stillness. 
Film No. 6 (A Contemporary Sexual Manual: 366 Sexual Positions) consists of nothing but a 
man, a woman, and their four-year-old daughter sleeping on a bed for an hour and a half. (As 
Ono mischievously remarks in the script, “[T]he 366 sexual positions are all in the mind of the 
audience.”15) And Ono’s Film No. 2 (Mona Lisa and Her Smile) script simply reads, “Ask 
audience to stare at a figure (ANY FIGURE) for a long time and then immediately turn their 
                                                 
12
 Quoted in Dorothée Brill, Shock and the Senseless in Dada and Fluxus (Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
England, 2010), 134. Emphasis added. 
13
 Shiomi, e-mail to author, May 20, 2011. Emphasis added. 
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 See Scott MacDonald and Yoko Ono, “Ideas on Film: Interview/Scripts,” Film Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1989): 18. 
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eyes to the screen and see their reflection.”16 But perhaps the most infamous example of stasis in 
Fluxus is provided by Jackson Mac Low, who in 1964 published a film script (of sorts) for a 
piece he called Tree Movie: 
 Select a tree*. Set up and focus a movie camera so that the tree* fills most of the picture. 
 Turn on the camera and leave it on without moving for any number of hours. If the 
 camera is about to run out of film, substitute a camera with fresh film. The two cameras 
 may be alternated in this way any number of times. Sound recording equipment may be 
 turned on simultaneously with the movie cameras. Beginning at any point in the film, any 
 length of it may be projected at a showing. 
 * For the word “tree,” one may substitute “mountain,” “sea,” “flower,” “lake,” etc.17 
 Like the aforementioned scripts by Ono and Mac Low, Maciunas’ Disappearing Music 
for Face is a part of the cinema of stasis, since it subverts the spectatorial expectations of 
movement and dynamism that are so central to most films. Unlike the scripts by Ono and Mac 
Low, however, the stasis in Disappearing Music is not achieved by giving attention to a static 
person or object. Rather, it finds stasis in flux, taking movement as its starting point and then 
slowing it down drastically to engender a sense of immobility. The filming of Ono’s 
disappearing smile with a high speed camera (along with the use of extreme slow motion) drains 
the action of its original vitality. Ono’s smile becomes—as far as the eye can tell—a static 
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object.
18
 For this reason, Disappearing Music is best understood as a protracted film, a work of 
cinema which uses extreme slowness to create the impression of stasis.   
 Several Fluxus artists, in fact, made use of this cinematic device. For example, Yoko 
Ono’s Eyeblink (1966) consists of a close-up of an eye blinking in extreme slow motion, and her 
film One (Match) (1966) applies the same process of protraction to the lighting of a match. Pieter 
Vanderbeck’s Five O’Clock in the Morning (1966) shows chestnuts and rocks falling at a 
drastically reduced speed, while in Joe Jones’ Smoking (1966), the simple and brief act of 
exhaling cigarette smoke is radically protracted so that it takes  almost five minutes to 
complete.
19
 Not only do these films generally deprive the viewer of any perception of movement, 
they do not even provide any implication of motion through montage (what Deleuze calls “pure 
mobility.”20) 
 How might one account for Fluxus artists’ fascination with stillness? Dorothée Brill 
provides a cogent theoretical framework. She notes that even though Fluxus has many affinities 
with Dada, its historical precursor, there is a crucial distinction. While Fluxus, like Dada, was not 
afraid to use sudden shock as an aesthetic strategy (e.g. Nam June Paik’s placement of a cow’s 
head hanging from the ceiling at one of his exhibitions in 1963), Fluxus also often moved in the 
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 Even though the film is based on an event score, the disappearing smile no longer seems to be an event at all, at 
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opposite direction, using a kind of boredom to produce a very different kind of experience: “By 
deliberately producing impulses that can be characterized as either unexpectedly strong or 
unexpectedly weak, Fluxus works attempt to resist their casual or incidental reception through 
the one or the other extreme. […] Since both shock and boredom run counter to the audience’s 
expectations, both were legitimate means for Fluxus artists either to jolt or drag the recipient into 
a mode of productive or engaged reception through a moment of irritation.”21 In other words, by 
offering stillness to an audience expecting movement, Fluxus artists deliberately engendered 
boredom as a strategy of subversion. As Paik put it (in his discussion of Mac Low’s Tree Movie), 
Fluxus was interested in generating a “meaningful boredom.”22   
 Additionally, by using stasis, Fluxus artists prompt the spectator to become more aware 
of the movement of her own body. Recall, for example, John Cage’s famous visit to Harvard’s 
anechoic chamber in 1952. Cage expected complete silence, but he was instead surprised to 
experience a heightened awareness of the sounds of his own body, the almost inaudible sounds 
of his “nervous system in operation” and his “blood in circulation,” moving him to remark, 
“Until I die there will be sounds.”23 (This experience, of course, inspired him to compose his 
landmark 4’33’’ later that year.) Similarly, the static mouth of Disappearing Music makes the 
spectator more aware of the subtle, often involuntary movements of her own mouth, while the 
static eye of Eyeblink heightens the viewer’s awareness of her own blinking. This attunement to 
the sounds and movements of one’s own body is a goal that Fluxus shares with Zen Buddhism 
(which Cage studied). As David T. Doris notes, in Zen Buddhism, “The act of sitting is 
perceived as a ‘dynamic stillness’—one sits in a rigorously prescribed posture, unmoving, yet 
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constituted by interior processes in constant motion: the heart beats, the blood courses through its 
vessels, air enters and is expelled through the lungs, the stomach churns away at its food…”24 
The protracted Fluxus films consequently encourage the spectator to become attuned to her own 
bodily movements, rather than seeking pleasure or engagement in the movements of others. 
 It is difficult to find many precedents for the unrelenting (and unsettling) quasi-
photographic stasis of these Fluxus films. Of course, Warhol’s early films (much like 
Disappearing Music) often focus on faces in stasis, as in his numerous screen tests, which 
frequently feature a stationary individual staring at the camera for several minutes. But the effect 
is quite different. Warhol’s subjects do move occasionally, however slight and subtle those 
movements might be (the blinking of the eyes, the shifting of the head, a slight quiver of the 
lips), while the image in Disappearing Music seems to never move—it only changes. Further, 
even though both Warhol and Fluxus use slow motion to engender a kind of immobility, they use 
it in radically different ways (although neither uses the type of slow motion that is generally 
employed in commercial cinema). I would not categorize Warhol’s stillies as protracted films, 
since the slow motion is so slight, it barely registers as slow motion. This is why many viewers 
of Warhol’s early cinema assume that what they are watching is “real time,” until they discover 
through research that his stillies were shot at 24 frames per second and screened at 16 (or 
sometimes 18) frames per second. (Of course, with certain Warhol films, the misperception is 
almost inevitable—in Empire, for example, how could one determine whether the Empire State 
Building is being shot at normal speed or slow motion?) Once one is aware of the slight 
protraction, however—particularly in a film that studies the human face, like Blow Job (1964)—
the temporal shift becomes palpable, inescapable. Each subtle movement performed becomes 
infused with lethargy and ennui. In Disappearing Music, the effect is of a different order. Here 
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too the viewer may not initially realize that the film is in slow motion, but this is only because 
the motion is so slow that it no longer seems to be motion at all. Disappearing Music (along with 
the other protracted Fluxus films) was shot at 2,000 frames per second, so that a few seconds of 
real time become stretched almost indefinitely, to the point that time seems to freeze altogether.
25
 
 The technological process used to create Disappearing Music results in an extreme slow 
motion—a hyperstasis. Not only is it distinct from the less pronounced slow motion used by 
Warhol, or even that used by more mainstream filmmakers (such as Scorsese in Raging Bull 
[1980]), it is also distinct from the extreme slow motion used in many other experimental films. 
Take, for example, Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho (1993), in which Hitchcock’s Psycho 
(1960) is slowed down dramatically (and stripped of its soundtrack); a film that initially had a 
running length of 109 minutes now takes a full day to view in its entirety. Even though both 
Disappearing Music and 24 Hour Psycho are protracted films, there is a crucial difference. Since 
Psycho was shot at a standard speed (24 frames per second), slowing it down dramatically 
deconstructs its continuity. The film becomes a series of still photographs in sequence, and what 
was initially perceived as movement now appears fragmentary. With Disappearing Music, 
however, the continuity is maintained—one no longer gets the impression of looking at a series 
of photographs, but at a single photograph. Consequently, the film places itself squarely at the 
intersection between cinema and photography. It is ontologically cinematic, phenomenologically 
photographic. 
 There is another crucial difference between these two protracted films that is worth 
noting: while the inordinate length of 24 Hour Psycho (like Warhol’s early stillies) elicits a 
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partial and distracted form of spectatorship, the protracted Fluxus films are brief, encouraging a 
close meditative gaze. Such an approach enables the spectator to see dimensions of everyday 
objects and experiences that are ordinarily invisible. For Bergson, this is the function of art: “to 
make us see what we do not naturally perceive.”26 And as James Broughton has argued, cinema 
is uniquely positioned to do just this: “Film is a way of seeing what has been looked at by 
everyone else and never really seen.”27 This is precisely the effect of the protracted Fluxus films. 
The extreme slowness of these works exposes us to elements of our everyday viewing experience 
which are always present, but which never present themselves to us. As such, they offer a rare 
glimpse into microtime, the infinitesimal intervals of duration which form the backdrop of every 
experience.
28
 For most of human history, these temporal interstices existed beneath the threshold 
of perception—only with the advent of the cinematographic apparatus did microtime become 
affectively accessible. The title of Shiomi’s event score—Disappearing Music for Face—hints at 
her interest in such interstitial moments. It is not necessarily the smile itself that interests Shiomi, 
nor is it the non-smile—rather, it is the disappearance, the space between the two affective 
states. While disappearing normally involves making the visible invisible, the film version of 
Disappearing Music for Face does just the opposite: it offers access to the hidden dimensions of 
a visual experience, and consequently makes the invisible visible. (This tradition is carried on in 
numerous video installations by Bill Viola, such as Anima [2000] and Dolorosa [2000], in which 
extreme slow motion is again used to access temporal interstices. Viola’s comments on these 
protracted installations could apply with equal force to a film like Disappearing Music: “I was 
most interested in opening up the spaces between the emotions. I wanted to focus on gradual 
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transitions—the idea of emotional expression as a continual fluid motion. This meant that the 
transitions, the ambiguous time when you shift from being happy to sad, is [sic] just as important 
as the main emotion itself.”29) 
 One is reminded here of Deleuze’s theorization of the evental. The event, in Deleuze’s 
view, is not merely the moment that something happens—rather, “events always involve periods 
when nothing happens. It’s not even a matter of there being such periods before and after some 
event, they’re part of the event itself.”30 For Deleuze, these periods in which “nothing happens” 
are routinely overlooked by the mass media, and so they are best interrogated by art. 
(Interestingly, he cites the films of Ozu and Antonioni as examples here—among the most static 
films outside of the avant-garde—since in these works, “the periods in which nothing happens 
don’t fall between two events, they’re in the events themselves, giving events their depth.”31) 
Through their use of extreme slow motion, protracted films like Disappearing Music are 
especially well suited to plumb these Deleuzian depths. They posit ordinary events as both 
actions and non-actions, movements and non-movements. If, as Deleuze asserts, “People miss 
the amazing wait in events they were least awaiting,”32 Disappearing Music reinstates this 
immanent (albeit overlooked) period of waiting that undergirds the evental. As a consequence of 
the inordinate slowness of protracted films, one no longer waits for an event—rather (as in the 
plays of Beckett) waiting becomes the event. 
                                                 
29
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 Pudovkin was one of the first film theorists to note the great cinematic potential of slow 
motion; he was excited by “[t]he disconcerting strangeness of retarded movements on the screen, 
the possibility of perceiving forms that ordinarily are imperceptible and invisible, yet none the 
less existent in actuality.”33  (This sentiment is precisely what inspired Gordon to make 24 Hour 
Psycho; when he first began to watch Psycho at a reduced speed, he remarked, “It was as if the 
slow motion revealed the unconscious of the film.”34) Maya Deren was similarly enthusiastic 
about the aesthetic possibilities of slow-motion. Since art forms like dance and theater were 
already capable of utilizing motion for artistic purposes, Deren believed that it was incumbent on 
serious filmmakers to use cinema to “discover a new dimension altogether of movement.” For 
Deren, slow motion represented one such new dimension, since it could be “brought to the most 
casual activities to reveal in them a texture of emotional and psychological complexes.” Just as 
the close-up enabled one to excavate the recesses of space, slow motion enabled the excavation 
of new temporalities. In Deren’s view, “Slow-motion is the microscope of time.”35  
Of course, Disappearing Music offers not only a temporal “close-up,” but a spatial one, 
as well: the slow-motion photography works in conjunction with the extreme close-up of Ono’s 
face to amplify the sense that one is perceiving the imperceptible. By distorting both the size and 
speed of an everyday experience, Disappearing Music confronts the spectator with the  manifold 
nuances that lurk beneath ostensibly atomistic actions. While the film’s slowness enables one to 
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see the interstices of temporal duration, the sheer size of Ono’s mouth permits an entrance into 
what Béla Balázs called “the world of microphysiognomy,” permitting the perception of 
elements of the human face “which even the most observant partner would never perceive.”36 In 
addition to providing a heightened sense of visual perception, the extreme close-up results in a 
face that is imposing, even overwhelming. (One is reminded of Sergei Eisenstein’s Kafkaesque 
observation that “the laws of cinematographic perspective are such that a cockroach filmed in 
close-up appears on the screen one hundred times more formidable than a hundred elephants in 
medium-long shot.”37)  
But the fact that the object being filmed in Disappearing Music is a human face (rather 
than anything else) amplifies its affective intensity. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari challenge conventional theorizations of the face which see it as a locus of compassion 
and humanity. Instead, they argue that the human face is “a horror story,”38 adding, “The face is 
not animal, but neither is it human in general; there is even something absolutely inhuman about 
the face. […] The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start.”39 Deleuze 
and Guattari are quick to note that they are speaking of the face as such, not merely one which 
has been modified or magnified in some way; in fact, they insist that the face is “by nature a 
close-up.”40 Nevertheless, a film like Disappearing Music, by offering an extreme close-up of 
this close-up, infinitely magnifies the face’s immanent inhumanity. As Mary Ann Doane asserts, 
“The scale of the close-up transforms the face into an instance of the gigantic, the monstrous: it 
overwhelms.”41 This description is especially apropos for the face of Disappearing Music, since 
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the magnification is even more extreme than the kind used in a traditional close-up. We are so 
close to the face that much of it falls outside the frame. All that remains is an enormous, 
grotesque, disembodied mouth. Its size on the cinema screen is so formidable that one can 
imagine being devoured by it, in much the same way that Judas, Brutus, and Cassius are eaten by 
Satan at the end of Dante’s Inferno.42  
All of this is to suggest that one experiences a peculiar intensity when watching 
Disappearing Music. The film’s minimalism, its stark simplicity, may seem to be deliberately 
boring, but those who view it in its entirety are often surprised to find just how gripping the film 
is. Michael Kirby (in an article on the ontological-hysteric theater of Richard Foreman) discusses 
the powerful affective responses engendered by temporal protraction. While Kirby is primarily 
concerned with theatrical (rather than cinematic) slow motion, his remarks remain relevant in 
theorizing protracted cinema:  
[A]rtificially slowing down the rate of change in the perceptual field may […] create  
what can be thought of as intensification through analogy. When the mind is involved  
with a crisis situation, things often seem to be happening in slow motion. The mind  
responds so actively that the progress of the skidding car seems retarded; each detail  
seems more sharply defined than it would be normally. A performance done in slow  
motion can create, by analogy, the same sense of crisis. The amount of information and  
the complexity of detail perceived are much greater than would be registered unless the  
mind were responding rapidly to a crisis situation. Even when the occurrences observed  
                                                 
42
 Since Disappearing Music, several films have exploited the disconcerting intensity of the massive mouth. I am 
thinking here of the opening of Jim Sharman’s The Rocky Horror Picture Show (1975), as well as the film versions 
of Samuel Beckett’s Not I (1972), including a filmed performance of the play from 1973 (starring Billie Whitelaw) 
and a more recent version directed by Neil Jordan in 2000. 
80 
 
 
 
are not dangerous or threatening, the retardation of flow creates psychic intensification.
43
 
Even if the slow motion of the protracted Fluxfilms is too extreme to evoke a sense of crisis per 
se, the temporal shift does nonetheless engender “psychic intensification.” The face’s eerie 
quiescence becomes absorbing, unnerving. As Deleuze and Guattari rightly assert, “[T]he 
slowest of movements […] is not the least intense.”44 
 But describing the visual dimensions of Disappearing Music is insufficient. As the title of 
Shiomi’s event score implies, the fading smile is meant to have an auditory dimension as well. 
Music represented a major influence (and a point of departure) for Fluxfilms. (This is 
unsurprising, since many of the Fluxus filmmakers, such as Joe Jones, were primarily known as 
avant-garde musicians.) Shiomi could have titled her work Disappearing Smile, but by calling it 
Disappearing Music for Face (and by calling her writings event scores) she draws attention to 
the profound affinities that her work shares with music. Of course, the difficulty of clearly 
taxonomizing the event scores of Shiomi is due in part to their status as interventions in 
intermedia. But this difficulty is also part of their aesthetic. Some of the instructions in Shiomi’s 
event scores could easily be performed (it is not particularly difficult to stare at a puddle), but 
other event scores command the performer to engage in actions which are clearly impossible: 
Star Piece (1963), for example, instructs the reader to find “[t]he third biggest star” and “[s]hoot 
it with a gun.”45 (Nam June Paik’s event scores also frequently offer instructions for actions that 
must surely be carried out only in the mind, such as his famous admonition to “climb into the 
vagina of a live whale”46—an action that is, if not technically impossible, at least wildly 
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improbable.) Of course, a score that cannot actually be performed would seem to veer more 
towards poetry than music; after all, it is possible to perform a Chopin étude, but it is not 
possible to literally “eat men like air.” But Fluxus artists were intent on subverting such tidy 
distinctions. In this, they took their lead from Cage. When he was asked why he wrote musical 
scores that were too long to actually be performed, he responded, “Composing’s one thing, 
performing’s another, listening’s a third. What can they have to do with one another?”47 The 
synaesthetic title of Shiomi’s event score (and the film it inspired), then, prompts the viewer to 
see a fading smile as a kind of musical performance, one that anyone can perform. It also 
encourages one to listen to a fading smile.  
 This may seem like an meaningless admonition. Can a smile (and its subsequent 
disappearance) be heard? In the absence of laughter, it is difficult to imagine literally hearing the 
smile of another person. Still, the Shiomi score certainly might inspire an individual to listen to 
his own smile, which could potentially produce barely audible sounds (changes in breathing, the 
movement of one’s saliva, etc.). It is true that Maciunas’ film version of Disappearing Music is 
completely silent, so any attempts to listen to Ono’s fading smile will be fruitless; nevertheless, 
the very act of attempting to listen to something which makes no noise can effect a kind of 
aesthetic enlightenment. Fluxus composer La Monte Young was well aware of this. This is why 
his Composition 1960 #5 (1960) consists only of “[t]urn[ing] a butterfly (or any number of 
butterflies) loose in the performance area.” While this may seem like an worthwhile piece of 
experimental theater or conceptual art, Young insisted on calling it as a musical composition. 
When a puzzled Tony Conrad admitted that he did not understand this work, Young responded, 
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“Isn’t it wonderful if someone listens to something he is ordinarily supposed to look at?”48 On 
another occasion, Young  asserted, “[I]t didn’t seem to me at all necessary that anyone or 
anything should have to hear sounds […] it is enough that they exist for themselves.”49 Like 
other Fluxus artists (and like Cage himself) Young was intent on radically expanding the 
definition of music. Any event—whether it produced sound or not—had a certain musicality. As 
George Brecht would later put it, “Music isn’t just what you hear or what you listen to, but 
everything that happens…Events are an extension of music.”50 Disappearing Music, then, can be 
conceptualized as a kind of silent music. (Of course, if one attempts to listen to Maciunas’ and 
Shiomi’s film, one may still come to appreciate the sounds of one’s immediate environment: the 
hum of the film projector, for example, or—for the true Cagean—the noise of one’s own nervous 
system and blood flow.)   
 Like Cage, Young, and Brecht, what interests Shiomi about music is not aurality but 
temporality. She claims that “the essence of music” is “the very recognition of time itself—the 
duration of time that is not necessarily realized as sound.”51 A Shiomi event often causes one to 
“feel the slow process of a banal action as a static musical duration.”52 Experiments in “static 
musical duration,” then, can be seen as important precursors to the protracted Fluxfilms. Again, 
the composer most closely associated with “static” music is almost certainly La Monte Young. 
His Composition 1960 #7 (1960) is simply a sustained open fifth (a B and an F#) “held for a long 
time,” while the score for his Composition 1960 #9 (1960) consists only of a horizontal line (this 
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is generally performed as a single tone sustained for a significant duration).
53
 However, over a 
decade before these compositions, Yves Klein paved the way for static music with his seminal 
Monotone Symphony (1949), in which a single chord is heard without interruption over the 
course of 20 minutes (followed by another 20 minutes of proto-Cagean silence). In traditional 
music, a chord is merely a link in a musical chain, one which takes on meaning only in the 
context of other chords or notes. But here, the chord is stripped of any contextualization and 
exists for its own sake. The listener hears a chord as such, and appreciates its aesthetic value in a 
way that would be impossible if it were part of a melody. In much the same way, Shiomi and 
Maciunas take an action that would normally occur only fleetingly and allow it to exist purely, 
without cause, effect, or justification. Of course, Klein’s chord (like the fading smile of 
Maciunas’ film) must occur for a significant duration of time in order for its import to be 
appreciated. A chord or a smile lasting only a second or two will not be fully apprehended. But 
by stretching time, both Klein and Maciunas create aesthetic experiences in which time loses 
meaning, both as an organizing principle and as a phenomenological constant. In both works, 
time seems to stretch to the point of tearing, leaving only naked duration in its wake. While 
Aristotle asserted that “thinking that time does not exist […] happens when we do not distinguish 
any change,”54 I would argue that this statement only holds true for chronological time. 
Psychological time, on the other hand (that is, Bergsonian durée), is at its most salient when no 
                                                 
53
 In 1964, Young agreed to provide his Composition 1960 #9 as a soundtrack to Andy Warhol’s Quartet 
Installation. The composition was realized as a very loud recording of a sustained tone produced by a bowed brass 
mortar. When officials asked Young to turn down the volume, he withdrew his composition altogether, leaving 
Warhol’s four films to continue playing in silence. See Joseph, “My Mind Split Open,” 83-86. For an exemplary 
analysis of Young’s oeuvre and its aesthetic significance, see also Branden W. Joseph’s Beyond the Dream 
Syndicate: Tony Conrad and the Arts after Cage (New York: Zone Books, 2008). 
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 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 105. 
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change is perceived. This is what enables both static cinema and static music to engender a 
corporealized sense of duration.
55
  
 In fact, I would argue that films like Disappearing Music offer profound insights about 
time itself, laying bare its plasticity and contingency. As many philosophers have noted, 
conceptualizing—or even defining—time has proven to be notoriously problematic. (Recall 
Saint Augustine’s formulation: “What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I 
want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know.”56) The immediate temptation is to hypostatize 
time by conceptualizing it as a river. But as J.J.C. Smart points out in his seminal 1949 essay 
“The River of Time,” this metaphor begs the question, how fast does the river run? And to speak 
of the river of time moving quickly or slowly presupposes that time itself exists in time.
57
 As 
Smart puts it, “[J]ust as we thought of the first time-dimension as a stream, so will we want to 
think of the second time-dimension as a stream also; now the speed of flow of the second stream 
is a rate of change with respect to a third time-dimension, as so we can go on indefinitely 
postulating fresh streams without being any better satisfied.”58 (Deleuze makes a similar 
observation in his second Cinema book: “[E]verything that changes is in time, but time does not 
                                                 
55
 Another notable composer of static music is Steve Reich. In his Four Organs (1970), the titular instruments 
continually repeat a chord that gradually extends in duration until it (and its constituent notes) transmute into a 
seemingly static wall of sound. Interestingly, Reich has conceptualized Four Organs as “a sort of slow motion 
music,” which suggests that extreme slowness (whether in music or film) can effectively engender a sense of stasis, 
one that permits the experience of duration as such. See Steve Reich, Writings on Music, 1965-2000, ed. Steve 
Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44.  
 Given Reich’s saliently cinematic description of Four Organs, one cannot help but wonder if it was in any 
way inspired by Michael Snow’s famous protracted film Wavelength, in which the camera’s move from one end of a 
room to another takes 45 minutes to complete. Reich saw the film and wrote about it in 1968. See Steve Reich, 
“Wavelength by Michael Snow,” in Campany, The Cinematic, 106-107. 
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 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 230. 
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 J.J.C. Smart, “The River of Time,” Mind 58, no. 232 (1949): 483-494. This kind of assumption is ubiquitous in 
popular discourse. For example, astrophysicists are frequently asked, “What existed before the big bang?” But since 
the big bang represents the advent of spacetime, this may be a meaningless question. To ask what came before time 
itself assumes the existence of some kind of metatime. As Stephen Hawking has famously suggested, asking what 
existed before the Big Bang may be comparable to asking what is south of the South Pole. See Stephen Hawking, 
“Hawking on the Future of Mankind,” BBC News, January 6, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/ 
newsid_9672000/9672233.stm 
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 Smart, 484. 
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itself change, it could itself change only in another time, indefinitely.”59) As Smart notes, to ask 
“[H]ow fast am I advancing through time?” or “How fast did time flow yesterday?” is almost 
incomprehensible: “What sort of measurements ought we to make? We do not even know the 
sort of units in which our answer should be expressed. ‘I am advancing through time at how 
many seconds per — ?’ we might begin, and then we should have to stop. What could possibly 
fill the blank? Not ‘seconds’ surely. In that case the most we could hope for would be the not 
very illuminating remark that there is just one second in every second.”60 
 But by constructing an alternate temporality, a film like Disappearing Music offers one 
way of thinking through this paradox. It provides a point of departure, a temporal counterpoint 
that enables us to imagine other speeds at which time could flow. The film advances through 
time at approximately 1 second per 83 seconds (and so, in contrast, one could argue that “real” 
time is now moving at 83 seconds per second, at least if Disappearing Music is used as the 
measuring rod). While Kant emphasized that “different times are not simultaneous, but 
successive,”61 Disappearing Music allows one to provisionally experience different temporalities 
simultaneously. Of course, the film can only be viewed in “real” time, but one’s perception of 
duration is inescapably altered by staring at this universe in which time has been radically 
transmogrified. That is, the extreme slowness of time in the film seems to bleed through to the 
real world, and the viewer’s own bodily movements unconsciously decelerate in response to 
Ono’s impossibly slow smile.  
 One of the most thoughtful analyses of the temporality of film is provided by Jean 
Epstein, in a short essay entitled “Timeless Time.” For Epstein, the cinematograph, by extending 
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 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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or condensing duration, “demonstrates the variable nature of time.”62 “[B]y ‘laminating’ time to 
demonstrate its extreme malleability,” film “seems to free us of terrestrial—that is, solar—time, 
from whose rhythm, it seemed, nothing would ever dislodge us. We feel introduced to a new 
universe, to another continuum in which […] a special time reigns, a local time which constitutes 
an enclave within earth time, which is itself merely a local time.”63 For Epstein, the fluid 
temporality of cinema implicitly undermines any attempt to reify time. Film exposes the 
destabilizing truth that “[t]ime contains nothing that can be called time-in-itself any more than 
space is comprised of space-in-itself. They are only composed, one as much as the other, of 
relationships, variable in their essence, between appearances which are produced successively or 
simultaneously. That is why there can be thirty-six different times and twenty kinds of space just 
as there can be innumerable specific perspectives depending upon the infinitely diverse positions 
of objects and their observer.”64 In other words, cinema is uniquely positioned to expose the 
contingency (even the arbitrariness) of our temporal coordinates. By radically protracting 
movement, one imagines other speeds at which the river of time could (perhaps even does) flow. 
Of course, the fact that time is relative has been understood since Einstein, but film is capable of 
offering affective access to these radically different temporalities in a way that is unrivaled by 
any other art form. When viewing Disappearing Music, one does not simply imagine time 
slowing down—one feels the temporal protraction. As the spectator becomes immersed in a new 
timescape—one in which there is no movement, only change—bodily processes begin to slow 
down, and one feels weightless. The screen’s unrelenting stasis provokes a hypnagogic reverie in 
which time itself seems to melt (as if one has entered Dalí’s painting The Persistence of Memory 
[1931]). 
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 Ever since the slow-motion experimentation of Fluxfilms, protracted films have remained 
a vital and provocative modality within avant-garde cinema. For example, James Broughton and 
Joel Singer’s Hermes Bird displays a penis becoming erect over the course of 11 minutes (“the 
slowest ascension of a penis that has ever been seen,” in Broughton’s words65), while in Michael 
Snow’s See You Later/Au Revoir (1990), an ordinary 30-second farewell is stretched out to over 
17 minutes. And in recent years, some filmmakers have taken this process of temporal 
protraction to new extremes. For example, in James Coleman’s film La tache aveugle (The Blind 
Spot), a very small amount of footage (less than a second) from James Whale’s The Invisible 
Man is slowed down so that each individual frame remains on screen for about 20 minutes (the 
work as a whole lasts eight hours). Douglas Gordon ups the ante still further with 5 Year Drive-
By (1995), in which John Ford’s western The Searchers (1956) is radically protracted, resulting 
in a film that would take an entire five years to screen.
66
 While the Fluxus artists construct an 
alternate temporality in which it takes over a minute for a second to pass, in La tache aveugle 
and 5 Year Drive-By, it takes several hours for a second to pass. Obviously, there are crucial 
distinctions to be made between Disappearing Music and a film like 5 Year Drive-By: for 
example, the protracted Fluxus films were designed to be seen in their entirety, but it would be 
practically impossible to see 5 Year Drive-By from beginning to end. Still, several important 
commonalities inhere in protracted cinema. These experiments in filmic duration all use extreme 
slow motion to derive stasis from flux, thus opening up opportunities to reflect on microtime, 
interstitial moments which regularly escape our perceptual awareness. Protracted films also 
manufacture alternate temporalities which modulate the experience of duration, effectively 
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 James Broughton, All: A James Broughton Reader, ed. Jack Foley (Brooklyn: White Crane Books, 2006), 162. 
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unmasking the contingency of time itself. If, as André Bazin asserts, “[F]ilm delivers baroque art 
from its convulsive catalepsy,”67 protracted cinema represent a renewed embrace of the 
cataleptic. By stilling the incessant movement of mainstream cinematic praxis, these films 
eschew momentum, and instead seek to excavate the multiplicity of the momentary. 
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 André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” in What Is Cinema? Volume I, trans. Hugh Gray 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 14-15. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STRUCTURING TIME: MICHAEL SNOW’S SO IS THIS AND THE TEXTUAL FILM 
 
“Unlike a book in your hand, a film keeps on going whether you like it or not. For it has an 
existence of its own. A microcosm larger than life, its boundaries are boundless.” – James 
Broughton
1
 
 
“The film of tomorrow will be lettrist and composed of subtitles. If at its conception cinema was 
by virtue of its images an attack on reading, the day will come when the cinema will be a mere 
form of reading.” – Isidore Isou2 
 
 Marcel Duchamp’s Anémic Cinéma (1926) is one of the  most unusual films ever made, 
even by the standards of the early European avant-garde. It is partly comprised of a series of 
filmed roto-reliefs, vertiginous rotating spirals moving at variety of speeds. If this were Anémic 
Cinéma’s sole content, it would be a compelling abstract film in the tradition of Walter 
Ruttmann’s Lichtspiel Opus I (1921), Hans Richter’s Rhythmus 21 (1921), and Viking 
Eggeling’s Symphonie Diagonale (1924). However, the shots of the roto-reliefs are interspersed 
with shots of ostensibly nonsensical written text: spinning phrases replete with alliteration, puns, 
and sexually suggestive double entendres (see Figure 1). Here is a sampling of Duchamp’s 
Dadaist wordplay:  
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 Quoted in Follow Your Own Weird, 31. 
2
 Quoted in Thomas Y. Levin, “Dismantling the Spectacle: The Cinema of Guy Debord,” McDonough, 441-442. 
Italics in original. The passage is taken from Isou’s obscure 1954 film Apology of a Unique Personality (Apologie 
d’un personnage unique). 
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 The child who nurses is a sucker of hot flesh and does not like the cauliflower of the hot 
 glass-house.  
 If I give you a penny, will you give me a pair of scissors [i.e. a fuck]?  
 Incest or family passion, in blows too drawn out.  
 Have you ever put the marrow of the sword into the stove of the loved one?
3
 
        
 
Figure 1: Marcel Duchamp, Anémic Cinéma (1926) 
  
The centrality of language in Anémic Cinéma challenged the widespread assumption that 
imagery—whether abstract or representational—was to be film’s sole currency. Duchamp’s 
cinematic vision was far more inclusive. He clearly sided with Surrealist poet Robert Desnos, 
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 Translations from the French text are taken from Katrina Martin, “Marcel Duchamp’s Anémic Cinéma,” Studio 
International 189, no. 973 (1975): 53-60. Given the complexity and polysemy of the original French text, Martin 
correctly points out that a faithful English translation of Anémic Cinéma is “impossible.” 
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who asserted, “Everything that can be projected on the screen belongs in the cinema, letters as 
well as faces.”4   
 Written text in a film was nothing new, of course—text had frequently been used in 
cinematic introductions, credit sequences, and intertitles. Indeed, intertitles were so ubiquitous in 
the era of silent cinema that the handful of films that disavowed from them—such as F.W. 
Murnau’s The Last Laugh (1924), Dimitri Kirsanoff’s Ménilmontant (1926), and Dziga Vertov’s 
Man with a Movie Camera—were the exceptions that proved the rule.5 Still, Anémic Cinéma’s 
use of text departed dramatically from its predecessors. Unlike conventional cinematic text, 
Duchamp’s language served no narrative (or even paratextual) purpose. Instead, the function of 
the words was primarily poetic (or, in the spirit of Dadaism, anti-poetic). Text no longer needed 
to be relegated to a subservient role—in the post-Duchampian world, the written word could be 
just as central to a film as imagery.
6
 The door had been opened for a new kind of cinema: the 
textual film. Rather than being composed of photographic or animated imagery, these works 
would foreground letters, words, numbers, punctuation marks, and other forms of written or 
typographical text—challenging what Hollis Frampton has called the “logophobia” endemic to 
cinema and other visual arts.
7
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 Quoted in P. Adams Sitney, “Image and Title in Avant-Garde Cinema,” October 11 (1979): 102. 
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 And silent films without intertitles did not necessarily forgo written text altogether. For example, as Scott 
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imagery.” See Scott MacDonald, ed. Screen Writings: Scripts and Texts by Independent Filmmakers (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), 2. 
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are subservient to cinematic imagery—than Duchamp’s more autonomous text.  
 Interestingly, Man Ray, who assisted Duchamp in the filming of Anémic Cinéma, would go on to make 
several films of his own that used written text for poetic (rather than diegetic) effect, such as L'Étoile de Mer (The 
Starfish) (1928) and Les Mystères du Château de Dé (The Mysteries of the Chateau of Dice) (1929).  
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 The prominence of text in avant-garde film has received a fair amount of scholarly 
attention.
8
 However, the implications of these intermedia experiments have not yet been 
adequately theorized. I want to argue that text-based cinema both challenges widespread 
preconceptions of what a film can do (and be), while highlighting cinema’s unique ability to 
modulate duration. Nowhere are the theoretical implications of textual cinema made clearer than 
in Michael Snow’s So Is This, a self-referential film in which individual words appear on screen, 
one at a time, gradually forming a series of statements which are alternately philosophical, 
facetious, and false. I will claim that textual films like So Is This help to demonstrate the folly of 
ontologies of cinema that prescribe necessary conditions. I will also argue for a more 
Wittgensteinian approach to conceptualizing film, one that recognizes the boundless elasticity of 
concepts like film and language. However, before analyzing So Is This, it will be useful to situate 
the work within the broader context of Snow’s cinematic oeuvre. 
 One of the most undertheorized elements in Snow’s aesthetic is his fascination with 
stasis. In some of his films, movement is minimal, as is the case in Dripping Water (1969) (co-
directed with his wife, Joyce Wieland) in which the only movement portrayed is water dripping 
into a dish.
9
 In other Snow films, the movement is extremely slow, giving the viewer an 
impression of stasis. (Snow’s protracted films include his widely revered Wavelength, a 45-
minute zoom from one end of a room to another, and See You Later/Au Revoir, in which an 
ordinary 30-second farewell is expanded to 18 minutes.) And Snow is not afraid to push his 
interest in stasis to its logical conclusion: in several of his films, there is no on-screen movement 
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 The most notable scholar in the field of text-based cinema is undoubtedly Scott MacDonald. In addition to the 
aforementioned Screen Writings, see his “Text as Image in Some Recent North American Avant-Garde Films,” 
Afterimage 13, no. 8 (1986): 9-20.  
9
 Dripping Water appears to be a cinematic interpretation of George Brecht’s event score Drip Music (Drip Event) 
(1959), the instructions for which simply read, “A source of dripping water and an empty vessel are arranged so that 
the water falls into the vessel.” See Friedman, Smith, and Sawchyn, 22. Snow’s film represents a distinctive 
“performance” of Brecht’s score, however, since the water falling into the vessel and the dripping heard on the 
sound track are deliberately asynchronous. 
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at all. One Second in Montreal (1969) consists only of photographs, Side Seat Paintings Slides 
Sound Film (1970) offers only paintings, and A Casing Shelved is simply a color slide of a 
bookshelf accompanied by Snow’s voice describing the items on it. Clearly, Snow is intent on 
challenging conceptions of cinema which see movement as its essence. As he puts it, “The basis 
of cinema as a technology is stasis; the fundamental unit is the still photograph. Motion is made 
from the perception of fast stills.”10 
 Snow’s fascination with cinematic stasis is particularly salient in So Is This. This “motion 
picture” is motionless and pictureless—it consists only of immobile typographical text.11 In other 
words, So Is This serves as a reminder that both imagery and movement are merely contingent—
not necessary—components of film. Like so many of the static films thus far considered, what is 
preeminent here is not movement, but duration. In fact, Snow has claimed that “controlling 
durations” is the starting point of his cinematic practice, and that So Is This and One Second in 
Montreal represent his “purest uses of duration.”12 As the text itself indicates, “The / decision / 
has / been / made / to / concentrate / on / the / distinctive / capacity / of / film / to / structure / 
time.”13 While Snow is correct to assert that film has a unique ability “to / structure / time,” 
film’s status as “a time form” (to borrow Maya Deren’s memorable phrase)14 has been 
challenged by some theorists. Thus, before making an argument about the temporality of textual 
films (and of cinema writ large), it will be necessary to address these criticisms.  
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 Michael Snow, e-mail to author, October 21, 2011. 
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 It is worth noting that not all textual films are static. For example, the text of Richard Serra and Carlotta Fay 
Schoolman’s Television Delivers People (1973) continuously scrolls from the bottom of the screen upwards, in the 
style of closing credits. 
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 Annette Michelson and Michael Snow, “The Sound of Music: A Conversation with Michael Snow,” October 114 
(2005): 56. 
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 Slashes do not appear in So Is This. However, the fact that words only appear one at a time is destabilizing for the 
reader/viewer. I use slashes when quoting from the film to elicit a comparable reading experience, one that is stilted 
and desultory. 
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 Deren, “Cinematography,” 160. 
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The most prominent argument against film’s status as a temporal art form runs like this: 
“Everything takes place in time. Therefore, film is only temporal in the trivial sense that 
everything is temporal. After all, even paintings and sculptures must be looked at for a certain 
duration (even if it is a very brief one) in order to be apprehended.” One of the most prominent 
proponents of this view is Anthony McCall (most famous for his seminal work of expanded 
cinema Line Describing a Cone [1973]). In McCall’s view, “[E]verything that occurs, including 
the process of looking and thinking, occurs in time and […] therefore, the distinction [between 
temporal and atemporal art] is absurd.”15 This is a seductive claim, one that is worthy of careful 
attention. Here is a more extended version of McCall’s argument: 
  Everything that occurs, including the (electrochemical) process of thinking, occurs in 
 time. […] Art that does not show change within our time-span of attending to it we tend 
 to regard as ‘object.’ Art that does show change within our time-span of attending to it 
 we regard as ‘event.’ Art that outlives us we tend to regard as ‘eternal.’ What is at issue is 
 that we ourselves are the division that cuts across what is essentially a sliding scale of 
 time-bases. A piece of paper on the wall is as much a duration as the projection of a film. 
 Its only difference is in its immediate relationship to our perception.
16
   
There is a great deal that McCall gets right here. He is certainly correct, for example, to point out 
that everything that happens happens in time. He is also right to suggest that there is a certain 
anthropocentrism subtending our distinctions between temporal and atemporal media: what we 
call an “object” and what we call an “event” is largely contingent on our own human time-span. 
(Of course, the obvious rejoinder to this claim would be: Why shouldn’t it be? What other time-
span should we use as a measuring rod?) I even think McCall is correct to suggest that a piece of 
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 Anthony McCall, “Line Describing a Cone and Related Films,” October 103 (2003): 56. 
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 Anthony McCall, “Two Statements,” in The Avant-Garde Film: A Reader of Theory and Criticism, ed. P. Adams 
Sitney (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 252-253. 
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paper on a wall may be more like a film than common sense would suggest, insofar as they are 
both likely to offer visual changes over a period of time—even if the piece of paper undergoes 
change at a rate that is beyond the realm of immediate human perception. (And is this not 
precisely the insight underlying Tony Conrad’s Yellow Movies (1972-73), in which paper 
covered in cheap paint is presented as a quasi-cinema-screen, so that the viewer can imagine the 
white paint slowly turning yellow over the course of several decades?
17
) 
 In spite of these insights, I think McCall is ultimately mistaken to claim that paper on a 
wall is “as much a duration as the projection of a film.” They may both endure for a period of 
time (as all things do), but there is a crucial difference: films offer a predetermined and 
structured duration, while paper does not. A filmmaker can modulate duration, deciding how 
long a spectator will see a given object or event, but this is not an option for an experimental 
artist who places pieces of paper on a wall. Obviously, there is no guarantee that a spectator will 
watch a film in its entirety, from beginning to end (and as I argued in Chapter 2, certain 
filmmakers, like Warhol, neither expect nor encourage this kind of spectatorship). Still, 
regardless of what a viewer may choose to do, a film has a fixed temporal structure, a 
predetermined durational unfolding that distinguishes it from traditional visual art.  
 Of course, So Is This is a remediation of written text, not visual art, and reading a book is 
temporally distinct from viewing a film, since the reader has more control over the rate of a 
work’s durational unfolding.18 Nevertheless, text remains temporal in a way that traditional 
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 In the theorizations of Jonathan Walley, works like Conrad’s Yellow Movies would be considered “paracinema,” 
since they “recognize cinematic properties outside the standard film apparatus,” and thus find “cinematic qualities or 
effects in nonfilmic materials.” See Jonathan Walley, “The Material of Film and the Idea of Cinema: Contrasting 
Practices in Sixties and Seventies Avant-Garde Film,” October 103 (2003): 15-30. See also Walley’s “The 
Paracinema of Anthony McCall and Tony Conrad,” in Avant-Garde Film, ed. Alexander Graf and Dietrich 
Scheunemann (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2007), 355-382. 
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 I borrow the term remediation from Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, who use it to describe the 
McLuhanesque appropriation of one medium by another. See Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1999). 
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visual art is not. Unlike a painting or a sculpture, text (along with film, drama, music, etc.) 
generally has an inherent trajectory that must be followed for a work to be apprehended. Unlike, 
say, One Second in Montreal, which temporalizes photography, or Side Seat Paintings Slides 
Sound Film, which temporalizes painting, So Is This uses the temporal medium of film to 
remediate another temporal medium: the book.
19
 This raises the obvious question: “Why?”—a 
query that Snow anticipates: “One / question / which / the / author / expects / is: / ‘Why / would / 
anyone / want / to / do / such / a / thing / as / this?’ / followed / by / ‘Wouldn’t / a / book / be / 
better?’” This question implicitly hints at its own answer: by cinematizing written text itself 
(rather than the content of a particular text), Snow impels us to consider the distinctions between 
the two media. And the viewer gradually comes to the realization that the most salient distinction 
between the textual film and the written word resides in their varying temporal structures. As 
Mary Ann Doane notes, “So Is This asserts its difference from a book through its rigorous 
control of the time of reading. The slowness or the rapidity of the appearance of new words on 
the screen is a play with filmic temporality and audience anticipation.”20  
 Indeed, if one sees the film version of So Is This in addition to reading the script,
21
 it is 
striking just how different the experiences are (even though they both involve reading the same 
text). For example, the reader of the script can set her own pace: she may choose to skim certain 
passages while reading others more carefully and deliberately. But this is not an option in So Is 
This. As Snow points out, “The number of frames per word and spaces between was precisely 
indicated. It’s composed.”22 Because of this careful structuring of cinematic temporality, a reader 
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 Throughout this chapter, I will use the term book as a convenient shorthand for referring to all traditionally 
typographical mediums, including magazines, journals, newspapers, text-based websites, and e-books. 
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 Mary Ann Doane, “The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity,” differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies 18, no. 1 (2007): 137. Italics added. 
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 The text of So Is This can be found in MacDonald, Screen Writings, 140-155. 
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 Snow, e-mail to author, October 21, 2011. 
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is forced to accept Snow’s pacing. At times, this means spending an inordinately long time 
staring at a single word. For example, at one point in the film, the text reads, “One / of / the / 
interests / of / this / system / is / that / each / word / can / be / held / on / the / screen / for / a / 
specific / length / of / time.” While most of the words in the film remain on the screen for just a 
second or two, the word length in this passage remains in place for almost an entire minute (see 
Figure 2). The eye becomes so tired of viewing the word that it begins to lose its semantic 
content and simply become an abstract series of shapes and squiggles. By the time the sentence 
finally completes itself, only alert viewers will remember how it began. On the other hand, 
certain words appear on only a single frame of the filmstrip, and as a result, inattentive spectators 
may miss them entirely. This is most evident in the film’s assault on the Ontario Board of 
Censors, which had previously banned Snow’s four-and-a-half-hour ‘Rameau’s Nephew’ by 
Diderot (Thanx to Dennis Young) by Wilma Schoen (1974) for its graphic sexual imagery: “This 
/ is / the / start / of / a / new / paragraph / from / which / any / children / present / should / shield / 
their / eyes. / Since / this / film / was / tits / originally / composed / ass / The / Ontario / Board / 
of / Censors / has / started / to / inspect / so-called / Experimental / Films. / e.g. / This. / Its [sic] / 
difficult / to / cock / understand / why / but / it / seems / as / if / their / purpose / is / to / protect / 
you / from / this. / To / protect / you / from / people / like / cunt / the / author / discussing / their / 
sexual / lives / or / fantasies / on / this / screen.”23 The taboo words here appear on the screen for 
only a split second, making it easy to miss them altogether. Unlike the word length, which feels 
weighty and laborious as a result of being on the screen for such an extended period of time, 
words like cock and cunt, because of their brief duration, seem sharp, caustic, and affectively 
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 In fact, So Is This goes so far as to address Mary Brown, the censor who banned ‘Rameau’s Nephew,’ by name: 
“Hello / Censors, / Hi / Mary. / This / Film / is / as / clean / as / a / whistle. / Ha / Ha / Ha/ Ha / (Hollow / laughter). / 
This / film / wouldn’t / say / shit / if /its / mouth / were / full / of / it. / Gulp.” The “Gulp” in this passage 
simultaneously expresses Snow’s fear of censorship (the nervous gulp) and his utter defiance of censorial strictures 
(the evocation of coprophagia).  
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jarring—even more so than usual. Through his control of the film’s temporal structure, then, 
Snow is able to modulate the pre-existing connotations of words, slightly altering the “flavor” of 
each one. (The flavor metaphor, incidentally, is borrowed directly from Snow: “I hope that the 
spectators can savour the many duration forms that happen in So Is This. There are spicy ones, 
salty ones, sweet ones, etc.”24) 
 
 
Figure 2: Michael Snow, So Is This (1982) 
 
 When struggling to read Snow’s taboo words, which appear for only a split-second, one 
is immediately reminded of another temporal distinction between books and films. In addition to 
permitting a reader to set his own pace, books allow the reader to return to previous passages in 
order to “catch” words or ideas that might have been missed the first time—or perhaps to review 
passages that were particularly compelling or confusing. But the durational unfolding of a film 
does not permit this. It proceeds at its own pace, indifferent to the demands of the audience. (Of 
course, the modern media environment complicates such distinctions: films like So Is This are 
increasingly viewed online, which does permit one to easily scroll back and catch passages that 
were initially missed.) Snow’s strict durational control is what makes a screening of So Is This 
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such a compelling experience. Since sentences become subdivided into the individual words that 
make them up, each word takes on a renewed importance, including words which are normally 
skimmed over, such as articles, prepositions, and conjunctions. In fact, these words are in larger 
typeface—and thus more visually dominant—than the more sesquipedalian words that Snow 
uses (e.g. semiological, Psychoanalytical, Incommunicado). Additionally, the experience 
becomes more participatory than more conventional modes of reading. In part, this is because the 
deliberateness (and relative slowness) with which each word appears encourages the audience to 
play a guessing game, hypothesizing about what direction a sentence will move in and what 
words will appear next. Scott MacDonald describes this dimension of the film perceptively: “In 
So Is This, Snow controls time—as all filmmakers do—and we are at his mercy. We cannot 
know what a sentence means until its over; as a result, Snow’s one-word-at-a-time structure 
forces viewers to construct a meaning, then reconstruct it, as individual words are revealed. 
Indeed, since the meaning of words is determined by their contexts within sentences, we cannot 
even be sure how a particular word is to be understood until subsequent words have been 
revealed.”25  
 So Is This calls attention to still another key distinction between reading a text and 
viewing a textual film: reading a book is almost always a solitary activity, while watching a film 
tends to be communal. Again, this situation has changed a great deal in the past several years, 
and I must confess that I watch more films alone (via the Web, DVD, etc.) than I do in group 
settings. Still, one can experience a film with other people in a way that is simply not possible 
with a book. One can certainly read along with someone else, but the experience is not the same. 
                                                 
25
 MacDonald, Screen Writings, 137. In addition to this implicit form of audience participation, there are points in 
the film when participation is explicitly encouraged—for example, when audience members are incited to sing 
together in their minds: “Let’s / all / raise / our / mental / voices / mutely, / mutually / in / song / (please / don’t / 
move / your / lips). / Ready? / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4: / ‘Some / where / o / ver / the / rain / bow / skies / are / blue…’” 
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I have read parts of a book with a friend reading over my shoulder, for example, but invariably, 
the experience is temporally asynchronous, if only slightly: one of us will laugh before the other 
has reached the humorous passage, for example. But given the fixed duration of film, responses 
become concomitant. As Snow puts it, “Usually the tempo of reading depends on the reader, so it 
seemed interesting to use film to control the duration of reading because control of duration is a 
capacity of film, not of a book.”26 And the fact that communality is a concern of Snow’s is hinted 
at in several passages in So Is This: “Warning: / This / film / may / be / especially / unsatisfying / 
for / those / who / dislike / having / others / read / over / their / shoulders.” And later on in the 
film: “When / was / the / last / time / you / and / your / neighbour / read / together? / This / is / 
Communal / reading! / it’s [sic] / Group / Lit!”27  
 As the expression “Group / Lit” implies, So Is This represents a remediation of literary 
text (broadly defined). One is immediately reminded of Marshall McLuhan’s famous claim that 
the contents of one medium are “always another medium. The content of the press is literary 
statement, the content of the book is speech, and the content of the movie is the novel.”28 
McLuhan seems to be making the (somewhat myopic) assertion that films remediate novels 
insofar as they offer extended narratives (ones which occasionally directly adapt novelistic 
content). This claim clearly has little relevance to avant-garde cinema, which often has closer ties 
to poetry—or even music or painting—than the novel. Still, what is interesting about textual 
films is the way that they adapt “literary” content in radically new ways. Rather than attempting 
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 Snow, e-mail to author, October 21, 2011. 
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 A rather different form of cinematic “Communal / reading” arises when an audience watches a foreign film with 
subtitles. Since entire phrases or sentences are usually displayed (as opposed to the word-by-word approach favored 
by Snow), reading rates can vary slightly, resulting in two kinds of temporal asynchrony: (1) Individual spectators 
may read at different speeds, leading some to apprehend textual content before others, and (2) spectators may 
experience a “delay,” reading the textual translation of a piece of dialogue before or after it is spoken. (For example, 
when watching foreign films, I often find myself quickly reading the subtitles with enough time remaining to 
anticipate how the actor or actress will deliver the lines I have just read.) 
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 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 305. 
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to translate written text into visual imagery, these films provide written text as visual imagery. 
To better appreciate this distinction, consider traditional remediations of the Bible, Western 
culture’s most influential text (or, more accurately, collection of texts). Biblical narratives have 
been one of the primary sources of cinematic content, from early films about the life of Jesus by 
Thomas Edison and Louis Lumière to Hollywood blockbusters like Cecil B. DeMille’s Samson 
and Delilah (1949) and The Ten Commandments (1956). But contrast these films to Andy 
Warhol’s proposed cinematic remediation of the Bible. I am not speaking here of his eight-hour 
Imitation of Christ (1967) (a work which has only a tenuous connection to the Biblical narrative), 
but of an unrealized project entitled Warhol Bible. Warhol planned on filming each individual 
page of the Bible, long enough to be read, before displaying the next page. (The film’s running 
length would have been a full 30 days!) It is not clear whether or not Warhol ever seriously 
planned to bring this project to fruition; it is quite possible that the idea itself fascinated him 
more than its actualization. In any case, Warhol Bible draws attention to the variety of ways that 
one medium can be appropriated by another. One need not “translate” the language of text into 
the language of cinema—one can simply film text directly. The most frequently repeated cliché 
about filmic adaptation is the claim that “the book was better than the movie.” Would it even 
make sense to compare the two in the case of Warhol Bible?
29
 
 Warhol’s proposition does differ slightly from a film like So Is This. While Snow’s words 
are naked, displayed in isolation from any kind of cinematic imagery, Warhol Bible would still 
have foregrounded photographic indexicality, in its “capturing” of actual pages from a Bible. In 
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 Warhol Bible appears to be a kind of practical joke, although this should not diminish its status as a serious 
meditation on the distinction between text and cinema. Since most viewers would hear the title and expect some 
kind of Warholian interpretation of Biblical stories (using actors, sets, dialogue, and so on), the absurdly literal 
content of the film would subvert these expectations. In fact, the idea for Warhol Bible is strongly reminiscent of the 
aforementioned Fluxus film 12! Big Names!, in which spectators were lured into the theater by flyers that promised 
they would see “big names”—like Warhol and Snow—only to be disappointed when they realized that the event was 
simply a textual film that displayed the stars’ names in typographical text, one at a time. 
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this sense, Warhol Bible has closer affinities to a textual film like Hollis Frampton’s Poetic 
Justice, in which the pages of a film script are displayed on a table, one at a time, so that, as 
Allen S. Weiss describes it, “paratext serves as text.”30 This explains why Snow does not 
mention Frampton in So Is This during the list of filmmakers who “concentrate / on / texts”: 
“Richard / Serra, / Tom / Sherman, / Su / Friedrich, / John / Knight / and / Paul / Haines”—Snow 
alludes exclusively to “films (and videotapes) that featured only text, that had no pictorial 
element.”31 It is the very fact that So Is This has no explicit pictorial element that allows the text 
itself to become pictorialized. The letters and words of Snow’s films are not merely the carriers 
of semantic information, but also visual experiences in their own right, typographic formations 
with a host of aesthetic of affective valences. 
 In some films, the idea of words as an aesthetic (rather than semantic) cinematic element 
is taken to extreme levels, resulting in text that cannot even be read. One of the earliest examples 
of this is Joseph Cornell’s By Night with Torch and Spear, a collage film in which text plays a 
prominent role. (The film appears to have been made in the 1940s, although the exact date is 
uncertain.) Cornell displays footage of camels, caterpillars, and workers in a steel factory, but 
these images are occasionally broken up by upside-down intertitles that appear and disappear 
very quickly. Cornell’s rigid temporal structure prevents one from reading much of the text, and 
as a result, it simply becomes a part of the film’s atmosphere. Similarly, Paul Sharits’ Word 
Movie (1966), a film comprised entirely of seemingly random words accompanied by flickering 
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 Allen S. Weiss, “‘Poetic Justice’: Formations of Subjectivity and Sexual Identity,” Cinema Journal 28, no. 1 
(1988): 50. Textual films like Poetic Justice are often characterized as “new talkies,” experimental films from the 
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light, moves at such a frenetic pace (one word per frame) that it is simply impossible to read the 
vast majority of the words that appear. One can make out individual words from time to time, but 
for the most part, the information overload results only in a fleeting visual impression of shapes 
and flashes.
32
 
 Clearly, By Night with Torch and Spear and Word Movie offer textual experiences that 
are quite distinct from So Is This—in Snow’s film, every word can be read and comprehended, 
so long as the viewer pays close attention. Still, Snow seeks to excavate more from his words 
than simply their semantic content. As was mentioned before, words that appear for prolonged 
durations lose their meaning and begin to become abstract shapes. (Recall Warhol’s maxim: 
“[T]he more you look at the same exact thing, the more the meaning goes away.”33) And since 
small words like of and is are in very large typeface, the pictorial qualities of each individual 
letter become foregrounded.  This was one of Snow’s goals: “The hope was that the changes in 
scale from word to word will help the spectator to see each word as an individual shape, a 
pictograph, a picture—but also as a shot. Reading, as we learn it, is not ‘seeing,’ not ‘regarding,’ 
so I wanted to introduce pictorial/design perception as well as ‘reading.’”34  
 But one of the most important questions raised by textual films in general—and So Is 
This in particular—is “What is a film?” Since Snow breezily jettisons many of the components 
that have traditionally been thought to be necessary conditions of film (both movement and 
imagery), what is left, exactly? What are the implications of So Is This (and other static and 
textual films) for the ontology of cinema? 
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 Another film that is worth mentioning here is Takahiko Iimura’s White Calligraphy (1967), in which characters 
from The Kojiki, an 8
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 century Japanese text, are scratched directly into the film stock and displayed in rapid 
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characters can be read, but not all of them; it’s too fast.” See MacDonald, “An Interview with Taka Iimura,” 26. 
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 Warhol and Hackett, POPism, 64. 
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 At the very least, such films should make us wary of any attempt to define cinema 
through recourse to necessary conditions (i.e. “x is a film if, and only if, it has the following 
properties”). Many film theorists have found themselves caught in the trap of drawing strict 
boundary lines around their object of study, only to have those boundaries challenged by some 
forward-thinking filmmaker or new technology. The result is a series of (more or less) pointless 
debates about whether x is a true film. Noël Carroll is one of the chief offenders here. In his 
essay “Defining the Moving Image,” he argues that there are five necessary conditions that must 
be met for something to be accurately categorized as a film. In the interest of time, I will give 
consideration to only two of them, as this should be sufficient to make my point. x is a film, 
according to Carroll, “only if x belongs to the class of things from which the impression of 
movement is technically possible.”35 As I have already argued in Chapter 1, this claim is 
problematic. Movement is not possible in So Is This—it is a static film. Carroll might respond 
that So Is This is still projected by an apparatus with the capacity for movement. But what if, 
after attending a screening of So Is This, I discovered that the particular version that I saw was 
not displayed via a movie projector, but rather a precisely timed slide projector (or some 
comparable technology that offered no technical capacity for movement)? Would it then be 
necessary to revoke the work’s cinematic credentials? And Carroll offers another problematic 
necessary condition of cinema, one that strikes me as exceedingly strange: “x is a moving image 
only if it is two-dimensional.”36 In Carroll’s view, then, is Francis Ford Coppola’s Captain EO 
(1986) only a film if I watch it without my 3-D glasses on? And if 3-D movies do not “count” as 
a counterexample to this claim, what would? What about Anthony McCall’s Line Describing a 
Cone, in which the three-dimensional projected light itself becomes the film? And what if future 
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technologies enable the creation of “hologram” films, which would literally exist in three 
dimensions? It is hard to know how Carroll would be able to respond to these questions without 
falling prey to the no-true-Scotsman fallacy.
37
    
 This kind of thinking is so widespread that even someone like McCall, who consistently 
challenges rigid definitions of film with his innovative works of expanded cinema, falls into the 
trap of prescribing necessary conditions. For example, in 1975, McCall claimed, “Line 
Describing a Cone deals with one of the irreducible, necessary conditions of film: projected 
light.”38 This claim has not aged well. Given the ubiquity of films watched on TVs, computer 
screens, and iPods in the modern era, few would continue to argue that light must be projected in 
order for a film to exist. (And this is not to mention a film like Walter Ruttmann’s Weekend, 
which features no light at all, but merely an audio track of “found” sounds accompanied by a 
blank screen.) Of course, it would be anachronistic to expect McCall to foresee future 
technological developments. But this is precisely the problem with demarcating boundaries 
around what a film is or can be: since any conception of cinema is necessarily limited by the 
technological and aesthetic practices that happen to be current at any given time, one can often 
mistake the contingent for the necessary. Does anyone doubt that 50 years from now, new 
technologies and innovative filmmakers will have pushed the boundaries of cinema in still new 
directions, ones which are simply unthinkable today? And this should be seen as a welcome 
development, not some bothersome challenge to ontological or theoretical dogmas. Concepts are 
not immutable, discrete entities created by a Deity with strict predetermined functions; they 
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evolve over time and continually adapt to varying intellectual and cultural environments. The 
concept film is no exception. There is simply no need to speculate about every future 
development in cinematic praxis before offering a tentative conception of film, so long as one 
does not paint oneself into a corner by insisting on inflexible boundaries.  
 But what is the alternative? How can we speak coherently about film without precisely 
defining our object of study? Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous discussion of games should provide 
solace to anyone who is troubled by such questions. In one of the most memorable passages of 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein points out that while we have little trouble using and 
understanding a term like game, this does not imply that there are any necessary conditions for 
something to classified as such:  
 Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games.” I mean board-games, card-
 games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say: 
 “They must have something in common, or they would not be called ‘games’”—but look 
 and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them, you won’t 
 see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of 
 them at that. […] I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
 “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family—
 build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth—overlap and 
 criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: “games” form a family.39 
This is precisely the approach one should take in understanding what films are. Films can be 
incredibly diverse: black and white or color, silent or sound, moving or static, photographic or 
textual, two-dimensional or three-dimensional, and so on. But as diverse as films can be, they 
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nevertheless have clear family resemblances that conceptually link them. And we come to 
understand these resemblances inductively, not deductively. As Wittgenstein puts it, “How 
would we explain to someone what a game is? I think that we’d describe games to him, and we 
might add to the description: ‘This and similar things are called ‘games.’”40 And is this not also 
how we might explain to someone what a film is? There is no need to draw rigid (and arbitrary) 
boundaries; film, in Wittgensteinian parlance, is “a concept with blurred edges.”41 
 I am not the first film theorist to evoke Wittgenstein in arguing for an amorphous and 
evolving conception of cinema. In his book The Virtual Life of Film, D.N. Rodowick also 
astutely asserts that “cinema studies can stake no permanent claims on its disciplinary territories; 
its borders are in fact continually shifting.”42 He elaborates: “Every medium consists of a 
variable combination of elements. In this respect, moving image media are related more by a 
logic of Wittgensteinian family resemblances than by clear and essential differences.”43 
However, Rodowick does not seem to be fully convinced by his own argument. Consider, for 
instance, his comments on Stan Brakhage’s seminal film Mothlight (1963). To create this 
innovative work, Brakhage collected the wings of dead moths, blades of grass, dirt, and other 
miscellany, and taped them directly to the filmstrip. The result is a kind of cinematic alchemy—
the ordinary objects become utterly transformed by their magnification, luminosity, and spatio-
temporal arrangement, and the film’s frenetic succession of images creates an experience of rare 
aesthetic force. Mothlight would seem to be a prime example of a filmmaker “shifting” the 
borders of cinema, a bold reimagining of what a film can do or be. Yet Rodowick seems to 
challenge Mothlight’s status as a film, claiming that “films of unrecognizable or nearly 
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unrecognizable images such as Peter Gidal’s Room Film (1973) remain films, while Stan 
Brakhage’s Mothlight (1963) is rather a motion sculpture animated by the projection 
apparatus.”44 This is a puzzling distinction. Brakhage’s original creation could certainly be 
conceptualized as a kind of sculpture, but why would running this work through a projector fail 
to produce a film? (Recall that Hollis Frampton once provisionally defined film as “whatever 
will pass through a projector.”45) To be sure, Mothlight is radically different from a more 
traditional film, like, say, Casablanca (1942), but is there not a clear family resemblance here? 
As a careful reader of Wittgenstein might point out, solitaire and basketball offer very different 
experiences, but they both remain games. 
 Wittgenstein represents an important influence on textual films in general and Snow’s 
cinema in particular.
46
 Like Wittgenstein, Snow dismantles facile conceptual taxonomies that 
resort to necessary conditions. By creating films without movement, films without imagery, 
films without filmstrips, and so on, Snow consistently challenges our preconceived notions of 
cinema. Consider the aforementioned A Casing Shelved, which presents a single stationary slide 
of a bookcase accompanied by Snow’s recorded voice describing it. As I mentioned in Chapter 
1, Carroll has questioned the cinematic credentials of A Casing Shelved: “I would argue that this 
‘film’ is not a film at all; to be a film, properly so called, requires the literal possibility of 
movement.”47 When I interviewed Snow about Carroll’s contention, I found his response to be 
impeccably Wittgensteinian. Rather than pedantically obsessing about necessary conditions, 
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Snow simply said, “A Casing Shelved is categorically problematic. However, it is a projection on 
a screen from a 35mm transparent source. There is no movement on the screen, but the 
movements of the eyes of the spectator are directed by the sound—my voice. That there is sound, 
which is a movement in time, is important in considering the work’s cinema status.”48 In addition 
to drawing our attention to the family resemblances between A Casing Shelved and more 
traditional fare, Snow usefully reminds us of the deeply entrenched bias towards the visual that 
subtends most theories of cinema. It seems absurd to claim that a work with visual movement but 
no possibility of sound (e.g. Stan Brakhage’s The Riddle of Lumen [1972]) is not a film. Yet 
somehow it seems more defensible to claim that a work with sound but no possibility of visual 
movement (like A Casing Shelved) is not a film. Ultimately, either claim rests on an unwarranted 
assumption that we must draw strict boundaries around the concept of film. It is hard to improve 
on Wittgenstein’s formulation in The Blue Book (one of his studies for Philosophical 
Investigations): “If […] you wish to give a definition of wishing, i.e., to draw a sharp boundary, 
then you are free to draw it as you like; and this boundary will never entirely coincide with the 
actual usage, as this usage has no sharp boundary.”49 The same is true of film. Theorists are free 
to draw prescriptive boundaries, and filmmakers are free to ignore them—in much the same way 
that traditional grammarians are free to insist that splitting an infinitive results in an 
ungrammatical sentence, while everyday speakers of English are free to completely disregard 
this rule. The concept of a film (like the concept of a grammatical sentence) is continually 
evolving. The word has no fixed definition, nor should we wish to place it in such a conceptual 
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straightjacket. As Wittgenstein puts it, “We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we 
use; not because we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real ‘definition’ to 
them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a 
ball they play a game according to strict rules.”50 
 In addition to stretching our predetermined notions of what a film can do, So Is This is 
equally intent on stretching our notions of what language can do. On both accounts, Snow 
challenges the facile generalizations that we easily fall prey to (films tell stories, language 
communicates information, etc.). Wittgenstein’s account of the malleability and infinite diversity 
of language in Philosophical Investigations is especially apposite here: “Think of the tools in a 
toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and 
screws. – The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.”51 A few pages 
later, Wittgenstein elaborates: “But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, 
question, and command? – There are countless kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the 
things we call ‘signs,’ ‘words,’ ‘sentences.’ And this diversity is not something fixed, given once 
for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, 
and others become obsolete and get forgotten.”52 So Is This introduces us to a host of new 
language games. While the standard uses of sentences all make an appearance—assertion (“This 
/ is / communal / reading!”), question (“Is / there / anybody / reading / this / right / now?”) and 
command (“Just / think / of / this / as / entertainment”)—there are also playful uses of words that 
represent apparently novel language games. Consider an unusual passage near the end of the 
film, where Snow announces that he will provide “ten / solo / words” (before going on to provide 
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twenty-five)
53: “And / Now; / ten / solo / words: / Coffee / Whisper / Psychoanalytical / Sunlight 
/ Sodomy / Chalk / Blast / Mind / Duke / Mohammedan / Braille / Blink / Simulacrum / Hiss / 
Mask / Annihilation / Lips / Truth / Cuneiform / Choir / Flesh / Liturgy / Cave / Flower / 
Incommunicado.” Putting these words in sequence appears to produce nonsense, an 
ungrammatical word salad that offers no meaning. Of course, in the words of evolutionary 
biologist Stephen Jay Gould, “Humans are pattern-seeking animals,”54 so it is difficult to read 
this sequence of words without searching for some kind of organizing principle (e.g. Is the 
“Cave” Plato’s cave, where there is no “Sunlight,” and “Simulacrums” replace “Truth”?) But 
such a hermeneutic framework risks playing one language game by the rules of another. What is 
important here is not meaning, but flavor: not only the “spicy,” “salty,” or “sweet” connotations 
of each word individually, but also (in the spirit of Eisensteinian montage) the novel 
connotations that arise as a result of Snow’s unusual juxtapositions. As Wittgenstein has noted, 
nonsensical language can still have a measured and deliberate effect on hearers (or readers), 
depending on what kind of language game is being played: “When I say that the orders ‘Bring 
me sugar!’ and ‘Bring me milk!’ have a sense, but not the combination ‘Milk me sugar,’ this 
does not mean that the utterance of this combination of words has no effect.”55 Similarly, Snow’s 
unusual combinations of words may be senseless, but there is still a clear effect on the audience. 
Of particular interest is how many of the words in this passage relate to various forms or 
methods of communication—“Whisper,” “Chalk,” “Braille,” “Hiss,” “Lips,” “Cuneiform”—
even though the passage itself communicates nothing (and ends with a word that evokes a lack of 
communication: Incommunicado). Both in content and form, this passage reminds the viewer of 
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the multiplicity of linguistic modalities, the infinite diversity of language games that can be 
played. 
 In its recourse to nonsense, So Is This is reminiscent of Duchamp’s enigmatic evocations 
of cauliflower, mosquitoes, incest, and Eskimos in Anémic Cinéma. It is also parallels another 
textual film released in the same year that So Is This was: Peter Rose’s Secondary Currents 
(1982). Like So Is This, Secondary Currents visually offers nothing more than typographical 
text, although in this case, the text is accompanied by a soundtrack, one in which a voice is heard 
speaking a non-existent language. The on-screen text undergoes a kind of linguistic entropy. The 
film’s words are initially fairly straightforward (“I don’t remember when the voice began”), but 
lucid language eventually gives way to incomprehensible jargon (“whose meandering 
lucubrations / foretold the essential entropy / of euphostolic processes and peregrinations / re-
invitriafied by the subcholate stratifications / of an ecstatic generative demuneration”). 
Eventually, we are left with apparently aleatory combinations of words and punctuation marks: 
“frisson eldo bas erra ti gon / ship to antel k trio lo montre / pi l like s k soke sl abqu ek / dko tj s 
abi. tu n kto / rt l px ex: s s at l / t-thel /: kethe ls o / ke lnc i ! u a je t s le / ee tri-sit pn vo tep.” By 
the end of the film, the screen is littered with random letters and punctuation marks.
56
 Of course, 
Duchamp’s nonsense (grammatically correct yet cryptic wordplay) is distinct from Snow’s 
nonsense (an agrammatical string of words), and both are distinct from Rose’s nonsense (random 
letters and punctuation marks which do not even form recognizable words or morphemes). This 
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diversity supports Wittgenstein’s contention that there is no limit to the number of language 
games we can play—even nonsense is not a single game, but rather, a collection of different 
games with different rules (or perhaps no rules at all). As Wittgenstein points out, “Even a 
nonsense poem is not nonsense in the same way as the babble of a baby.”57 
 While I am unable to catalogue all of the language games that Snow plays throughout So 
Is This (there are far too many), it will be instructive to give attention to one additional example. 
Contra Wittgenstein’s claim that “[t]he demonstrative ‘this’ can never be without a bearer,”58 
Snow refuses to identify the this of the film’s title—or at least, if there is an identity, it seems to 
continually shift. Consider some of the sentences that appear early in the film: “This / is / the / 
title / of / this / film.” “The / rest / of / this / film / will / look / just / like / this.” “This, / as / they / 
say, / is / the / signifier.” There is an inescapable and unresolved ambiguity in these sentences. 
For example, when the film asserts that “this […] is / the / signifier,” we are left wondering: what 
is the signifier, exactly? The word this? The language Snow is using? The medium of film itself? 
Or perhaps all of the above? Snow exploits the same linguistic loophole that was foregrounded 
by René Magritte when he painted his landmark La trahison des images (The Treachery of 
Images) (1928-1929), in which a straightforward painting of a pipe is accompanied by text that 
reads, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe” (“This is not a pipe”). The confusion that the painting frequently 
engenders (If this is not a pipe, then what is it?) comes from the ambiguity of the word this 
(ceci)—a viewer might initially interpret this as the representational content of the painting 
(which clearly is a pipe), but this can also mean the painting itself (which, of course, is most 
emphatically not a pipe).
59
 In the post-Wittgensteinian universe that Snow inhabits, neither 
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l’auteur / au / tableau / bien / connu / de / Magritte: / Ceci / n’est / pas / une / pipe. / C’est / vrai / ici / aussi. / 
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words nor films have single fixed meanings, functions, or essences—rather, concepts are fluid 
and in a state of continual flux. Snow puts it this way: “Language lives—grows, bulges, shrinks, 
learns to talk, loses its hair […] [T]here is a sense in which the cloudiness at the edges of the 
compendium of definitions of Art, which is especially noticeable, is also discernible on 
examination of all definitions.”60 
 Throughout this chapter, I have claimed that textual films blur the boundaries separating 
the mediums of literature and film; however, certain media theorists—such as Noël Carroll—
have challenged the very coherence of terms like film medium and the medium of literature. In 
his essay “Forget the Medium!” Carroll contends that “strictly speaking, there is no single and/or 
distinctive medium of film from which the film theorist can extrapolate stylistic directives; at 
best there are film media, some of which perhaps await invention even now.”61 Carroll is 
certainly correct to note that there are a multiplicity of media that can be used to display a film 
(e.g. celluloid, analog video, digital video, etc.). However, I disagree with Carroll when he 
claims, “Talk of the (one and only) medium with respect to an artform, then, is generally a 
misleading simplification or abstraction.”62 It is certainly a simplification, but I would argue that 
is generally a useful simplification, not a misleading one. Think of how we use the term art. If I 
were to visit The Guggenheim and make a generalization about 20
th
 century art, an interlocutor 
could certainly interject, “Ah, but don’t you mean the 20th century arts, since there are numerous 
artforms from that century, including painting, photography, dance, film, music, etc.?” I might 
feel compelled to use the plural form simply to pacify this pedant, but in everyday language, it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
L’auteur / amait / beaucoup / le / mot / ‘ceci.’” (“It / makes / the / author / think / of / the / well / known / painting / 
by / Magritte: / This / is / not / a / pipe. / It’s / true / here / also. / The / author / likes / the / word / ‘this’ / a / lot.”) 
My translation. 
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 Michael Snow, “Trying to Figure It Out,” in The Michael Snow Project, 280. Italics in original. 
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 Noël Carroll, “Forget the Medium!,” in Engaging the Moving Image (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 
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understood that the term art, though technically singular, refers to a multiplicity of artforms. And 
so it is with the term medium. No one would deny that there is technically more than one 
medium of film, yet the term film medium can nevertheless serve as a convenient shorthand for 
denoting this broad array of media forms (conceptually linked via a Wittgensteinian “family 
resemblance”). 
 Carroll takes issue with references to the medium of literature, as well, albeit for very 
different reasons: he makes the counterintuitive claim that literature “does not appear to have a 
medium at all.”63 Anticipating that this assertion will be greeted with skepticism, Carroll 
elaborates, “Suppose that words do constitute the medium of literature. They could hardly 
amount to a distinctive artistic medium. For words are shared with all types of speech and 
writing, on the one hand, and by all sorts of artforms, including theater, opera, song, and even 
some painting and sculpture, on the other hand.”64 One should immediately notice the rhetorical 
leap that Carroll makes here—he begins by claiming that literature has no medium at all, before 
making the less ambitious (and less interesting) claim that words are not limited to literature. But 
whoever thought they were? I find Murray Smith’s rebuttal of Carroll on this point useful, so I 
will quote him at length: 
Can we not say that words play a uniquely central role in the artform of literature, a role 
they do not characteristically play in any other artform? After all, some works of 
literature make use of pictorial devices—think of examples of “pattern” or “concrete 
poetry” in which words are arranged on the page in order to form striking, sometimes 
depictive patterns. George Herbert’s “Easter Wings” is one such poem; Guillaume 
Apollinarie’s Caligrammes form a collection of them. But we would not be tempted to 
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say that Herbert’s work is a painting rather than a poem, any more than we would be 
tempted to say that Michael Snow’s So Is This (1982), a film comprised entirely of shots 
of words, is a poem rather than a film. If the issue of the medium of a work is as 
incidental or irrelevant as Carroll contends—if it can be eliminated—what would stop us 
from thinking of Herbert’s work as a painting and Snow’s work as a poem? Why do we 
not say these things? Because we recognize that the word (in Herbert’s case) and the 
cinematographic image (in Snow’s case) are somehow foundational to the enterprises of 
each, even if they are being used to unusual ends, in both cases.
65
 
As Smith points out, the fact that the medium of language may play a prominent role in several 
artforms (including textual films like So Is This) is no reason to dismiss its significance as the 
medium (or at least a medium) of literature. In his counterargument to this claim, Carroll doubles 
down on his original position, attempting to downplay the role that the medium plays in 
influencing our categorization of a given artwork. In Carroll’s view, 
We categorize So Is This as a film because we know the tradition in which Snow is 
working. It fits into an ongoing conversation about the nature of cinema. If Milton’s 
Paradise Lost were recorded on film—a page being turned every thousand frames or 
so—and, if that was the only form in which it existed, we would not call it a film, but a 
poem. The same would be true if Ezra Pound initially “published” his Cantos on film. 
Our classifications depend far more on history and what we know of the author’s 
intentions than upon that through which medium the work is delivered.
66
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It is difficult to know how to respond to this peculiar claim. To begin, it seems to rest on a false 
dichotomy: that a textual film must be either a film or a poem. Why could it not be 
simultaneously both? In fact, some scholars have written about cine-poetry or the poetry-film as 
a way of conceptualizing works that that straddle the boundary between these two artforms.
67
 
The idea that something—literary or otherwise—might be “recorded on film” but not called a 
film is perplexing.  
 Presumably, Carroll is implying the following: if Ezra Pound had released Cantos on 
film, it would be called a poem, but if he instead decided to publish Cantos as a book, and Andy 
Warhol later created Warhol Cantos, this would fit “into an ongoing conversation about the 
nature of cinema” and would now be a film. If this seems like a defensible distinction, imagine 
the following scenario: I tell my wife that I am going upstairs to see what our son is doing. When 
I open the door to his bedroom, I find that his DVD player is running, and I see my son eating 
popcorn while gazing intently at his television screen. On the screen I see only the pages of an 
opened book with typographical text on it. I return downstairs, and my wife asks me, “What is he 
doing?” Acceptable answers to this question include “Watching TV,” “Watching a film,” or even 
“Watching some really weird film that just shows the pages of a book.” But imagine if I 
responded to my wife’s query by saying, “I honestly do not know. I will need to do some 
research to learn more about the historical circumstances and authorial intent of the object of our 
son’s inquiry before I am in any position to determine what kind of artwork he is engaging with.” 
She would be absolutely justified in worrying about my mental health. 
 In spite of the criticisms I have been leveling at Carroll, he performs a valuable service 
when he draws attention to the amorphousness and mutability of terms like medium and film. As 
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intermedia hybrids like So Is This (and other textual films) continue to remind us, these terms are 
constantly being reanalyzed and renegotiated, and it is useful to remember this inherent semantic 
instability when theorizing about their properties. In fact, interrogating artworks which challenge 
conventional media boundaries is perhaps the preeminent method of coming to understand a 
given medium. As David Campany puts it, “[W]e come to know what media are less by looking 
for their pure centres than their disputed boundaries.”68 Film has no “pure centre,” no essence, no 
rigid boundaries demarcating its territorial domain. But film is in good company here. As 
Wittgenstein so perceptively notes, “Many words […] don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all 
because it has no sharp boundary.”69 
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CHAPTER 5 
COLORED BLINDNESS: 
DEREK JARMAN’S BLUE AND THE MONOCHROME FILM 
 
“[T]here is more than one blue, and more than one meaning of blue.” – Barbara Rose1 
 
“There is no such thing as an empty space or an empty time. There is always something to see, 
something to hear.” – John Cage2 
 
Just a few months before dying of AIDS, Derek Jarman released Blue, one of the most 
profound meditations on death in the history of cinema. The viewer sees nothing more than a 
monochromatic blue screen for the duration of the film’s seventy-six minutes, while the sound 
track provides ambient music, poetry, sound effects, and autobiographical musings. In part, the 
film potently evokes the blindness that gradually overtook Jarman during his struggle with 
AIDS. Further, it represents a tribute to the French artist Yves Klein, who produced a series of 
monochromatic paintings in his trademark color, IKB (International Klein Blue).
3
  
Blue is a static film, albeit one which is distinct from those discussed so far. The films of 
Warhol and Fluxus offer motionless objects or individuals, while static textual films like Snow’s 
So Is This provide immobile typographic text. However, Blue offers no image at all—or, if there 
is an image, it is simply the cobalt-blue cinema screen itself. (This is why Vivian Sobchack 
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maintains that, strictly speaking, Blue is “not image-less,” but “figure-less.”4) Drained of any 
visual content or movement, Jarman’s film instead offers an ostensible void, an absence, a retreat 
from representation. In other words, Blue is a monochrome film, a cinematic work which visually 
presents nothing more than a field of color. In this chapter, I want to consider the implications of 
remediating monochromatic paintings in cinema, while also exploring the symbolic and affective 
valences of color itself. While there are numerous monochrome films worthy of close 
consideration, I will focus primarily on Blue—not only because it is a uniquely poignant and 
engaging film, but also because it raises important questions about the role of cinematic stasis in 
the digital age.  
The rich history of the monochrome in the realm of painting is well known—it is a 
tradition that includes seminal works like Kazimir Malevich’s Black Square (1915) and 
Suprematist Composition: White on White (1918), Robert Rauschenberg’s White Paintings 
(1951), and Yves Klein’s blue monochromes, such as IKB 191 (1962).5 However, this tradition 
has seen cinematic expression far more often than one might expect. For example, Nam June 
Paik’s Zen for Film consists of a blank white screen and a completely silent sound track.6 Robert 
Huot’s Red Stockings (1969) offers three minutes of Kodachrome red, broken up only once by a 
single frame of a woman’s crotch (although the intensity of Huot’s red produces flickering green 
afterimages every time the spectator blinks). Ma (Intervals) (1977), a film by Takahiko Iimura, 
alternates between black and white screens for its 24-minute duration (the purity of the 
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monochromes is intermittently threatened by a single off-center vertical line). And in Dan 
McLaughlin’s Red/Green (1985), a monochromatic red color field slowly changes to green over 
the course of about five minutes.
7
  
More radical still is Tony Conrad’s series of Yellow Movies, such as Yellow Movie 2/16-
26/73 (1973), which consists only of cheap white paint on paper which is outlined to look like a 
movie screen. Obviously, these are works that stretch the definition of cinema to its breaking 
point; however, since the term movie carries with it expectations of duration, one becomes 
reminded of the temporal dimensions of paint itself (especially cheap paint), the way that it fades 
over time. (The white paint has yellowed significantly since the work’s inception.) Yellow Movie 
is organic, meditative, and immersive—it is also a practical joke. One of the most common 
insults leveled at bad films is, “It’s like watching paint dry.” Here is a film that is not simply like 
watching paint; one is watching paint. It is little wonder, then, that Conrad calls Yellow Movie “a 
comedy.”8 Monochrome films like these would have perhaps provided the ideal cinematic 
experience for someone like Theodor Adorno, who once quipped, “I love to go to the movies; 
what I can’t stand are the images.”9 
What are the aesthetic and theoretical implications of these experiments? Noël Carroll 
has persuasively argued that “[t]he point of many still films is reflexive—to point to aspects or 
elements of film that are often neglected (like narration in the case of Ôshima [Band of Ninja] or 
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scripting in the case of Frampton [Poetic Justice]). Subtracting movement from the visual array 
is a way of leading viewers—or at least certain kinds of viewers—to these reflexive 
observations.”10 Along similar lines, by withholding motion, as well as any visual representation, 
monochrome films like Blue draw attention to color itself. Unlike, say, the 1930s—when black 
and white was the norm, and films like Rouben Mamoulian’s Becky Sharp (1935) delighted 
audiences with their bold, assertive palettes—color has for decades been the default in cinema, 
and as such, it easily becomes invisible. But paradoxically, Blue—a film about the loss of 
vision—enables us to see a color that we had previously been blinded to. Jarman foregrounds the 
color blue as a color, and thus encourages the viewer to become lost in its affective and 
associative dimensions. 
 Before considering the cultural valences of the color blue per se, however, it will be 
useful to examine the significations of color writ large. In the West, color has often been seen as 
a marker for difference or alterity. This is why David Batchelor, in his book Chromophobia, 
notes that Western culture has historically harbored a deep distrust of color, a distrust made 
manifest in color’s association with marginalized Others: “Colour is made out to be the property 
of some ‘foreign’ body—usually the feminine, the oriental, the primitive, the infantile, the 
vulgar, the queer or the pathological.”11 The link between color and alterity has also been noted 
by Tom Gunning, who asserts that in film, “color signifies difference itself.”12  
 Jarman’s own homosexuality—as well as his queer politics—designated him an 
unambiguous cultural Other, particularly in Margaret Thatcher’s Britain. The fact that Jarman 
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linked color to his own queerness is seen in many of his writings. For example, in the 
introduction to his Wittgenstein (1993) script, he writes, “The forward exploration of Colour is 
Queer,”13 and in his book Chroma (which features a series of meditations on color), he declares, 
“Colour seems to have a Queer bent!”14 Blue is nothing if not an embrace of color itself, and for 
Jarman, this is simultaneously an embrace of his own sexual identity. It is unsurprising, then, that 
Jarman conceptualizes color as decidedly prelapsarian:  
 Turfed out of the Garden of Eden for a snack by the unpleasant new God, [Adam and 
 Eve] found themselves in a colourless world. Remember them as you buy a dozen 
 Granny Smiths. There were few colours in the wilderness. At that time God hadn’t even 
 sent a rainbow begging for forgiveness.
15
  
The “unpleasant new God” that Jarman alludes to is, of course, the same Old Testament God 
who advocates the stoning of homosexuals—the God whose stringent moral dualism results in a 
“black and white” universe. For the atheist Jarman, then, color and non-normative sexuality both 
exist without shame before the invention of God and sin. Jarman’s longing for this utopian world 
is evident throughout his films, which consistently seek to counteract fear of the Other 
(homophobia, chromophobia, etc.). This stretches from his first feature-length film, Sebastiane 
(1976), with its explicit depictions of homosexuality, to his final film, Blue, with its privileging 
of color over line.
16
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 But why does Jarman select blue for his first monochrome film rather than any other 
color? What does it represent? In a sense, this is a misleading question. As Tracy Biga suggests, 
Jarman deliberately frustrates any attempts to pin blue down to a single symbolic meaning: “It is 
variously a color, a person or agent, a mood, a concept and a thing.”17 Such semiotic slipperiness 
is central to Jarman’s vision. Yves Klein too was wary of attempts to tease a symbolic meaning 
out of his blue monochromes: “Novices keep asking me: ‘But what does it represent?’ I could 
answer, and I did so in the beginnings [sic], that it simply represents blue, by itself…This is not 
inaccurate; it is, in my opinion, of the greatest importance.”18 In other words, there is a sense in 
which monochromatic blue, both for Klein and Jarman, can be seen as decidedly asymbolic. 
What is important is not what the color represents, but its affective power, its ability to induce 
serenity and contemplation. 
 While Klein understandably does not want his art to be reduced to a simplistic symbolic 
meaning, “blue, by itself” can never really exist by itself. That is, even blue’s affective 
dimension is propelled and informed by the various significations that it has been acquiring over 
the centuries. (As Henri Bergson notes in Matter and Memory, “Perception is never a mere 
contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which 
complete it as they interpret it.”19) Consequently, an interrogation of the art of Klein and Jarman 
necessarily entails an analysis of the symbolic and associative dimensions of the color blue, even 
though neither Klein’s paintings nor Jarman’s film should be interpreted as facile symbolic 
gestures. For example, in viewing Klein’s art, one’s experience is inevitably colored by blue’s 
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association with tranquility—viewing an IKB monochrome is peaceful and contemplative. 
Jarman’s Blue evokes this mood, as well (and this sense of calm is often complemented by the 
soothing ambient tones on the sound track); however, the film’s blue screen simultaneously 
engenders impatience and frustration. This is partly due to the temporal nature of film, the fact 
that Jarman (unlike Klein) forces us to look at the color blue for an extended duration. But this 
sense of frustration is also likely linked to our frequent encounters with blue screens while 
waiting for a VHS tape or a DVD to begin, an important paratextual element which shapes our 
affective response to the film. The blue screen marks a period of transition, of waiting for 
movement to signal that a film has begun. Of course, when viewing Blue, we recognize that this 
desire to see movement will be denied, but like Vladimir and Estragon, we still somehow 
anticipate the arrival of something that will never come. Blue becomes a conceptual waiting 
room, and as the voiceover in the film indicates, “Hell on earth is a waiting room.” Jarman’s own 
poor health forced him to “come to terms with sightlessness” (another expression from the film’s 
sound track), and the spectator is forced to come to terms with it as well.
20
  
Blue’s association with waiting is clearly culturally contingent, but even its status as a 
peaceful color is not necessarily immanent—as Michel Pastoureau points out, the association of 
blue with peacefulness is an historical phenomenon which can be traced back to the Middle 
Ages.
21
 This development is closely related to another association which began around the 12
th
 
century: blue as a marker for the numinous. Before this time, blue was the object of considerable 
prejudice in the West, “with hardly any role in social life, religious practice, or artistic 
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creation.”22 However, the 12th century saw the creation of blue stained glass; it was also the time 
in which blue became the color of the Virgin Mary’s robe in art.23 Ever since, blue has been 
closely associated with the sacred, the divine. 
 This is clearly important in understanding Klein’s art. Klein was deeply religious and 
mystical, and his own belief in Rosicrucianism was a powerful impetus for his blue 
monochromes. As Jane Alison notes, Klein’s paintings were “a genuine bid for transcendence; 
an art that attempted to be simultaneously radical and spiritual; an avant gardism of the 
numinous.”24 For Klein, blue was inextricably linked with the infinite, the immaterial. He took 
his cue from Kandinsky, who saw blue as the “heavenly colour.”25 
 It could be argued that Jarman is reaching for something similar. Confronting his own 
mortality, Blue could represent a yearning for transcendence, a vision of a spiritual realm freed 
from “the pandemonium of image” (an expression used in Blue). This is essentially how Kate 
Higginson interprets the film. While Jarman obviously rejects the hegemonic (and homophobic) 
forms of religion that were commonplace in Thatcher’s Britain, for Higginson, this is no reason 
to completely exclude religiosity as a component of his artistic vision. She reads Blue as 
“Jarman’s attempt to see his way to […] a habitable, even pleasurable, after-life,”26 a 
“consolatory vision of a queer h(e)aven.”27 The opening lines of Blue are central to Higginson’s 
reading of the film: 
 You say to the boy open your eyes 
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 When he opens his eyes and sees the light 
 You make him cry out. Saying 
 O Blue come forth 
 O Blue arise 
 O Blue ascend 
 O Blue come in 
Higginson first notes the erotic content of these lines: “Assuming ‘you’ to be Jarman and the 
‘boy’ to be his lover, the ‘light’ which engenders a ‘crying out’ is orgasmic, the ‘arising,’ 
‘ascending,’ and ‘coming in’ are phallic and penetrative.”28 But Higginson also suggests that 
these lines could have a spiritual dimension, in their evocation of a “boy being bedazzled by a 
divine blue light.”29 For Higginson, this intersection of spirituality and homosexuality, a 
persistent theme in Jarman’s work, constitutes a “queering of the sacred.”30 
 While Higginson’s reading of Blue is innovative and compelling, she seems too intent on 
salvaging some kind of religious impulse from the film. There is no reason to suppose that IKB 
has the same spiritual import in Blue that it had in the hands of Klein. As Donald Judd notes, 
“Colour will always be interpreted in a new way…infinite change may be its constant nature.”31 
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And this sentiment is echoed by Jarman himself in Chroma: “Two colours are never the same, 
even if they’re from the same tube. Context changes the way we perceive them.”32 Even though 
Jarman alludes to “the blue of Divinity” in Blue’s sound track, the contextual significance of the 
color changes when one remembers that Jarman was an atheist who was deeply suspicious of 
Church doctrines. As William Gass points out, the color blue is often seen as “the godlike hue,”33 
but it can also evoke “the constantly increasing absentness of Heaven […] the color of 
everything that’s empty.”34 I would argue that Klein is interested in the former signification, 
Jarman the latter. Jarman’s own skepticism regarding the Divine should color a viewer’s 
response to the film; even though the shade of blue used is essentially the same, its symbolic 
status has been reversed. Blue no longer connotes heaven, but an empty sky, a vacuum that was 
filled by God in the pre-Nietzschean universe.  
 This is Steven Dillon’s interpretation of the film. In his book Derek Jarman and Lyric 
Film: The Mirror and the Sea, Dillon sees in Blue “a deep hopelessness with regard to the 
possibilities of visualizing another world,”35 adding that in this new context, blue can be seen as 
“a visual absence, a nothingness before the abyss of death.”36 This cogent reading helps to 
explain why one of the questions asked in Blue is, “Will the pearly gates slam shut in the faces of 
the devout?” The heaven of traditional Christianity is not open for business. In its place is a void, 
a nothingness. This is why for Jarman, “the way of heaven” can be seen “without looking out of 
the window.” The only spirituality that Jarman is interested in is an inner, subjective one, not one 
based on the dogmas of any church. This is further hinted at in his film Caravaggio (1986), in 
which the eponymous protagonist reflects on his own death: “The gods have become diseases. 
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Thought without image. Lost in the pigment.” This vision of an imageless color field, 
uncorrupted by Divine presence, is precisely what Jarman brings to fruition in Blue. By 
reappropriating IKB, Jarman effectively deconstructs the color’s traditional spiritual 
significance. 
 Of course, the fact that Jarman uses blue to evoke non-existence is not only a subversion 
of traditional religious schema; it simultaneously places itself within a related historical tradition 
in the West: “the bluish hues of death.”37 This connection has been made by Jarman before. For 
example, in Caravaggio the artist has a revealing interior monologue on his deathbed: “The 
room turns slowly. I steady myself, staring into the blue void. Dull metallic flies cluster like 
rotted grapes.” The idea of death as a “blue void” here is a clear precursor to Blue. Caravaggio’s 
monologue also echoes Emily Dickinson’s famous poem “I heard a Fly buzz—when I died—.” 
In the poem Dickinson imagines seeing a fly just before her death, as she synaesthetically 
experiences a  
 Blue—uncertain stumbling Buzz—  
 Between the light—and me—  
 And then the Windows failed—and then  
 I could not see to see—.38  
 In Caravaggio and Blue, Jarman builds on Dickinson’s rich symbolism, reiterating blue’s 
association with death, as well as a loss of vision. Further, both Dickinson and Jarman work to 
de-romanticize death, emphasizing the materiality of the dead body and the absence of an 
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afterlife.
39
 The fly in Dickinson’s poem can be read as a symbol of the quotidian, accentuating 
the eerie ordinariness of death. This is also one of the central insights of Blue. The film eschews 
traditional Hollywood depictions of death, which are often drenched in bathos and faux 
profundity. Instead, Blue’s sound track emphasizes the ordinary and the mundane, and so a film 
about dying is filled with the type of minutiae normally reserved for episodes of Seinfeld (e.g. 
Jarman’s observation that a diminutive man in the waiting room looks like Jean Cocteau, his 
fleeting desire to purchase a new pair of shoes, etc.).  
 The fly of Dickinson’s poem can also be read in a more macabre vein, as an insect 
preparing to eat the flesh of the deceased. Thus, the poem subverts theorizations of death as a 
meaningful, spiritual experience, a passing away to another world. Instead, death is merely an 
opportunity for necrophagia in an indifferent Darwinian universe, a failing of vision followed by 
the gruesome decomposition of the body. “I heard a Fly buzz—when I died—” is a radically 
materialist poem, one that confronts the inescapable corporeality of the human body. And an 
almost identical philosophical stance lies at the heart of Blue. There is certainly an irony here, 
since for Klein, the monochrome was a means for “attain[ing] the spiritual absolute.”40 Yet the 
idea of a spiritual absolute is undermined in Blue’s unflinching emphasis on the ravaged and ill 
body. This idea becomes especially prominent during a passage in the film in which a voice 
reads off the interminable list of side effects of the drug Jarman is taking, DHPG:  
 Low white blood cell count, increased risk of infection, low platelet count which may 
 increase the risk of bleeding, low red blood cell count (anaemia), fever, rush, abnormal 
 liver function, chills, swelling of the body (oedema), infections, malaise, irregular heart 
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 beat, high blood pressure (hypertension), low blood pressure (hypotension), abnormal 
 thoughts or dreams, loss of balance (ataxia), come, confusion, dizziness, headache, 
 nervousness, damage to nerves (peristhecia), psychosis, sleepiness (somnolence), 
 shaking, nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite (anorexia), diarrhoea, bleeding from the 
 stomach or intestine (intestinal haemorrhage), abdominal pain, increased number of one 
 type of white blood cell, low blood sugar, shortness of breath, hair loss (alopecia), itching 
 (pruritus), hives, blood in the urine, abnormal kidney functions, increased blood urea, 
 redness (inflammation), pain or irritation (phlebitis).  
While this passage from Blue provides the most exhaustive (and exhausting) catalogue of the 
natural shocks that flesh is heir to, similar monologues that dwell on the physicality of the body 
are ubiquitous in the film’s sound track. Even though Jarman resolutely refuses to give us a 
visual depiction of the body, the disembodied voice speaks of little else. As Patrizia Lombardo 
puts it, “With a violent leap, the most bodyless film ever produced projects the human body in its 
most cruel and unspeakable presence.”41 
 Blue’s cathectic attachment to the human body has palpable effects for the spectator, who 
becomes increasingly aware of the embodied nature of her own perception. Since one cannot see 
the film’s protagonist (or anybody else), the verbal descriptions of bodily ills seem to affect (or 
perhaps afflict) one’s own body. When the voice speaks of “irregular heart beat,” my attention is 
suddenly focused on my own heart beat, which now somehow feels irregular (no doubt a 
byproduct of the power of suggestion). When the voice speaks of “sleepiness,” I am tempted to 
yawn. And when “shortness of breath” is alluded to, I become increasingly aware of the tempo of 
my own breathing (not unlike Cage during his famous visit to the anechoic chamber). There is 
nobody (and no body) on the screen to transfer these sensations to—without on-screen motion to 
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command my attention, I instead become the observer of my own miniscule bodily movements, 
and these subsequently become as much a part of the cinematic experience as the color field or 
the sound track. Eventually, the film’s frequent evocations of death prompt me to imagine all of 
these movements ceasing—for a brief moment, my body freezes in place, I become breathless, 
my heart stops. The static film immobilizes me. I do not simply imagine my own death; I 
experience it. However provisional this experience may be, its affective intensity remains 
profoundly unsettling.   
 There is only one other film that rivals Blue in its unblinking insistence on the 
corporeality of the body facing death: Stan Brakhage’s The Act of Seeing with One’s Own Eyes 
(1971), which displays actual autopsies of dead bodies for 32 minutes. Flesh is cut into, brains 
are removed, bodily fluids are drained. The film is shot with an unsettling objectivity which 
refuses to assign any kind of meaning to these deaths. Non-existence simply exists. (And 
Brakhage also evokes Dickinson, though it is likely accidental: in one scene, a fly is seen 
meandering on the foot of one of the corpses.) 
 Central to the experience of viewing The Act of Seeing is its complete silence. Somehow, 
the film would be less disturbing if we could hear the sounds in the morgue: footsteps, breathing, 
instruments clanging on tables. Instead, we hear what the corpses hear: nothing. In this sense, the 
film is the inverse of Blue. Brakhage captures non-existence by giving the spectator nothing to 
hear, while Jarman captures non-existence by giving the spectator nothing to see. It is true that 
Jarman’s blue screen is apprehended visually, and his sound track elicits mental imagery. 
Nonetheless, the lack of any traditional photographic images on the screen makes clear the film’s 
raison d’être: as the narrator suggests, Blue offers a space in which the viewer can be “released 
from image,” which for Jarman represents “a prison of the soul.” Blue and The Act of Seeing are 
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both experiments in sensory deprivation. And yet, in spite of their unrelenting visual and 
auditory voids, both films use the sparse materials available to conjure up the material body and 
its confrontation with death.
42
   
 Blue is obviously a static film, and The Act of Seeing could be loosely categorized as 
such, as well—even though it is not as unrelentingly still as the films I have discussed so far (it 
includes the movements of the coroners and a great deal of camera movement). Nevertheless, the 
subject (and paradoxically, the object) of the film is the human cadaver, which is entirely still. 
Since these are obviously real cadavers, the spectator recognizes that there is no chance that they 
will become animated. (This clearly is an option in fictional films; consider Dreyer’s Ordet 
[1955], for example, in which the dead body of Inger is resurrected and begins to move again.) 
Since both Blue and The Act of Seeing interrogate the nature of mortality, it is fitting that they are 
essentially drained of movement. As Laura Mulvey points out, movement is “the commonly 
accepted sign of life,” which suggests that stasis in cinema is uniquely positioned to suggest just 
the opposite: “the presence of death.”43    
 While Blue’s voiceover is poignantly evoking the deterioration of Jarman’s body, another 
kind of deterioration takes place: what I have earlier called (in reference to Warhol’s stillies) the 
degradation of signification. In the first part of this chapter, I emphasized the symbolic valences 
of Jarman’s blue and how these informed the viewer’s response to the color. But this tells only 
half of the story. As the film continues, and as the viewer’s sense of time becomes distorted, blue 
itself begins to lose all meaning. The brain becomes weary of processing blue, and as a result, the 
color as such degenerates—on a phenomenological level, it no longer seems to even be a color. 
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This breakdown begins early on in the film, when the voices begin to allude to other colors (red, 
magenta, and yellow). The effect of seeing blue while being asked to envision other colors is a 
bit jarring. It is not unlike the Stroop effect, in which the name of a color (like red) is printed 
with the ink of a completely different color (like green). The results have been well documented: 
it is difficult for the spectator to ignore the language and simply recite what color she is seeing, 
almost as if there is an internal psychological battle between perception and language.
44
 This is 
the tension that Jarman produces throughout his film. Even though the word blue is spoken 
frequently in the film’s sound track, other words for color dominate as well: the word black is 
heard ten times, white five times, yellow nine times. Given the constantly changing language in 
Blue and the unchanging visual field, language begins to win out over perception. Literal sight 
becomes less and less relevant, and other senses (like the sense of hearing) begin to become 
more attuned than usual, mirroring Jarman’s own experience as someone overcome with 
blindness. While the static blue originally provoked restlessness, the unrelenting stasis comes to 
provoke a kind of catatonia.  
I have already mentioned several precedents for Jarman’s monochromatic screen in the 
films of Paik, Huot, McLaughlin, and Conrad. However, as Peter Wollen and Roland Wymer 
have pointed out, Blue’s most important precursor is almost certainly Guy Debord’s first film, 
Hurlements en Faveur de Sade, which simply presents alternating black and white voids 
accompanied by a non-narrative sound track.
45
 Unlike the silent monochromes of Paik’s Zen for 
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Film and Conrad’s Yellow Movies, one of the most striking components of Hurlements and Blue 
is the disembodied voice. Both Debord and Jarman exploit the affective intensity of what Michel 
Chion has called the acousmatic: sounds which are heard even though their sources cannot be 
seen.
46
 For Chion, the acousmatic is at its most poignant and haunting when it is a voice, 
especially one which has not yet been coupled with a face: “[W]hen this voice has not yet been 
visualized—that is, when we cannot yet connect it to a face—we get a special being, a kind of 
talking and acting shadow to which we attach the name acousmêtre.”47 All of the voices in 
Hurlements and Blue are radical acousmêtres: rather than being voices which have not yet been 
connected to faces, they are voices which are never connected to faces—disembodied,  
incorporeal, even ghostly. It is fitting, then, that both Hurlements and Blue are (to a large extent) 
films about death. The voices of Blue describe the process of dying in vivid detail, while those of 
Hurlements allude to “the perfection of suicide,” even discussing several actual suicides (those of 
proto-Surrealist Jacques Vaché, as well as Madeleine Reineri, a twelve-year-old girl who “threw 
herself into the Isère River.”48) Not only do these films’ static monochromatic screens suggest 
the immobility of the cadaver, but the use of bodiless voices evokes death, as well. As Chion has 
                                                                                                                                                             
occasionally flashes on and off (in a manner that seems to anticipate the flicker films of Peter Kubelka and Tony 
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pointed out, in cinema, “the voice of the acousmêtre is frequently the voice of one who is 
dead”—or at least, one who is “almost-dead.”49 
But in addition to interrogating death, the renunciation of imagery in Blue and 
Hurlements also becomes a means of evoking blindness—both metaphorically and literally. Not 
only does Debord’s film refuse to give the audience anything to see, the sound track foregrounds 
this visual void. For example, Debord’s own voice is heard saying, “Totally dark, eyes closed to 
the enormity of the disaster,” and another voice later intones, “I don’t think we’ll ever see each 
other again.”50 In other words, the recurring darkness of the screen is complemented by language 
that reinforces visual absence. Suggestions of visual absence are also prominent in Blue; 
however, in Jarman’s hands, they are literalized, since he is frequently describing what it feels 
like to go blind. Because of the impoverishment of images, the audience of each film becomes 
more aware of the sound track. Consequently, a viewer of Blue can echo Debord’s proclamation 
in Hurlements: “I lose myself in the hollow archipelagos of language.” However, the language 
that is spoken in Hurlements is often silenced—whenever the screen turns black, all sounds 
cease. These moments of silence occur momentarily throughout the film’s duration, and while 
they generally only last for a few seconds, or occasionally, a few minutes, the film concludes 
with a silence that lasts an agonizing 24 minutes, and the effect is unsettling. While Jarman’s 
blue screen and gentle ambient music can momentarily evoke a kind of peacefulness, Debord’s 
black screen—accompanied by an uncompromising silence—is sinister, threatening, affectively 
jarring. As Janet Harbord has argued, “To throw an audience into darkness is one of the most 
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powerful, and possibly sadistic, things a film-maker can do”—and here she is discussing the 
darkness used by Chris Marker in La Jetée, which lasts a mere ten seconds!
51
  
Still, in spite of their renunciation of visual movement, most monochromatic films 
continue to provide some kind of auditory “movement” via the vicissitudes of the sound track. 
One might wonder, then, what separates works like these from radio broadcasts, or more 
currently, podcasts? (One is reminded of the voice in Isidore Isou’s Treatise on Slobber and 
Eternity, which asserts, “Take photography away and cinema becomes radio.”52) Steven Dillon 
notes this affinity, saying, “As a movie that is all sound track, Blue might be thought of as a 
species of radio, where we would read the film into a tradition of radio plays by Samuel Beckett 
or Harold Pinter.”53 In fact, this comparison to radio becomes especially salient in what appears 
to be the first monochromatic film—and the first static film—ever made: Walter Ruttmann’s 
Weekend. Ruttmann presents the audience with an audio montage composed of dozens of 
carefully arranged sounds, including clocks, whistles, dogs, and human voices—a remarkable 
experiment that anticipates Pierre Schaeffer’s musique concrète of the 40s and 50s. While 
Weekend is sometimes referred to as a piece for radio, it was in fact designed to be projected in a 
movie theater, accompanied by a static imageless screen. This is why Ruttmann referred to 
Weekend as “cinema for the ears” 54 and “a blind film.”55  
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 Quoted in Nora M. Alter, “Screening Out Sound: Arnheim and Cinema’s Silence,” in Arnheim for Film and 
Media Studies, ed. Scott Higgins (New York: Routledge, 2011), 83. 
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 It seems that such appellations would also be apropos in describing Blue, particularly 
since (as Roland Wymer points out) Blue was broadcast concomitantly on Channel Four and 
Radio 3 in 1993: “Listeners who did not have access to a television were invited to apply for a 
blue postcard which they could stare at during the transmission.”56 Along similar lines, those 
who purchase Blue on compact disc have the option of staring at the monochromatic blue CD 
jacket while listening to the sound track. It is unlikely that many have chosen to take advantage 
of such options. While such an experience might seem superficially analogous to viewing the 
film, the affective response produced by Blue comes not merely from staring at the color, but 
from the frustration of expectations. No one expects movement when looking at a postcard or a 
CD jacket, so looking at one for an extended period of time feels absurd, pointless. But 
movement is more or less ubiquitous on movie screens, so staring at one feels natural, even if a 
spectator may realize on an intellectual level that the blue screen is going to remain static.
57
  
 In spite of this intellectual awareness, monochrome films often engender a level of 
frustration. Whereas most films use the illusion of movement to captivate the audience, keeping 
them entirely still (“glued to their seats”), the stasis of films like Blue and Hurlements inevitably 
causes restlessness and fidgeting. Since there is no movement on the screen, the spectators’ 
bodies begin to move to compensate. This is why the experience of just listening to Blue is quite 
different from seeing it. Listening to Blue is comforting, thoughtful, engaging. One can put on 
headphones and go about one’s day while becoming immersed in the poetry and music that 
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 Quoted in Esther Leslie, Hollywood Flatlands: Animation, Critical Theory and the Avant-Garde (London: Verso, 
2002), 66. Another monochromatic film that is evocative of Weekend in many ways is Ben Vautier’s Monochrome 
for Yves Klein, Fluxversion I (1963). The event score/script simply reads, “Performer paints a movie screen with 
nonreflective black paint while a favorite movie is being shown.” See Friedman, Smith, and Sawchyn, 104.  
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 Wymer, 173. 
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 During my second viewing of the film, I looked down at one point to scribble some notes. Instinctively, my head 
jerked up momentarily to look at the screen, just in case I was missing something. I knew nothing had changed, of 
course, but the expectation of change is so central to most viewing experiences that it can be difficult to overcome 
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Jarman provides. But seeing Blue is a much more ambivalent experience. The color itself at first 
complements the sound track’s sense of peacefulness. But the color’s refusal to change somehow 
supplements the soothing sound track with an uneasy, almost maddening quality. Cage’s 4’33’’ 
is a useful point of reference. We all hear (relative) silence quite frequently and do not even 
notice it. It is only when we expect to hear sound (when attending a concert, playing a CD, etc.) 
that silence is striking. Such a subversion of expectations produces an affective shift that causes 
the body to squirm, sometimes intolerably. This is why the Paris premiere of Hurlements at the 
Ciné-Club d’Avant-Garde in the Musée de l’Homme elicited a violent reaction from the 
audience and was terminated after twenty minutes—and why later screenings continued to 
provoke riots and protests.
58
  
 What is one to make of the voids that are presented in monochromatic films? Is it sadistic 
for filmmakers (and masochistic for spectators) to embrace absence, deprivation, nothingness? 
Does the cinematic void imply a kind of nihilism? I would be hesitant to subscribe to such a view 
(even though the monochromatic film certainly could be used in such a way). In fact, it is not at 
all clear why these films should be reductively theorized as nothing more than optical voids. As 
many philosophers have noted, a void as such is not possible—a void is not the absence of any 
content, but simply the absence of anticipated content. This is why for Bergson, “the idea of the 
absolute nought” is “a self-destructive idea, a pseudo-idea, a mere word”; the void is “only a 
comparison between what is and what could or ought to be, between the full and the full.”59 
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 For a more thorough account of the reception of Hurlements, see Levin, 343-344. See also Zack Winestine, 
“Howls for Guy Debord,” Film Quarterly 62, no. 4 (2009): 14-15. In addition to outlining the reception that the film 
received in 1952, Winestine describes his experience seeing a screening of Hurlements at New York’s Walter Reade 
Theater in 2009. Since the audience is uncomfortable with the lengthy silence and black screen that close out the 
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compensate. 
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Deleuze echoes this sentiment in his second Cinema book, in which he explores the implications 
of cinematic emptiness. For Deleuze, “An empty space, without characters” can have “a fullness 
in which there is nothing missing.”60 And the idea of emptiness as a kind of fullness was 
explored in art well before the experimental monochromes of the 20
th
 century. For example, as 
Paul Schrader points out, “Emptiness, silence, and stillness are positive elements in Zen art, and 
represent presence rather than the absence of something.”61 Monochrome paintings and films 
simply carry on this tradition, reaffirming Rauschenberg’s assertion that “A canvas is never 
empty.”62 
 In fact, as Barbara Rose has argued, the monochrome painting may initially suggest 
“simplicity and unity,” but this appearance ultimately “masks a potential for multivalence and 
paradox.”63 Along similar lines, a film like Blue does not use the monochromatic screen to 
merely posit nihilism and emptiness. Rather, Jarman’s blue screen is a site of multiplicity, 
limitlessness, eternity. As Jim Ellis puts it, Blue “recalls Klein’s understanding of the void not as 
an absence, but rather as an infinity.”64 Even when the monochromatic screen presents only 
whiteness or blackness (as in Weekend, Hurlements, and Zen for Film), colors with strong 
cultural associations of absence, the effect is not merely one of negation, but of affirmation. 
These are films which (like the works of Malevich and Rauschenberg) posit absence as a kind of 
presence. Susan Sontag’s formulation in “The Aesthetics of Silence” is apposite here: “[T]here is 
no such thing as empty space. As long as a human eye is looking, there is always something to 
see. To look at something which is ‘empty’ is still to be looking, still to be seeing something—if 
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 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 244-245.  
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 Schrader, 27. 
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 Quoted in Branden W. Joseph, Random Order: Robert Rauschenberg and the Neo-Avant-Garde Order 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 21. 
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 Jim Ellis, Derek Jarman’s Angelic Conversations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), xxii. 
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only the ghosts of one’s own expectations.”65 In other words, it is not so much that these films 
give the spectator nothing to see; rather, the spectator is given something new to see: color as 
color—a locus of purity, contemplation, and immersion.  
 In addition to providing a kind of empty fullness, the stasis of Blue also has profound 
implications for the role of movement in cinema’s ontology.66 Tom Gunning has suggested that 
movement may be essential to cinema “[i]nsofar as we are referring to the movement of the 
apparatus, the film traveling through the projector gate,”67 and Laura Mulvey has similarly 
claimed that the impression of stasis in film is essentially an “illusion,” since it is paradoxically 
the result of “the continuous flow of the filmstrip and its individual frames.”68 These are 
worthwhile observations; however, the rise of digital film is quickly making them obsolete. This 
is an especially important point to remember when discussing Blue, since in its later incarnation, 
the film does not rely on traditional methods of projection. The color field was initially achieved 
through the use of a blue film loop; however, this was eventually supplanted by a video-
generated blue screen. (For ease of expression, I will call the celluloid version of the film Blue 1 
and the later computer-generated version Blue 2.) When viewing Blue 1, aleatory specks 
occasionally punctuate the screen and thus remind the spectator of the film’s movement through 
the projector. As Babette Mangolte has pointed out, in traditional cinematic praxis, “[T]ime is 
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 Susan Sontag, “The Aesthetics of Silence,” in Styles of Radical Will (New York: Picador, 1969), 10. 
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 While Blue is Jarman’s only unambiguously static film, stasis nevertheless plays a prominent role in some of his 
other films. In particular, it could be argued that The Angelic Conversation (1985) represents an interstitial link 
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inscribed in the emulsion grain, which constantly trades places and spaces from one frame to the 
next.”69 But in Blue 2, there is no emulsion grain, and thus no temporal inscription.  
 This radically changes the experience of the film. The stasis becomes even purer, since 
movement is neither directly displayed nor indirectly suggested; in essence, the film has become 
phenomenologically and ontologically motionless. Mary Ann Doane’s words about digital film 
become especially relevant here: “What is lost in the move to the digital is the imprint of time, 
the visible degradation of the image.”70 In most of the static films created before Blue, one never 
really forgets that one is watching a film. In fact, for all its photographic and televisual 
aspirations, a film like Warhol’s Empire nevertheless draws attention to the medium itself—
when there is little or no on-screen movement, the spectator inevitably becomes more aware of 
the imperfections of the film stock:  its fuzziness, its graininess, the scratches that frequently 
intrude on the image. (During MoMA’s February 19, 2011, screening of Empire, for example, 
one of the first tweets was “That is one fuzzy mother fuckin building.”71) Much the same can be 
said of the monochrome films released before Blue. For example, the blank screen of Nam June 
Paik’s Zen for Film forces the viewer to become more attuned to the movements taking place on 
the film stock itself.
72
 And Blue 1 produces a similar effect, as specks, splotches, and momentary 
discolorations intermittently stain the color field (see Figures 1-2). But in the film’s digital 
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Anthology, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991), 116. 
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incarnation, Jarman offers a new aesthetic: his computer-generated image suggests neither the 
movement of on-screen images nor the movement of the film stock itself (see Figure 3). The 
film’s only temporal signposts are now the “movements” of the sound track. In effect, then, Blue 
1 foregrounds the process of Jarman’s bodily decay through the decay of the filmstrip itself. As 
Mangolte has suggested, silver-based film evokes “degradation” and “entropy”73 (connotations 
which are especially pronounced in monochrome films, where there is nothing to look at except 
the dissolution and disintegration of the film stock). Blue 1 is a corporeal film about the 
corporeal body. Blue 2, on the other hand, evokes not the process of dying, but death itself. 
Visually, there is no decay, no entropy, no change—only a perpetual, immutable absence. 
 
 
Figure 1: Derek Jarman, Blue 1 (1993) 
                                                 
73
 Mangolte, 264. 
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Figure 2: Derek Jarman, Blue 1 (1993) 
 
 
Figure 3: Derek Jarman, Blue 2 (1993) 
  
 Notice the way that Blue 2 radically departs from its artistic forebears. The monochromes 
of Allais, Malevich, Rauschenberg, and Klein are all corporeal objects, and as such, they 
foreground the materiality and flatness of the artwork itself.
74
 Even most monochrome films—
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 Any discussion of the anti-illusionist flatness of much modernist art is necessarily indebted to the writings of 
Clement Greenberg. See, for example, his seminal essay “Modernist Painting,” in Clement Greenberg: The 
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such as those of Debord, Paik, Huot, and McLaughlin—foreground the materiality of the 
filmstrip, since its graininess and splotchiness becomes more salient when our attention is no 
longer monopolized by moving images. However, Blue 2 would seem to have no materiality to 
foreground. Norman Bryson’s musings on the distinctive nature of PC screens are worth 
considering here: “[T]he PC screen does not behave like the modernist image […] It cannot 
foreground the materiality of the surface (of pigments on canvas) since it has no materiality to 
speak of, other than the play of shifting light.”75 Much the same can be said of Blue 2 (although 
in this case, the light is not even shifting). The film becomes a prescient post-Greenbergian 
meditation on the etherealization that art has undergone in the digital era. Art can no longer draw 
attention to its own materiality, since it has—to a large extent—become immaterial: films 
without celluloid; music without records, tapes, or CDs; paintings that exist primarily, not as 
paint and canvas, but as ones and zeros. 
 It is difficult to see a screening of the digital version of Jarman’s final film—all the DVD 
versions I have encountered display Blue 1, and all the online versions I have found have fallen 
victim to lossy compression, resulting in a constant pixilation of the blue screen that is both 
distracting and aesthetically unsatisfying. However, there are numerous temporalized digital 
monochromes available online which enable an analogous visual experience. To provide just one 
example, a series of ten videos on YouTube (created by xsetpointer) offer completely silent 
monochrome screens of various colors for exactly ten minutes. They are given technical names 
like monochrome blue – RGB 0,0,255 – #0000FF (2007) and monochrome green – RGB 0,255,0 
                                                                                                                                                             
Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: 
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– #00FF00 (2007).76 Of course, since these videos have no soundtrack, there are now no 
temporal coordinates—either visual or aural—to ground one’s experience (assuming that one 
does not one move one’s mouse to reveal the slowly moving bar at the bottom of the YouTube 
screen). But if one simply watches one of these videos without interference, it is 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from looking at an actual picture of a monochrome on 
one’s computer. Like Jarman’s computer-generated version of Blue, these temporalized 
monochromes are paradoxically free of any traces of temporality.
77
 
 Films and videos that (like Blue) are entirely monochromatic are relatively rare; however, 
a plethora of works nevertheless make use of the static blank screen. For example, a substantial 
amount of Ken Jacobs’ 33-minute Blonde Cobra (1963) is comprised of a black screen (which is 
often held for several minutes at a time), accompanied by the acousmêtre of underground film 
legend Jack Smith telling disturbing stories, singing, and laughing maniacally. (The effect is 
unsettling—without a visual component, the viewer almost feels as if she is hearing voices in her 
head.) The black screen was also used extensively by Jean-Luc Godard in his Le gai savoir (The 
Joy of Learning) (1969)—often (as in Hurlements and Blue) as a way of evoking blindness. (For 
example, during one “blackout,” a voice is heard saying, “Here, the image is missing. The 
Anglo-Canadian police gouged out the eyes of a cameraman who was filming the landscapes and 
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faces of a free Quebec.”78) And a significant portion of Malcolm Le Grice’s Threshold (1972) 
consists of monochromatic black, green, red, and yellow screens (accompanied by long stretches 
of silence punctuated by brief clips of strange, fragmented sounds). While none of these are 
static or monochromatic films per se, they all exploit the affective intensity of the empty screen. 
Much the same could be said of flicker films, like Tony Conrad’s The Flicker and Paul Sharits’ 
Ray Gun Virus (1966). While the lability resulting from the continually flashing frames produces 
an affective experience that is quite distinct from that engendered by monochrome films, both 
modalities nevertheless use blank figure-less screens of various colors as currency. By 
remediating the monochrome painting and temporalizing it in diverse ways, all of these films 
foreground the plenitude of emptiness and the multivalence of the monolithic. They also serve to 
verify Ivan Chtcheglov’s insight (in his analysis of De Chirico’s paintings) that “an empty space 
creates a richly filled time.”79 
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CONCLUSION 
STATIC CINEMA IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
“All that was chemical and photographic is disappearing into the electronic and digital.” – D.N. 
Rodowick
1
 
 
“Time […] is like a wall that keeps crumbling on all sides.” – Michel Chion2 
 
 “No one goes to the movies anymore.” This is one of the only lines of dialogue in Tsai 
Ming-liang’s Goodbye, Dragon Inn (2003), a melancholy, visually arresting film about a large 
dilapidated movie theater in Taipei that is screening its last film (Kung Hu’s Dragon Inn 
[1967]).
3
 The theater is eerily empty, although one feels the weight of the thousands of people 
who once populated it. (As one man tells another, “This theater is haunted. Ghosts.”) There are 
only a handful of individuals watching the Kung Hu film at any given moment, and while a few 
spectators seem genuinely engrossed, most of those present seem more interested in people 
watching, snacking, or cruising for gay sex. Near the end of Goodbye, Dragon Inn (after the film 
within the film is over), Tsai provides a prolonged static shot of the empty theater.
4
 The shot is a 
nostalgic contemplation of how films used to be seen. In the modern era, audiences are 
increasingly turning to home-viewing options (DVDs, movies on demand, streaming videos, 
YouTube, etc.) rather than theaters, and this significantly alters the cinematic experience. As I 
stared at Tsai’s empty seats, I reflected wistfully on my own experiences of going to the theater 
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when I was younger, and how long it has been (about a year) since I attended a film screening at 
a movie theater. (I was watching Goodbye, Dragon Inn where I watch most films now—on my 
computer monitor. The contrast made the film even more poignant for me.)  
 It may seem strange to conclude a dissertation on static avant-garde cinema with an 
evocation of Tsai’s magnum opus. Goodbye, Dragon Inn is not an experimental film, but an art 
film. And in spite of its frequent stillness (with the exception of one shot, Tsai’s camera never 
moves), it is not a static film per se, but a work of slow cinema.
5
 Nevertheless, I believe a brief 
discussion of Goodbye, Dragon Inn provides a fitting coda for this project. Not only does it 
foreground the continued centrality of stasis for many filmmakers in the modern era, even 
outside of the avant-garde, but it also draws attention to the decline of the movie theater, and 
thus forces us to ponder the fate of the cinema of stasis (and cinema more broadly) in the “post-
cinematic” era.6 
 The “death” of cinema was perhaps inevitable, given the rise of VHS and DVD 
technology—not to mention Pay-per-view, TiVo, Netflix streaming videos, and other similar 
technologies that enable home viewing. While it is easy to lament the way that such 
technological developments have displaced the ambience—perhaps even the aura—of the 
traditional movie theater, it should also be remembered that they offer unprecedented 
opportunities: at no time in history has it been easier to access any film that one is interested in 
seeing. One’s cinematic “diet” is no longer strictly determined by whatever the nearest cineplex 
happens to be screening at any given moment. For most of my life, I had very little access to art 
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films. (There were no arthouse cinemas in my area, and many video rental shops carried only 
commercial films.) And while I was occasionally able to find well known masterpieces like 
Bergman’s The Seventh Seal (1957) or Antonioni’s Blow-Up (1966), I had essentially no access 
at all to avant-garde cinema. Now I watch several experimental films per week. Some are 
obtained via DVD; most are only available through websites like UbuWeb, YouTube, and 
Dailymotion. Indeed, many of the films I have discussed in this dissertation—such as So Is 
This—are rarely screened and unavailable on DVD, and as a result, they would be practically 
impossible to see if they had not been made available online.  
In addition to its convenience and accessibility, “screening” films on one’s computer has 
significant ramifications for the temporal dimensions of film. Of particular note here is the 
moving “time bar” that generally appears at the bottom of the screen. Perhaps someone seeing So 
Is This in a theater would take Snow at his word when the on-screen language indicates that the 
film is “about / two / hours / long.” But all I need to do is briefly shake my mouse and reveal the 
time bar to verify that the film is actually 48 minutes and 33 seconds in length. The bar provides 
a visual cue that allows me to gauge how far a film has progressed (and how much time remains) 
at any given moment. It also allows unprecedented control of the filmic experience. While 
pausing, rewinding, and fast-forwarding have long been features of VHS tapes and DVDs,  never 
before has spectatorial control been so salient and pronounced. After my first viewing of 
Disappearing Music for Face, for example, I was able to quickly jump from the film’s beginning 
to its end and back again to determine precisely how much Ono’s lips had moved. After 
watching Snow’s Wavelength on Google Video, I could take Snow’s 45-minute zoom and 
“scroll” through it in just a few seconds, to get a better sense of the space that Snow’s camera 
had traversed. And while watching Warhol’s uneventful Eat on YouTube, I decided to play a 
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game of Snake superimposed over the image of Robert Indiana slowly masticating. (I suspect 
Warhol would have approved.) 
The ontology of film, too, has been profoundly altered by the rise of the digital. On-
screen movement and stasis are no longer reliant on the movement of film stock, but on the 
transfer of information. In spite of this fundamental shift, some theorists continue to see 
movement as essential to the ontology of film, even in its digital incarnation. In D.N. 
Rodowick’s theorization, “The film projector produces movement by animating still images. But 
as presented on electronic displays, the image is movement or subject to continual change 
because the screened image is being constantly reconstituted, scanned, or refreshed.”7 Rodowick 
is certainly correct to point out that the technological basis of digital cinema demands that the 
images undergo constant permutations; however, I fail to see why this implies that “the image is 
movement.” It seems that Rodowick is problematically conflating movement and change. The 
digital image may be labile, but it is not movement itself—it simply engenders the perception of 
movement (or stasis) in a way quite distinct from the film projector. A similar confusion 
subtends Rodowick’s claim that “even a ‘photograph’ displayed on an electronic screen is not a 
still image. It may appear so, but its ontological structure is of a constantly shifting or self-
refreshing display.”8 Again, Rodowick seems to use the word  still synonymously with 
unchanging. A photograph displayed in a digital static film does undergo continual change, but 
in a sense, it remains still—both ontologically and phenomenologically. That is, it neither relies 
on movement for its existence (as does the celluloid film, which must constantly move through 
the projector), nor does it produce the phenomenal perception of movement.  
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 Jon Jost’s digital film Muri Romani (Roman Walls) (1999-2000) provides a useful way of 
thinking through this distinction. The film begins with a static shot of a patch of decaying wall in 
Rome, scrawled with white graffiti that reads, “IL SOGNO E FINITO L’ILLUSIONE 
CONTINUO” (“The dream is over, the illusion continues”9) (see Figure 1). There is a slow 
dissolve to a similar patch of wall, which gradually gives way to still another wall, and so on. By 
the end of the 80-minute film, a full 280 static shots of walls have been displayed (all of them 
shot with a DV camera). Jost has claimed, “Editing decisions were based on the aesthetic 
commonality between images so that one does not ‘see’ a dissolve, but rather the image seems 
only to change in time.”10 The result of this approach is that it is generally very difficult for a 
viewer to know, at any given moment, if she is looking at a single wall, or if there are elements 
of the previous shot or the upcoming shot which are pervading the image. (All of this is 
complemented by the quotidian sounds of Rome’s streets, such as sirens, bells, and barely 
audible conversations.) The screen remains devoid of movement, even though it is constantly 
changing—and (contra Rodowick) the same could be said of the digital process that produces 
it.
11
  
 
                                                 
9
 Translation by Jon Jost, e-mail to author, November 16, 2011. 
10
 Jon Jost, “Muri Romani,” http://www.jon-jost.com/work/muri.html. A similar process was used to create Jost’s 
strikingly beautiful static landscape film Canyon (1970), comprised of several shots of the Grand Canyon. 
11
 Jost has indicated his intention to make a much lengthier version of Muri Romani, one that would use 1,000 stills 
and last over eight hours. Ibid. 
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Figure 1: Jon Jost, Muri Romani (Roman Walls) (1999-2000) 
 
 One of the ironies of Muri Romani is the fact that, while the walls are decaying, the film 
stock is not. No matter how many times the work is screened, its digital ontology ensures that 
each viewing will be identical—the film will not undergo the entropic degradation that Rome’s 
walls have clearly been the victim of. Absent are the discolorations and splotches that invariably 
intrude on the celluloid image (not to mention the specks of dust that so enthralled John Cage 
during his viewing of Zen for Film). The film has become visually “perfect.” This is not a value 
judgment. In fact, for many filmmakers and theorists, this perfection is precisely the problem 
with digital film. For example, Babette Mangolte finds digital cinema to be “too perfect,” even 
suggesting that “this perfection distracts from its credibility.”12 However, as Nicholas Rombes 
has pointed out, this perfection has also prompted many digital filmmakers “to reassert 
imperfection, flaws, an aura of human mistakes to counterbalance the logic of perfection that 
pervades the digital.”13 And this is the paradox at the core of Muri Romani. As the graffiti in the 
                                                 
12
 Mangolte, 273. 
13
 Nicholas Rombes, Cinema in the Digital Age (London: Wallflower Press, 2009), 2. Italics in original. A useful 
example of this reassertion of imperfection is provided by Lev Manovich. He notes how the synthesis of reality and 
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opening shot implies, the film is interested in exploring both termination and continuation. The 
dream of cinematic indexicality is over, but the illusions that this indexicality produced continue 
to assert their presence in digital form. The walls themselves are decrepit and decaying—they 
will eventually be torn down or replaced. But their representations in Muri Romani will live on; 
they will not decay, no matter how many times the film is screened or copied.
14
  
 I certainly sympathize with cinephiles like Mangolte who prefer the pulsations and 
imperfections of celluloid to the sanitized crispness of digital film—in much the way that I 
sympathize with audiophiles who eschew iPods and CD players in favor of vinyl records, in spite 
of (or perhaps because of) their “imperfect” scratches and pops. But there is also something 
tantalizing about digital cinema—its liberation from photographic indexicality creates a 
multiplicity of new aesthetic possibilities, and its “purity” of image is often absorbing, even 
sublime. Additionally, as a film like Muri Romani makes clear, digital film can make substantive 
and compelling contributions to the cinema of stasis. Film can now be stripped not only of the 
movement of the camera and elements within the mise-en-scène, but even of the suggestion of 
movement provided by the emulsion of the film grain. For the first time, it is possible for a static 
film to be perceptually indistinguishable from a photograph. Mangolte suggests that such 
advances have come at a price: namely, she claims that, without the emulsion grain, without the 
shutter, without the rhythmic pulsations of the film stock, digital film is “unable to establish and 
construct an experiential sense of time passing.”15 But I would argue that digital film simply 
constructs an alternate experience of time passing, one which is free of the temporal signposts 
                                                                                                                                                             
computer-generated images in Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park (1993) was only successful because the film’s CGI 
elements were consciously “degraded”: “their perfection had to be diluted to match the imperfection of the film’s 
graininess.” See Manovich, 202. 
14
 This is at least true in principle, although in practice, as Manovich usefully points out, the transmission of digital 
media often involves lossy compression, which can result in “loss of data, degradation, and noise.” See Manovich, 
54-55.  
15
 Mangolte, 263. 
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that cineastes have become so accustomed to. After all, it is not as if time no longer seems to 
pass when viewing a digital film—even one as static as Muri Romani. Rather, the movements 
that permit the experience of temporal flow are no longer those of the traditional 
cinematographic apparatus, but those of consciousness itself. Barthesian duration continues to 
unfold, Bergson’s snowball continues to roll—and this is why a cinematic spectator always 
experiences the passing of time. 
 However, it should be emphasized that cinema—even when it is static—can offer a vast 
array of temporal experiences. When watching a furniture film, time is malleable and 
dispersed—the work’s temporal coordinates are molded and partitioned by the spectator. In 
protracted films, time seems to grind to a halt, only to proceed at a radically decelerated rate, one 
that offers perceptual access to microtime. In textual films, temporality is generally rigidly 
structured, resulting in disparate cadences that can be swift and disorienting or lethargic and 
alienating. And in monochrome films, temporal signposts become the province of the sound 
track or the moving emulsion grain (when these elements are present)—or else, such signposts 
disappear altogether, leaving only naked duration in their wake. As the existence of these diverse 
modalities of static cinema makes clear, movement’s place in the ontology and phenomenology 
of film has been grossly over-stated. Movement—whether actual or potential—is not a necessary 
condition of cinema, but a contingent one. In the words of Raymond Bellour, “[I]t isn’t 
movement that defines most profoundly the cinema […] it is time.”16 
                                                 
16
 Raymond Bellour, “The Pensive Spectator” (trans. Lynne Kirby), in Campany, The Cinematic, 122. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE CINEMA OF STASIS 
1 in 10. Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, date unknown. 
1 to 60 Seconds. Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1973. 
5 Year Drive-By. Dir. Douglas Gordon. UK, 1995. 
8h01-8h11. Dir. Gottfried Schlemmer. Austria, 1968. 
9  Minutes. Dir. James Riddle. USA, 1966. 
10 Feet. Dir. George Maciunas. USA, 1966. 
12! Big Names! Dir. George Maciunas. USA, 1975. 
13 Lakes. Dir. James Benning. USA, 2004. 
24 Hour Psycho. Dir. Douglas Gordon. UK, 1993. 
1000  Frames. Dir. George Maciunas. USA, 1966. 
2068 Schatzi. Dir. Kurt Kren. Austria, 1968. 
3175 Asyl. Dir. Kurt Kren. Austria, 1975. 
5262 Washington Boulevard. Dir. Mark Lewis. Canada, 2008. 
Academic Still Life (Cézanne). Dir. Malcolm Le Grice. UK, 1977. 
Angel. Dir. Joseph Cornell. USA, 1957. 
Anima. Dir. Bill Viola. USA, 2000. 
The Anticoncept (L’Anticoncept). Dir. Gil Wolman. France, 1951. 
Argument. Dirs. Anthony McCall and Andrew Tyndall. USA, 1978.  
Band of Ninja (Ninja bugei-cho). Dir. Nagisa Ôshima. Japan, 1967. 
The Blind Spot (La tache aveugle). Dir. James Coleman. France, 1978-1990. 
Blow Job. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1964. 
Blue. Dir. Derek Jarman. UK, 1993. 
157 
 
 
 
Boom. Dir. David Claerbout. Belgium, 1996. 
Breach. Dir. Sam Taylor-Wood. UK, 2001. 
Canyon. Dir. Jon Jost. USA, 1970. 
Carrots and Peas. Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1969. 
A Casing Shelved. Dir. Michael Snow. Canada, 1970. 
Centers. Dir. Vito Acconci. USA, 1971. 
Le corbeau et le renard (The Fox and the Crow). Dir. Marcel Broodthaers. Belgium, 1967. 
Dead Movie (aka Projection Piece). Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1968. 
Deux Devises & Onomatopoeia. Dir. Stan Douglas. Canada, 1983-1986. 
Disappearing Music for Face. Dirs. George Maciunas & Mieko Shiomi. USA, 1966. 
Dolorosa. Dir. Bill Viola. USA, 2000. 
Dripping Water. Dirs. Michael Snow & Joyce Weiland. Canada, 1969. 
Eat. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1963. 
Empire. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1964. 
End After Nine. Dir. George Maciunas. USA, 1966. 
Entrance to Exit. Dir. George Brecht. USA, 1965. 
Eureka. Dir. Ernie Gehr. USA, 1974. 
Eye Blink. Dir. Yoko Ono. USA, 1966. 
Film in Which There Appear Edge Lettering, Sprocket Holes, Dirt Particles, Etc. Dir. George 
 Landow. USA, 1966. 
Film No. 5 (Smile). Dirs. John Lennon and Yoko Ono. UK, 1968. 
Five: Dedicated to Ozu. Dir. Abbas Kiarostami. Iran, 2003. 
Five O’Clock in the Morning. Dir. Pieter Vanderbeck. USA, 1966. 
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Fog Line. Dir. Larry Gottheim. Canada, 1970. 
Gellért. Dir. Tacita Dean. UK, 1998. 
Haircut. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1964. 
Hermes Bird. Dir. James Broughton. USA, 1979. 
Heterodyne. Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1967. 
Hôtel Monterey. Dir. Chantal Akerman. USA, 1972. 
Howls for Sade (Hurlements en faveur de Sade). Dir. Guy Debord. France, 1952. 
If I Had Four Dromedaries. Dir. Chris Marker. France, 1966. 
I See Nothing, I Hear Nothing, I Say Nothing (Je ne vois rien, je n'entends rien, je ne dis 
 rien). Dir. Ben Vautier. USA, 1966. 
Island. Dir. Fiona Tan. Sweden, 2008. 
La Jetée (The Jetty). Dir. Chris Marker. France, 1962. 
Kindergarten Antonio Sant’Elia, 1932. Dir. David Claerbout. Belgium, 1998. 
Kiss. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1963. 
Knackered. Dir. Sam Taylor-Wood. UK, 1996. 
The Last Century. Dir. Sam Taylor-Wood. UK, 2005. 
A Lecture. Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1968. 
Lemon (For Robert Huot). Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1969. 
Letters, Notes. Dir. Stephanie Barber. USA, 2000. 
Letter to Jane: An Investigation About a Still. Dirs. Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin 
 France, 1972. 
Line Describing a Cone. Dir. Anthony McCall. USA, 1973. 
A Little Death. Dir. Sam Taylor-Wood. UK, 2002. 
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A Little Phantasy on a Nineteenth-Century Painting. Dir. Norman McLaren. Canada, 1946. 
Long Film for Ambient Light. Dir. Anthony McCall. USA, 1975. 
Ma (Intervals). Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1972. 
The Man We Want to Hang. Dir. Kenneth Anger. USA, 1995-2002. 
Muri Romani. Dir. Jon Jost. USA, 1999-2000. 
New York Near Sleep For Saski. Dir. Peter Hutton. USA, 1972. 
Notions of Silence (1-5). Dir. Johnnie Lawson. Ireland, 2010. 
On a Most Beautiful Meadow. Dir. Peter von Guten. Switzerland, 1968. 
One  (Match). Dir. Yoko Ono. USA, 1966. 
One Frame Duration. Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1977. 
One Second in Montreal. Dir. Michael Snow. Canada, 1969. 
Parallel. Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1974. 
Pietà. Dir. Sam Taylor-Wood. UK, 2001. 
Plague Summer. Dir. Chester Kessler. USA, 1951. 
Poetic Justice. Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1972. 
Production Stills. Dir. Morgan Fisher. USA, 1970. 
Projection Instructions. Dir. Morgan Fisher. USA, 1976. 
Queensway: Pan and Zoom. Dir. Mark Lewis. Canada, 2005. 
The Quiet Shore. Dir. David Claerbout. Belgium, 2011. 
Red/Green. Dir. Dan McLaughlin. USA, 1985. 
Red Stockings. Dir. Robert Huot. USA, 1969. 
Reflecting Sunset. Dir. David Claerbout. Belgium, 2003. 
Screen Tests. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1964-1966. 
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Secondary Currents. Dir. Peter Rose. USA, 1982. 
See You Later/Au Revoir. Dir. Michael Snow. Canada, 1990. 
Serene Velocity. Dir. Ernie Gehr. USA, 1970. 
Side Seat Paintings Slides Sound Film. Dir. Michael Snow. Canada, 1970. 
Sixty-Minute Silence. Dir. Gillian Wearing. UK, 1996. 
Skagafjördur. Dir. Peter Hutton. USA, 2002-2004. 
Sleep. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1963. 
Smoking. Dir. Joe Jones. USA, 1970. 
Soft Rain. Dir. Ken Jacobs. USA, 1968. 
So Is This. Dir. Michael Snow. Canada, 1982. 
Song 12. Dir. Stan Brakhage. USA, 1965. 
Song 27: My Mountain. Dir. Stan Brakhage. USA, 1968. 
Sound Distance of a Good Man. Dir. Robert Longo. USA, 1978. 
Still Life. Dir. Bruce Baillie. USA, 1966. 
Still Life. Dir. Sam Taylor-Wood. UK, 2001. 
Study for a Portrait (Violetta). Dir. David Claerbout. Belgium, 2001.  
Sunset. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1967. 
Tambours du jugement premier (Drums of the First Judgment). François Dufrêne. France, 
 1952. 
Teatro Amazonas. Dir. Sharon Lockhart. USA, 1999. 
the ten mark. Dir. Joe Sheehan. UK, 2010. 
Ten Skies. Dir. James Benning. USA, 2004. 
Tree Movie. Dir. Jackson Mac Low. USA, 1961. 
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A Voyage on the North Sea (Un voyage en mer du nord). Dir. Marcel Broodthaers. Belgium, 
 1973-1974. 
Warhol Bible. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, unfinished. 
Wavelength. Dir. Michael Snow. Canada/USA, 1967. 
Weekend (Wochenende). Dir. Walter Ruttmann. Germany, 1930. 
Zen for Film. Dir. Nam June Paik. USA, 1962-1964.
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APPENDIX 2: FILMS RELEVANT TO UNDERSTANDING THE CINEMA OF STASIS 
 
1165 Bild Helga Philipp. Dir. Kurt Kren. Austria, 1965. 
3778 Tree Again. Dir. Kurt Kren. Austria, 1978. 
3879 Sentimental Punk. Dir. Kurt Kren. Austria, 1979. 
The Act of Seeing with One’s Own Eyes. Dir. Stan Brakhage. USA, 1971. 
Adebar. Dir. Peter Kubelka. Austria, 1957. 
The Angelic Conversation. Dir. Derek Jarman. UK, 1985. 
Apotheosis. Dirs. John Lennon and Yoko Ono. UK, 1970. 
Arnulf Rainer. Dir. Peter Kubelka. Austria, 1958-1960. 
Around Five. Dir. Abbas Kiarostami. Iran, 2005. 
Bad Burns. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1982. 
Ballet Mécanique. Dirs. Fernand Léger and Dudley Murphy. France, 1924. 
Blink. Dir. John Cavanaugh. USA, 1966. 
Blonde Cobra. Dir. Ken Jacobs. USA, 1963. 
Bleu Shut. Dir. Robert Nelson. USA, 1971. 
La Chambre. Dir. Chantal Akerman. USA, 1972. 
Chinese Series. Dir. Stan Brakhage. USA, 2003. 
Closed Vision. Dir. Marc’O. USA/France, 1954. 
Critical Mass. Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1971. 
Critique of Separation (Critique de la séparation). Dir. Guy Debord. France, 1961. 
Cross Cut: A Blue Movie. Dir. Robert Huot. USA, 1969. 
The Dante Quartet. Dir. Stan Brakhage. USA, 1987. 
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Doppelprojection I-IV. Dirs. Birgit and Wilhelm Hein. Germany, 1971-1972. 
Film about a Woman who… Dir. Yvonne Rainer. USA, 1974. 
Filmmakers. Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1966-1970. 
Film No. 4 (Bottoms). Dir. Yoko Ono. USA, 1966. 
The Flicker. Dir. Tony Conrad. USA, 1965. 
Le gai savoir (The Joy of Knowledge). Dir. Jean-Luc Godard. France, 1969. 
Gently Down the Stream. Dir. Su Friedrich. USA, 1981. 
Gloria! Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1979. 
God is Dog Spelled Backwards. Dir. Dan McLaughlin. USA, 1967. 
The Great Society. Dir. Fred Mogubgub. USA, 1967? 
The Greeting. Dir. Bill Viola. USA, 1995. 
Guy Debord: His Art and His Time (Guy Debord, son art, son temps). Dirs. Guy Debord and 
 Brigitte Cornand. France, 1994. 
Là-haut sur ces montagnes. Dir. Norman McLaren. Canada, 1945. 
Henry Geldzahler. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1964. 
The Human Face is a Monument. Dir. Stan Vanderbeek. USA, 1965. 
In the Penal Colony. Dir. Dan McLaughlin. USA, 2003. 
Into Great Silence. Dir. Philip Gröning. Germany, 2005. 
Jeanne Dielman, 23 quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles. Dir. Chantal Akerman. France, 1975. 
Je tu il elle. Dir. Chantal Akerman. France, 1974. 
Lunch Break. Dir. Sharon Lockhart. USA, 2009. 
Manhatta. Dirs. Charles Sheeler and Paul Strand. USA, 1921. 
Man with a Movie Camera. Dir. Dziga Vertov. Soviet Union, 1929. 
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(nostalgia). Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1971. 
A Movie. Dir. Bruce Conner. USA, 1958. 
Object Lesson. Dir. Christopher Baughman Young. USA, 1941. 
On the Passage of a Few Persons Through a Rather Brief Unity of Time (Sur le passage de 
 quelques personnes à travers une assez courte unité de temps). Dir. Guy Debord. France, 
 1959. 
Paul Swan. Dir. Andy Warhol. USA, 1965. 
Palindrome. Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1969. 
Phi Phenomenon. Dir. Morgan Fisher. USA, 1968. 
Piece Mandala/End War. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1966. 
Poemfield No. 2. Dir. Stan Vanderbeek. USA, 1966. 
Police Car. Dir. John Cale. USA, 1966. 
Pond Scum, One Line. Dir. Mark Lewis. Canada, 2010. 
La Poulette Grise (The Grey Chicken). Dir. Norman McLaren. Canada, 1947. 
The Pressures of the Text. Dir. Peter Rose. USA, 1983. 
Ray Gun Virus. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1966. 
… Reel Five. Dir. Stan Brakhage. USA, 1999. 
Refutation of All the Judgements, Pro or Con, Thus Far Rendered on the Film The Society of the 
 Spectacle (Réfutation de tous les judgements, tant élogieux qu’hostiles, qui ont été 
 jusqu’ici portés sur le film La Société du spectacle). Dir. Guy Debord. France, 1975. 
Remembrance of Things to Come (Le souvenir d'un avenir). Dirs. Yannick Bellon and Chris 
 Marker. France, 2001. 
Sears Catalogue 1-3. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1965. 
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See Saw Seams. Dir. Stan Vanderbeek. USA, 1966. 
Shutter. Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1971. 
Sirius Remembered. Dir. Stan Brakhage. USA, 1959. 
Snowblind. Dir. Hollis Frampton. USA, 1968. 
Society of the Spectacle (La Société du spectacle). Dir. Guy Debord. France, 1973. 
Still. Dir. Ernie Gehr. USA, 1971. 
Television Delivers People. Dirs. Richard Serra & Carlotta Schoolman. USA, 1973. 
Third Beach 1. Dir. Mark Lewis. Canada, 2010. 
T, O, U, C, H, I, N, G. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1968. 
Treatise on Venom and Eternity (Traité de Bave et d'Éternité). Dir. Isidore Isou. France, 1951. 
Unrolling Event. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1965. 
Views from Home. Dir. Guy Sherwin. UK, 2005. 
We Turn in the Night, Consumed by Fire (In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni). Dir. Guy 
 Debord. France, 1978. 
White Calligraphy. Dir. Takahiko Iimura. Japan, 1967. 
Word Movie. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1966. 
Wrist Trick. Dir. Paul Sharits. USA, 1965.
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 Since cinema’s inception, there has been much disagreement among film theorists about 
the role of movement in cinema’s ontology. For example, while Rudolf Arnheim has argued that 
motion is a sine qua non of cinema, Roland Barthes has insisted that motion is not as central to 
cinema’s ontology as duration, an experiential “unfolding.” In this dissertation, I argue—
following Barthes—that movement is merely a contingent, not a necessary, condition of cinema. 
I further suggest that the very enterprise of prescribing necessary conditions of cinema is 
myopic, reductive, and reactionary.   
 In supporting these claims, I interrogate the cinema of stasis, a modality of avant-garde 
films which feature little or no movement. By foregrounding stillness, these films often blur the 
lines between cinema and other art forms, including photography, painting, and literature. Giving 
especially close attention to films by Andy Warhol, Fluxus, Michael Snow, and Derek Jarman, I 
explore the aesthetic and affective valences of cinematic stasis, while drawing attention to the 
numerous ways that static films broaden our conception of what films can be and do. 
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